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EUROPE FROM WATERLOO TO SARAJEVO

EUROPE FROM WATERLOO TO SARAJEVO

A SKETCH OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

BY PERCY ASHLEY, C.B.

WITH A SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER BY

HARRY ELMER BARNES

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PREFACE

THE hundred years which began with the assembling of the Congress of Vienna were inaugurated by an attempt to create a Concert of Europe; they witnessed the realisation, in large measure, though not completely, of the nationalist aspirations of the disunited and subject races of Europe, the steady growth of democracy and representative institutions, a broad widening of popular education, an unparalleled development of industry and trade and a revolution in the means of transport, with the ever-increasing economic interdependence of the nations, and a widening range of international co-operation; and they ended in the most far-reaching and most disastrous war the world has seen. The decisive period in the history of Europe during those hundred years was the decade from 1861 to 1871; thereafter nationalism largely changed its character, industrial and commercial rivalry became the chief manifestation of national ambitions and spread throughout the world, and racialism began to manifest itself. In the first half of the century statesmen could call into being, or at least could guide, forces whereby the map of Europe in 1815 was greatly changed; in the second half of the century, and especially in its last five-and-twenty years, they were driven by forces which they had not evoked and could do little to direct or restrain. The present work is an attempt to sketch this movement of a hundred years; and having regard to its purpose and narrow compass much detail has necessarily been omitted, and some developments of great interest in themselves have been touched upon only very lightly or altogether left aside.

The Book has already been published in England under

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another title. In the present (American) Edition, a number of corrections (typographical and other) have been made and some phrases modified, and I desire to express my indebtedness to Professor Langer, of Clark University, in this matter.

The Publishers of this American Edition have thought it desirable that the original work should be enlarged by the addition of a chapter on the immediate causes of the World War of 1914–1918. That chapter is by Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, who is solely responsible for the statements made and the opinions expressed therein. Differences of opinion between historians are probably always unavoidable, and their likelihood is increased with the nearness of the events related to the writers' own times. In the present case it is necessary to say that the writer of the original work dissociates himself completely from, and in some cases disagrees entirely with, the conclusions set out by Professor Barnes—conclusions, both as to facts and as to their interpretation, which seem to him to attach exaggerated importance to incidents and personalities the influence of which was only superficial. It is unfortunately especially necessary to emphasise this disagreement as regards Professor Barnes's presentation of British policy, which appears to be based in important particulars on an incomplete appreciation of the facts and their true significance.

PERCY ASHLEY

London,
July, 1925.

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CHAPTER I

The Congress of Vienna and the Europe of 1815

The Congress of Vienna, which began to assemble in September, 1814, had as its primary purpose the elaboration of the arrangements made by the Treaties signed at Paris in the previous May and June between France on the one hand and the Powers leagued against her (the United Kingdom, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) on the other, for the re-distribution of the territories to be surrendered by France, and the establishment thereby of a lasting balance of power in Europe. But inasmuch as all the Powers which had taken part in the Napoleonic Wars on either side were invited to attend the Congress, which was to be on a scale and of a scope unequalled hitherto in European history, great and varied expectations were popularly formed as to its achievements. Some of these were purely selfish, as in the case of the numerous petty rulers (ecclesiastical as well as lay) whom Napoleon had dispossessed; others were disinterested and humanitarian, as the British desire for joint action against the Slave Trade and the general hope that means would be found for securing a lasting peace. Few of these expectations were shared by the small group of monarchs and statesmen who had convened the Congress and were determined to keep its direction in their own hands—Alexander I. of Russia, with his curious set of advisers, mostly non-Russian, such as Stein, Capo d'Istrias, and Pozzo di Borgo; Francis I. of Austria, with Metternich; Frederick William III. of Prussia, with the not very effective Hardenburg; and the

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demands especially of the Prussian generals. France had to pay a substantial though not oppressive indemnity and the cost of the armies of occupation; but these were entirely withdrawn in little more than three years, and the fact that Napoleon had left her free from debt made it easy for her to discharge the financial obligations laid upon her by the Allies. Materially she had suffered during more than twenty years of war less than any of the Allies, except the United Kingdom, but she had lost heavily in population, her trade had been shattered, and her industries, in spite of strenuous official encouragement during the Napoleonic régime, had made little real progress. Her economic interests were overwhelmingly agricultural, and despite a well-developed urban life only about one-fifteenth of her population dwelt in towns having more than twenty thousand inhabitants. The Revolution had changed legal and proprietary relationships throughout rural France, and the great estates of princes, nobles, and the Church had become national property and been sold in part. But relatively little of these lands had passed to the peasantry; by 1820 something like one-half of the estates which had belonged to the old nobility had reverted in one way or another to the original owners, whilst the remainder and the Church estates had been acquired by the new nobility created by Napoleon from the ranks of successful generals, lawyers, and financiers. But beneath this the actual structure of rural life had changed little, and the same was true of agricultural methods and products, so that it could be said, even a full generation after 1815, that a thirteenth-century peasant revisiting French farms would find in many instances little that would be new to him.

France under Louis XVIII. retained the social organisation given to her by the Revolution, and the highly centralised administrative, judicial, financial and educa-

tional systems devised by Napoleon; an acute critic has observed that by 1815 she had become, what she remained a century later, a democratic society directed by a centralised bureaucracy. But the form and spirit of her central government remained undetermined—more than three-quarters of a century were to elapse, and four revolutions were to take place, before stability was attained. Under pressure from the British and Russian governments Louis XVIII. granted a charter which established a parliamentary monarchy on the British model, with a very restricted franchise based on a high assessment for taxation, but the conditions of political life were greatly affected by the return of Napoleon and the royalist reaction after Waterloo. The Imperialists, though overthrown, were still numerous and were joined by the old republicans, who resented the loss of territory and the Allied occupation, regarded the Bourbons as the mere creatures of France's enemies, and feared that the Restoration would bring the re-establishment of many of the old feudal privileges and exactions. Their fears found some excuse in the claims of the extreme royalists, the "Ultras," led by the King's brother and heir, in the repressive laws directed against those who had supported Napoleon during the Hundred Days, and in the violence of royalist mobs in the south. The King himself was in sympathy with the moderates, and sought to draw his ministers from their ranks, but the first parliament was more royalist than the monarch, and it was not until after its dissolution in September, 1816, that a legislature to the King's liking was obtained.

On the east of Europe lay the vast Russian Empire, which in the north had acquired Finland from Sweden and in the south Bessarabia from Turkey; it covered more than two million square miles. On the west it was bounded from north to south by Sweden, the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, Prussia, the Austrian dominions, and the Otto-

man Empire, being separated from this last by the line of the river Pruth and the northern mouths of the Danube; on the extreme east it stretched across northern Asia to the Pacific. The northern limit was set by the Arctic Ocean; the southern limits were the Black Sea, the Caucasus (Georgia had been conquered in 1802 and some Persian territory on the west of the Caspian in 1813), and an indeterminate line from the Caspian eastward to Lake Baikal and thence to Kamschatka. The part of this southern frontier which separated Russia from Western Turkestan, with its independent khanates, was gradually to be pushed forward from 1822 onwards; the advance of the eastern portion of the line was not to commence until a quarter of a century later.

The immense territories comprised within these boundaries had no homogeneity. Two parts enjoyed a substantial autonomy. One was Finland, where the Russian Emperor was Grand Duke, with its peasant population of Finns and its middle and upper classes of Swedish descent, its parliament, its special code of laws and courts, its separate customs tariff, its distinct coinage. The other was the kingdom of Poland, the cause of the fiercest diplomatic conflict at the Congress of Vienna and of the Emperor Alexander's greatest disappointment. He had dreamed of an autonomous kingdom which should include the Napoleonic grand-duchy of Warsaw and the old Polish territories, a far greater area, which Russia had acquired in the partitions of the eighteenth century; of this new realm he would be monarch and from him it would receive a liberal constitution. But his plan was strongly and successfully opposed by Austria and Prussia, who feared that its realisation would maintain, and indeed stimulate, disaffection among their own Polish subjects, and met with little sympathy from Castlereagh, who was anxious to strengthen Prussia and keep Russia as weak as possible

in central Europe. So the idea was perforce dropped, but of the grand-duchy of Warsaw there was made a kingdom bound to Russia only dynastically and having a definite constitution, a parliament, and its own separate administration. The dominant class was the very numerous body of nobles, who alone held the land; the mass of the people were peasants, freed from serfdom but landless; but the population was increasing rapidly and Poland was already entering upon that course of economic progress and industrial development which during the next century was to distinguish her markedly from the rest of the Russian Empire. In the west of European Russia on the Baltic lay the province of Lithuania, including White Russia, where the population was mainly of the orthodox faith and spoke Russian, and a Lithuanian region, where Catholicism was the general creed and some of the inhabitants spoke their ancient language whilst the upper classes spoke Polish and counted themselves of the Polish race. The other Baltic provinces, Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, had been gradually Germanised; the upper classes and the townsfolk were the descendants of German colonists, and spoke German, while the peasants spoke their native languages; all classes alike professed the Lutheran faith. In the extreme south, in Bessarabia, the people were largely Rumanians, with an admixture of Polish Jews; the territories to the east, conquered in the eighteenth century from Turkey, were inhabited by Asiatic races intermixed with German and Russian colonists; the frontier country of the Caucasus was occupied by a variety of small races, such as the Christian Armenians and the Mohammedan Circassians. To the east of the Volga there was a mingling of Russian and Asiatic peoples, partly Orthodox and partly Mohammedan, whilst still further east Siberia was as yet only a land of isolated Russian colonies. All these territories and the old Polish provinces were, however, but the fringes of the Rus-

sian empire; its real strength lay in Great Russia, stretching from the confines of old Poland to the Volga, with its pure Russian population of Orthodox faith, and its centre at Moscow, and in Little Russia (the Ukraine) with its distinct dialect and a variety of religious creeds, though orthodoxy was predominant.

This Russian empire (excluding Finland, the Baltic provinces and Poland) was essentially an eastern state upon which certain western institutions had been imposed from above, without appreciably affecting the spirit of the government, the habits and thoughts of the people, or the economic structure of society. The population was divided into a relatively small, though actually numerous, highly privileged class of landowning nobles, from whom the officers of the army and the administration were recruited, and the peasants, serfs of the crown or of the nobles and in a state of complete legal and economic dependence, utterly ignorant and poverty-stricken. The middle class, already playing so important a part in western Europe, hardly existed in Russia; the clergy were of peasant stock and of a scarcely higher level of intelligence. Russia was essentially an agricultural country, but had already in 1815 entered upon that policy of extreme and comprehensive protection which was to characterise her for the next century. The Emperor was an autocrat, restrained only by a bureaucracy which was highly centralised, largely uncontrolled, and, like all Eastern administrations, leisurely, arbitrary, inefficient and corrupt. Public opinion there was none.

The Holy Roman Empire, the sole though for centuries merely formal bond between the bewildering variety of kingdoms, ecclesiastical and other electorates, and principalities of all degrees of significance and insignificance into which Germany was divided in the eighteenth century, had come to an end in 1806; and for part of it Napoleon had substituted the Confederation of the Rhine, from which Austria

and Prussia were excluded. When after his downfall the task of reorganisation had to be undertaken, there were a few statesmen who desired the effective confederation of all the German states, and there was some body of opinion, mostly academic, which even hoped that in such a confederation representative institutions might find a place. But all such projects were doomed to failure by the unwillingness of each of the leading states—Austria and Prussia—to yield the leadership of Germany to the other, and by the particularism of the rulers of the smaller states, who would surrender no particle of their authority to any central government. So all that was done was to form a loose Confederation of the thirty-eight states to which Napoleon's sweeping changes had reduced the previous multitude (the ecclesiastical states were not restored, and the claims of the mediatised princes were ignored by the Congress of Vienna), and Austria was given the presidency. The chief federal obligation of the members was not to enter into any alliance with a foreign state against the Confederation or any of its members. A Diet, composed of plenipotentiaries of the various state governments, was to frame fundamental laws, but never did so, and was, in fact, from the first utterly futile. The rulers of Austria and Prussia were members of the Confederation only in respect of the German portions of their territories; the kings of the Netherlands and Denmark were members in virtue of their duchies of Luxemburg and Holstein respectively; the King of Great Britain and Ireland was a member as king of Hanover. Bavaria was of substantial importance, but the kingdom of Saxony was weakened by the loss of two-fifths of its territory to Prussia, and all the other states were small, and the future of the Confederation depended entirely upon the relations between Prussia and Austria.

In both those states and in Saxony, Hesse, and some of the northern principalities the government was absolutist,

the monarchs and their ministers were unchecked by any representative institutions, and the rights of the subjects were at the arbitrary will of the rulers. In other of the northern states, as for instance Hanover and Mecklenburg, there were assemblies of the "Estates," convoked from time to time and enjoying certain rights of control so long as they did not come into acute conflict with the prince and his ministers. Only in the southern states was there constitutional government based on definite laws and with representative institutions established or about to be so—the first to enter on this path were the kingdom of Würtemberg and the grand-duchy of Saxe-Weimar, to be followed in 1820 by Bavaria, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt. Political life was, however, nowhere active, and political experience entirely lacking outside official circles.

Germany as a whole was predominantly agricultural, and remained so during more than half the nineteenth century. The emancipation of the peasants had commenced before 1789, particularly on the crown lands, but elsewhere little progress had been made. The west and south-German peasant was not badly-off, when viewed from either the legal or economic standpoint, but in the eastern provinces of Prussia—in the region of great estates—the peasants' conditions were far worse than those of the same class in pre-Revolutionary France. In both west and east the entirely landless inhabitant of the country district was rare, but whereas in the west custom had mitigated law and the peasant-holder was practically secure in his holding, and services were as a rule not burdensome, in the east these were heavy and servile and tenure was still in fact, as in law, at the will of the lord. The legislation of Baron von Stein in 1807 had laid only the basis of reform in this matter. The towns played a relatively small part in German life; the twelve largest cities of the German Empire of 1914 had a century earlier a combined population of

less than three-quarters of a million. The "continental system" of Napoleon had ruined most of the industries which the fostering care of the "enlightened" princes of the eighteenth century had laboriously built up; the existence of a number of small states with separate fiscal systems and customs tariffs, the splitting-up of the larger states into widely-dispersed groups of territories, and the diversity of legislation, all checked the growth of commerce and impeded the development of large-scale industry.

In the territorial redistribution made at Vienna Prussia had acquired a substantial part of the kingdom of Saxony, the larger portion of the territory ceded by France on the left bank of the Rhine, Westphalia and Swedish Pomerania (this by a very advantageous exchange with Denmark); she had also recovered much of her Polish territory (the province of Posen, with Danzig and Thorn). She had become predominant in northern Germany, largely through the support given by Castlereagh to her claims, and had replaced Austria as the guardian of Germany on the west. But her territories were still divided by the kingdom of Hanover and a number of smaller states into two distinct groups, and between the eastern and western portions there was a sharp difference of religious creeds (the older territories, except the Polish parts, were Lutheran, the new accretions were Catholic), of law and administrative organisation, and of economic interests.

The Austrian realm was in some respects stronger than at any date since the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War. The Hapsburg emperor had given up his possessions in the Netherlands, though the great majority of his former subjects there would have preferred the restoration of Austrian rule to the compulsory union with Holland, and had found compensation in the acquisition of Venetia and Lombardy—an obvious strategic gain. Apart from this area the territories of the Austrian emperor fell into four

great groups. There were the "hereditary states of Austria," consisting of the original arch-duchy and later additions, predominantly German in population and language, except in the southern districts, such as Carniola, part of Styria and Carinthia, and Istria where the inhabitants (Slovenes) were of Slav stock, and at Trieste where, as in the other towns of the Adriatic lands, Italian was the chief language. Secondly, there were the "countries attached to the Bohemian crown," Bohemia itself, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia; there the population was overwhelmingly Czech, though there were many Germans in the towns and the north-western corner of Bohemia was entirely Germanised. Thirdly, there was the kingdom of Galicia, to which Bukovina was attached; the first had a population entirely Slav, but divided into Poles (Catholics) in the west, and Ruthenes (Catholics, but with a special ritual and a married priesthood) in the east, whilst the people of Bukovina were in origin Rumanian. Finally, there were the group of "states attached to the crown of St. Stephen"—Hungary with its Magyar population but numerous German colonies, and in the north-west a Slav race (the Slovaks) on the Moravian frontier; Transylvania, inhabited chiefly by a Rumanian peasantry (Orthodox) under the dominance of Maygars, and with some German settlements; and Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, where the population was mainly Croat but Italians were numerous in the towns and there were many Serb refugees in the lands adjacent to the Ottoman Empire. Slavs of one or another race constituted the majority of the subjects of the Hapsburg monarchy, but they were divided into two great groups of the north and south, sundered by a broad belt of the dominant races—Germans on the west and Magyars on the east. The sole bond of union between the various territories, with their diverse nationalities, civili-

sations and creeds, was the person of the monarch; the government, both of Hungary (which was administratively separate) and of the rest of the empire, was essentially autocratic, with a highly-centralised bureaucracy, though there were special ministries or councils for various portions of the realm; some local provincial assemblies existed, but had little real power. The Germans and Magyars were mutually antagonistic, though animated by a common hostility to their Slav fellow-subjects; but the nationalist movements which later played so fateful a part were not yet active. It must be added here that Cracow, on the Galicia-Poland frontier, had been left by the Congress a Free City, and became a focus of Polish agitation.

In the west Holland and Belgium had been united by the Congress of Vienna under the House of Orange. The primary object was the restraint of France, and the plan was in accordance with the policy of Castlereagh and in pursuance of the aims of Pitt; but it was doomed from the first. The Belgians, both Walloons and Flemings, were Catholic, the Dutch were Protestant; Belgium was already largely industrial (she has been described by a recent economic historian as "the one country in Europe which kept pace industrially with England in the first half of the nineteenth century"), though with a broad agricultural basis, Holland was essentially agricultural and commercial and derived great wealth from her overseas possessions, especially Java and Sumatra; the two parts of the monarchy differed in race, language and historical traditions. No one of these differences was in itself a decisive obstacle to effective union, but the cumulative effect was almost insuperable. The constitution of the united realm was fairly liberal—too much so for the influential clerical party in Belgium, which resented the liberty of worship which it gave; but in the parliament Belgium, with its larger population, had only equal

representation with Holland, Belgians had an insignificant share in the ministerial and administrative offices, the Dutch language was obligatory for all official purposes.

Of the Scandinavian countries Sweden (which had ceded Finland to Russia), and Norway (ceded by Denmark in 1814) had been brought into personal union under Bernadotte—an ill-matched union which lasted with constant friction for some ninety years and then was quietly dissolved. From 1815 onward these two countries stood almost entirely aloof from the general movement of European politics, as did also Denmark, to which the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were attached in a personal union, except in so far as the realm became for a time a centre of diplomatic intrigue because of the duchies and the conflict between Prussia and Austria of which they were the occasion rather than the cause. The two northern kingdoms had constitutional governments. In Sweden the king could take no action without the advice of the council of state, and no law could be enacted except with the concurrence of a diet representative of the nobles, clergy, middle-class, and peasants; in Norway an assembly elected on a very wide franchise had control of legislation and finance. In Denmark, on the other hand, there was an autocracy, intelligent, well-intentioned, but uncontrolled, which was not appreciably modified until 1849.

Switzerland had been throughout the eighteenth century a loose confederation of small states, mostly oligarchical in government, jealous of their sovereign rights, and pursuing no common policy; the federal assembly was no more than a meeting of envoys. The French invasion of 1798 replaced this by the Helvetic Confederation, with a central government and constituent states all based on a democratic system copied from that of France; this was modified by Napoleon, who restored to the cantons much of their independence (subject to the maintenance of democratic institu-

tions) whilst leaving to the federal diet the control of foreign and military affairs. After his fall conflict arose between the cantons which desired the restoration of the pre-Revolutionary system and those which sought an effective union. Alexander of Russia, who was largely under the influence of Swiss advisers (Jomini and La Harpe) intervened and carried the other Powers with him; the rival parties came together, and after prolonged discussions agreed to the Federal Pact (August, 1815), which was substantially the constitution established by Napoleon. It was ratified by the Great Powers, which guaranteed the neutrality of Switzerland.

In Spain, King Ferdinand, restored by the British army in 1814, and enthusiastically welcomed, had fallen at once under the influence of the extreme royalists and the ultra-clerical party. Reaction was violent; the constitution set up in 1812 to replace the absolutist régime destroyed by the French invasion was annulled, ex-ministers and other liberal leaders were thrown into prison, the monasteries throughout Spain were re-established and their lands restored, the clergy were exempted from taxation, the Inquisition was brought again into action. An ignorant peasantry, led by an intolerant priesthood, gave full support to the arbitrary action of an equally ignorant and obstinate king; there was little effective opposition from any source. The country was in grave distress and disorder; the finances were chaotic; the army was unpaid and ill-disciplined; the country districts were harassed by brigandage, an inheritance from the guerilla warfare against the French; agriculture was neglected; commerce had almost disappeared. The great overseas possessions of Spain in Central and South America were rapidly falling away—Venezuela, New Granada (Colombia), and Buenos Aires (Argentina), had proclaimed their independence in 1810, and had been quickly imitated

by Chile and Mexico; elsewhere the representatives of the home government had little authority, for though the rule neither of Joseph Bonaparte nor of the national government had been accepted in Spanish America, the continuance, after the restoration, of a restrictive commercial policy in the supposed interests of the mother country and the reactionary proceedings of Ferdinand destroyed any lingering loyalty. It was evident that only a drastic change of policy and strenuous and sustained effort could save for Spain any part of her once vast empire.

The distressful conditions of Spain were repeated in the case of her neighbour in the Iberian peninsula. Portugal had been the base for Wellington's campaigns, and in the years immediately preceding the overthrow of Napoleon the government—a regency (for the royal family had taken refuge in Brazil, Portugal's great oversea possession)—had been carried on largely under a British protectorate. That continued after 1815, but there was much dissatisfaction, partly because of the failure of Portugal to recover territory from Spain at the Congress of Vienna and the feeling that the United Kingdom had not given her adequate support, partly because of the reluctance of the royal family to return from Brazil, and partly, especially when in 1816 John VI., already regent of Brazil, succeeded to the throne of Portugal but remained at Rio de Janeiro, because of the fear that the positions of the two countries would be reversed. Portugal was poverty-stricken and in disorder; it was evident that the allegiance of Brazil would not be long retained; Portugal's possessions in Africa, apart from small islands in the Gulf of Guinea, were little more than holdings of strips of coastline on the west (Angola) and east (Mozambique), with no effective occupation of the interior.

There remains of the Europe which came within the purview of the Congress of Vienna only the Italian peninsula.

The Napoleonic conquest had brought about the formation of three Italian states—in the north the kingdom of Italy, in the north-west and centre the group of provinces (Piedmont, Genoa, Tuscany, Parma and Rome) which were incorporated in the French Empire, and in the south the kingdom of Naples. The two great islands of Sicily and Sardinia had maintained with British aid their independence of French rule, and had given shelter to the refugee royal families of Piedmont and Naples respectively. Divided as they were the Italians were at that period more united, and political, legal and administrative conditions were more uniform throughout the peninsula, than they had been for centuries; there was even the beginning of a common Italian sentiment. The Congress of Vienna had been most reactionary in its dealings with Italy; the old rulers were restored, and the peninsula was divided into the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, which became possessions of the Austrian Emperor, the two kingdoms of Piedmont-Sardinia in the north-west and of the Two Sicilies in the south, the grand-duchy of Tuscany, the duchies of Modena, Parma, and Lucca, and the States of the Church, held by the Pope in temporal sovereignty and stretching across the peninsula from the middle-western coast to the Adriatic and the frontier of Venetia in the north-east. The fact that the restoration was confined to dynasties and that the republics (aristocratic though they were) of Genoa and Venice were abolished, is an illuminating commentary on the interpretation placed by the Congress of Vienna on the doctrine of legitimacy. Austria not only ruled directly the provinces of the north-east, but dominated the other rulers of the peninsula; the dukes of Tuscany and Modena were Austrian, as was Napoleon's wife, who received Parma; the king of Naples was a French-Bourbon; and they all, with the Pope, took their policy from the court of Vienna. Only in Piedmont-Sardinia was there an Italian dynasty, but as yet

it laid no claim to, and did not merit, the leadership of Italy. Everywhere there was a violent re-action, but not all the features of the old régime were restored. In the Papal States the civil administration became clerical, lay officials were dismissed, the Inquisition was re-established, and the Napoleonic code abolished; in Piedmont-Sardinia freedom of worship was swept away, and a censorship of university teaching and the Press was set up. But in Lombardy and Venetia the Austrian government, not yet committed completely to the repression of the subordinate races, allowed a form of provincial representation; Sicily, though it had become a dependent province of Naples, yet kept some of its ancient privileges; the new régime in Tuscany was moderate under a grand duke who was the most enlightened of contemporary Italian rulers; Naples and other states retained much of the French administrative system, though animated by a very different spirit; and generally throughout Italy the special privileges of the nobles had finally disappeared. The evils of the time were the political dominance of an alien power, the absence of any community of interests between rulers and ruled, the sway of clerical intolerance, the repression of intellectual activity, the intrusion of the political police into private life, and the division of the peninsula into so many small states and the prevention thereby of any common action towards the amelioration of its backward economic condition.

Outside the Europe and its oversea dependencies which formed the subject of the discussions at Vienna there lay south-eastern Europe, where an Asiatic and Mohammedan power held sway everywhere except in one mountainous region of the north-west, where the little principality of Montenegro had never submitted to the Turks, and had secured the formal recognition of its independence in 1799. West of the river Pruth and north of the Danube were the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, in which a Rumanian

population enjoyed some measure of autonomy under the rule of Constantinopolitan Greek princes, appointed by the Sultan, and the protection of Russia established by treaty in 1812. South of these lay the provinces inhabited by the Bulgars, Christians under the ecclesiastical leadership of the patriarchate of the Greek Church; lying nearest to Constantinople these provinces were naturally the last to make any effective manifestation of nationalism. North-westward were territories in which the inhabitants were overwhelmingly Serb and Christian, though the land was held by Mohammedan converts. Westward again, along the eastern shores of the Adriatic, was Albania, a land inhabited by warlike mountain tribes with little coherence, constantly at war with themselves and their neighbours; some of the tribe had long accepted Mohammedanism and were consequently permitted to carry arms, served on special terms in the Sultan's army and formed his bodyguard, and many were settled elsewhere throughout his European dominions and were used as agents for the oppression of the Christians. The southern part of Albania was largely hellenised, and under Ali Pasha of Janina was at the time of the Congress, and for some years after, almost independent. Finally, in in the south, inhabiting the southernmost parts of the Balkan peninsula and the islands of the Ægean Sea (besides the Ionian islands, which the United Kingdom had acquired), and numerous also at Constantinople and along the coast of Asia Minor, there were the Greeks, who were active as traders and seamen and played an important part in the Turkish administration; their œcumenical Patriarch at Constantinople was head of the Orthodox Church throughout the Turkish dominions—a position only reluctantly recognised by the non-Hellenic races. Outside Europe the Turkish dominions embraced Asia Minor to the confines of Persia, Syria and Palestine, Arabia, Egypt, and Northern Africa to the borders of Morocco; but the Sultan's hold on much

of Arabia was slight, Egypt was fast moving towards independence, the Turkish overlordship of Tripolitania, Tunis, and Algeria was ineffective, France held since 1740 some control over the Holy Places of Palestine, and in the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji in 1774 Russia had claimed a right of protection over all Orthodox Christian subjects of Turkey. The strength of the Turkish Empire lay in Asia Minor, though this was obscured by the extent of its territories elsewhere and the possession of Constantinople; the Turks in Europe were merely a small garrison, effective because only those who professed the Mohammedan creed could carry arms, enjoy civil rights and own land. The subject races were not yet stirring, except the Serb, who had risen in 1804 with success and sought Austrian and Russian protection, and when put back under Turkish rule in 1812 (with promise of some measure of autonomy) rose again in 1815; and no thought of a "Balkan problem" seems to have troubled the diplomatists at Vienna.

Such was Europe when the Congress of Vienna had done its work. The statesmen who took the leading part in the deliberations of that Congress have been often and violently denounced. But much of the criticism directed against them has been due in part to a failure to appreciate the true purposes and conditions of the Congress, and in part to a disposition to judge their policy in the light of after-events, which they could not reasonably be expected to foresee. For the more idealistic hopes to which the convening of the Congress of Vienna had given rise they were in no way responsible—their public pronouncements had neither originated nor encouraged them. There was among the more enlightened Germans and Italians an intellectual appreciation of the value of national unity, but the desire was neither definite nor widespread. The doctrine of self-determination, which was to play so great a part during the

next hundred years, found little expression, except perhaps in Poland; the subject peoples of the Austrian Empire showed as yet no marked dissatisfaction with their lot; the Turkish Empire, where indeed the same was broadly true, was outside the scope of the discussions at Vienna; and statesmen pressed for the solution of grave immediate problems may well be pardoned if they appear oblivious of desires and movements which find little active or organised manifestation. More open to criticism is their attitude towards the restriction of the power of rulers within definite legal limits and the participation of the peoples in the conduct of public affairs. But as to this it must be said, first, that throughout Europe the mass of the people were entirely without political knowledge and experience, and that representative institutions have seldom been successful in any nation unless that nation has been gradually trained to their use; and secondly, that statesmen who had spent the greater part of their political lives in struggling against the forces set loose in Europe by the French Revolution, which with much that was good had brought much human suffering and economic disaster in its train, were unlikely to view with favour anything which even appeared to weaken authority. And on the other hand, the Congress of Vienna had solved a series of complicated problems without a renewal of war; it gave Europe peace for more than thirty years; it inaugurated European co-operation in non-political matters by action against the slave trade and by the internationalisation of the great rivers which were trade routes; and it established the system of European Congresses, that is, it created the Concert of Europe. But inasmuch as Europe as a whole had not attained, and was in fact not yet ready for, representative institutions and responsible government, the action of that Concert depended upon the harmony or discord of the aims and wills of a small

number of monarchs and statesmen who, whatever their positions in domestic matters, were in foreign affairs largely irresponsible save to their own consciences and their own conception of the interests which their policies should serve.

CHAPTER II

The Concert of Europe

§ 1. *The Personages*

In the negotiations carried on during the Allied campaign of 1814 against Napoleon, in the discussions preceding the Congress of Vienna and at the Congress itself, and in the international politics of the following seven years, three outstanding personalities dominated the European stage.

The first was the Austrian Chancellor, Metternich, the most typical product of the continental school of diplomacy of the eighteenth century. At thirty years of age, in 1803, he was appointed Austrian ambassador at Berlin; three years later he was transferred to a similar post at Paris; and three years later still he was appointed Chancellor of the Austrian Empire, when its fortunes were at their lowest after the battles of Wagram and Aspern. Thereafter his aim was to maintain amicable but non-committal relations between his monarch and Napoleon, until the time should come when Austria could throw her strength decisively into the balance and become the arbiter of Europe. A man of great personal charm and diplomatic skill, though of narrow vision and little real prescience, with few beliefs and no enthusiasms, he was a devoted adherent of the House of Hapsburg, the embodiment of conservatism, and a convinced supporter of autocracy. Disdainful of public opinion, and uncompromisingly opposed to the whole principle and practice of representative government, he was to become the the leader of the resistance to all movements, liberal and

national, which had their modern source in the French Revolution. But it must always be remembered that Metternich was pursuing the only policy possible for the Austrian Empire so long as it was organised on a centralistic basis. Liberalism and nationalism were principles incompatible with the government of a state composed of some dozen nationalities. Besides, Metternich's influence on domestic affairs has been greatly overestimated. He retained undisputed control of the foreign policy of the monarchy only because he abstained from interference in internal matters, which the Emperor Francis regarded as his own field. And even in European politics Metternich was not to have his way unchallenged. There was another competitor for the leadership of Europe, whose actions before and at the Congress of Vienna had caused Metternich much disquietude and were to continue to do so for some time thereafter.

The Emperor Alexander I. of Russia was the grandson of the great Catherine II. and son of that Emperor Paul whose brief reign of unbalanced autocracy, after bringing Russia into chaos, had been ended by his murder in 1801, when Alexander was only twenty-four. Brought up in a corrupt court, where the monarch despised her heir and would have excluded him from the throne, and with a father for whom no respect was possible, Alexander had yet developed a high sense of duty, an almost overwhelming consciousness of the responsibility which the Russian system of government laid upon him, and an appreciation of the need for reform which appeared in the earliest acts of his domestic administration. But he was highly impressionable, and the disinterestedness of his motives was an inadequate compensation for the instability of his policy at home and abroad. Attracted at first by Napoleon, his antagonism was aroused when that adventurer became Emperor of the French; after the rupture of the peace of Amiens he had turned to the United Kingdom,

and had persuaded the King of Prussia to join Austria and Russia in the great campaign marked for the Allies by the disasters of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, which forced Austria to make peace, crushed Prussia, and gave Napoleon possession of Poland. But Napoleon saw his way to use Russia, he was prepared to give Alexander's ambitions full play elsewhere, and at the interview of Tilsit the strength of his personality brought Alexander for a time completely under his influence. Russia entered the "continental system," she lost her prestige in Germany, she permitted the creation of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, but she was given the prospect of acquiring Finland from Sweden—a prospect realised two years later—and encouraged to direct her attention to the Balkan provinces of Turkey. But the friendly relations between Alexander and Napoleon did not last. Alexander was irritated by non-success in his Turkish wars, by Napoleon's disapproval of his territorial designs in the Balkans, and by an enlargement of the grand-duchy of Warsaw at the expense of Austria; the Russian commercial classes suffered from the "continental system"; Russia and France drifted into war. The disasters which befell Napoleon in his Russian campaign convinced Alexander that it was his mission to liberate Europe, for it was his realm which had struck the first great blow at the Corsican colossus; and thereafter he claimed the leadership of the continental Allies, in military strategy as in diplomacy. All his influence was on the side of moderation in the treatment of France, both in the details of the military occupation and in the settlement of her territorial boundaries; and it was largely due to his insistence that Louis XVIII. issued a charter which gave France representative institutions and some measure of constitutional government. Metternich was already perturbed at Alexander's claim to that position in Europe which he aspired to secure for his master, that is, for himself; he was still more alarmed by Alexander's

liberal tendencies; and at the Congress of Vienna the antagonism became acute.

The third personality was the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Castlereagh. Born in 1769, he had served in various ministerial offices from 1802 onward, and in 1812 had been entrusted with the charge of the Foreign Office. Cold in manner, and an ineffective speaker—a fact which was a source of weakness to him in the House of Commons—he was laborious, clear-headed, entirely honest, and distinguished above all by "courage and common sense." His fundamental purpose after taking office in 1812 had been to create a Concert of Europe against France, and then to secure its continuance to prevent any restoration of the Napoleonic régime; and his greatest achievement was the Treaty of Chaumont (9th March, 1814) which bound the four Great Powers to continue war until Napoleon had been overthrown, and certain schemes of political reconstruction secured (a confederated Germany, an independent Switzerland, a free Spain under the House of Bourbon, an enlarged Holland under the Prince of Orange), and gained his further object, the continuance of the alliance for twenty years after the conclusion of peace and mutual guarantees against any attempt by France to upset the arrangements to be made in the ultimate peace treaty. Castlereagh had been much influenced by Pitt, under whom he had served, and in two important respects his work at Vienna was in pursuance of the policy of Pitt; there was a marked hostility to Russia, and a desire to keep her as weak as possible on her middle-European frontier—hence came opposition to Alexander's Polish schemes; and there was a determination to keep Belgium, and particularly Antwerp, out of the hands of the French—a policy which led to the union with Holland, since Belgium seemed unable to stand alone. But in the main his influence was moderating. Though he desired to strengthen Prussia as a barrier against Russia, and did

in fact obtain for her more than France and Austria were at first willing to allow, thereby making her preponderant in the north of central Europe, he had firmly resisted her extreme claims against Saxony, and with Russia supporting her, and Austria and France hostile, Great Britain's vote was the deciding one. Similarly, after Napoleon's return and final overthrow, when Prussia, the smaller German states and the Netherlands were pressing for drastic penalties upon France, including much transfer of territory, and Austria was wavering, Great Britain, under Castlereagh's leadership, ranged herself with Russia on the side of moderation. Castlereagh was a convinced believer in the necessity of a Concert of Europe, that is, of common action by the Great Powers in matters affecting them all, and of periodical Congresses as affording the best means of intimate discussion and effective decision. In this he was in accord with Metternich, and the Concert, which functioned with more or less efficiency after 1815, was their joint creation—it sprang from the provisions of the Treaty of Chaumont and not from the nebulous statement of theologico-political principles enunciated some eighteen months later by Alexander I. as the basis for the so-called Holy Alliance. A later treaty of November 20, 1815, between the United Kingdom, Austria, Russia, and Prussia bound the contracting parties in the event of revolutionary efforts in France to concert between themselves and the King of France the measures necessary for the safety of their respective states and the general tranquillity of Europe, and also to meet together at fixed intervals for consultation upon their great common interests and the measures most salutary for the prosperity and peace of Europe.

But there soon developed a marked divergence between Castlereagh and Metternich as to the scope of the informal alliance and the extent of its responsibility. In the mind of the British statesman the pledge which bound the Great

Powers was to secure the perpetual exclusion of the Napoleonic dynasty from the throne of France and the maintenance of the territorial arrangements made at Vienna. Beyond that it did not and should not go. Metternich sought to extend it so as to guarantee political security to the restored or any other dynasties, and to safeguard them against any constitutional changes; and when after coquetting with liberalism for a time Alexander I. turned his back upon it, Metternich seemed to have obtained control of the Concert. But so soon as he attempted to use it for the suppression of efforts in various states for domestic reform, justifying his action on the ground that any movement for change would be the prelude to a new revolutionary upheaval, he encountered a resistance from Castlereagh which was at first passive, but by 1822 was becoming active. Then an overburdened brain broke down and Castlereagh ended his own life; his office passed to a statesman who was definitely to break with Metternich and win thereby a reputation for wisdom and statesmanship which was long denied to Castlereagh, from whom he differed not so much in purpose as in method, in the enjoyment of changed conditions, and in the gifts of oratory and epigram.

§ 2. *The Period of Congresses*

The period of fifteen years from the Congress of Vienna to the first breach in the territorial arrangements made by it may properly be described as the period of Congresses, and of the system of Metternich, which depended essentially, in the political conditions of the time, upon the mutual sympathy and full co-operation of a small number of monarchs and ministers. It was marked by the admission of France to the Concert of Europe, the first movements of liberalism and nationalism, the efforts of Metternich to use the Concert to repress those movements and all schemes for

political reform which did not emanate from the rulers (and even those which did so emanate were discouraged), the conflict within the Concert which resulted from those efforts and from the revival of the territorial and commercial rivalries that had been subdued but not ended by the Napoleonic peril, the further disintegrating effect of events outside the Europe which the Congress of Vienna had surveyed, and the ultimate failure of the Concert to maintain one of the most important parts of its handiwork.

At the Congress Talleyrand, the representative of France, had forced his way into the inmost council; he had placed the restored French monarch on an equality with the rulers of the United Kingdom, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The return of Napoleon and his ready acceptance by France seemed to have overthrown the work of Talleyrand and condemned France to a long isolation. But the terms imposed upon her were not harsh; the country was obviously weary of war, the government of Louis XVIII. was steering a middle course which kept both extreme royalists and unrepentant imperialists and republicans in check, the indemnity was quickly paid, and France was so quiet that the army of occupation, imposed in 1815 for five years, was substantially reduced in 1817, and removed entirely at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in September-October, 1818. At that Congress, restricted to the five Great Powers, and summoned primarily to arrange the evacuation of the occupied territory, France was admitted to the Concert of Europe. The restoration of a legitimate government carried that logical consequence.

The Congress was of great importance for yet another reason. The liberal tendencies of Alexander I. had given Metternich much anxiety. In Germany the Russian Emperor had encouraged certain of the lesser princes, related to him by marriage, to allow some political rights to their subjects; in France he supported the moderate chief minister,

the Duc de Richelieu, against the extreme royalists; he had granted a constitution to Poland; in the Balkans he undoubtedly encouraged secretly the anti-Turkish aspirations of the subject races; Russian agents were believed to be active even in Italy. But Alexander's enthusiasm in this, as in all other directions, was short-lived. Some agitation in the German universities, particularly in the south, in favour of constitutional government and German unity, some demonstrations in Poland and reports of conspiracies in Russia, were sufficient to give him pause. Metternich possessed all the arts requisite to influence so impressionable a mind. When at Aix-la-Chapelle the general European situation had been surveyed and the chief danger-spots noted, the Austrian Chancellor could flatter himself that he would encounter little if any opposition from Alexander. He was apparently free to use the weapon of the Concert as he chose, for the close personal relations maintained between himself and Castlereagh for some years past, and the absence of any specific question upon which Austria and the United Kingdom were at issue, seemed to make Metternich secure upon that side also. But it was not until nearly two years later that the new weapon was used; Metternich had first to deal with the affairs of Germany.

In that Confederation, and particularly in Prussia, the hopes formed during the final struggle against Napoleon had already been completely disappointed. It was apparent that the Germanic Confederation was doomed to impotence, and though the rulers of some of the smaller states were well disposed towards reform, the majority were inflexibly conservative. The promise made by Frederick William III. of Prussia in May, 1815—of a written constitution and a parliament, formed of representatives from the provincial assemblies, with power to discuss, though not to initiate, legislation—was never fulfilled. The German reformers had hoped much from the example of Russia; now, as the king

fell under the reactionary influence of the great landowners and the bureaucracy, they came to regard the Prussian government as even more inimical than the Austrian. In Hesse the prince was an unrestricted despot, seeking to restore to the minutest details the régime existent before the French Revolution; the political system of Hanover was not influenced by its dynastic association with the United Kingdom—it had an assembly of notables, with little power and no publicity for its discussions; in Oldenburg the grand duke refused any form of assembly; in Saxony the assembly of the estates was denied any knowledge of the state finances; in the two Mecklenburgs, which lagged behind the rest of Germany for a century, all power was in the hands of the landowners. In the south, though, as already indicated, a more enlightened policy prevailed, and state assemblies were given the rights of legislation and taxation, the influence of traditional authority, the inexperience of all except a very limited class in public affairs, the predilections of the "nobles," so numerous and powerful everywhere, tended to keep all real power in the hands of the ruling princes. The numbers who cared sufficiently for reform to be active in seeking it were relatively small; they were to be found mainly in the professional and academic classes, and the liberal propaganda was carried on chiefly in student societies and in the Press. Limited as the numbers were, their activities alarmed Metternich, and the Congresses of Carlsbad in 1819 and Vienna in the following year—gatherings of German princes only—were convoked to deal with them. At Carlsbad decrees were issued which dissolved the students' societies, established a censorship of the Press and of the universities, and set up for the latter a central disciplinary court. At Vienna it was decided that any German state unable with its own resources "to maintain order" should be aided by the Confederation, and the southern princes undertook to limit freedom of debate in the state assemblies,

lest anything said there should encourage the opponents of absolutism elsewhere. From that time there was for several years little in Germany to disturb the mind of Metternich.

His anxieties henceforth were to have quite different sources. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle the directors of the European Concert had feared only an Imperialist reaction in France or a democratic movement in Germany; they foresaw no danger from elsewhere. They had decided to meet from time to time, but not to discuss the domestic matters of any state outside the five Great Powers unless asked to do so by that state, which would then be represented. And so far they had not dealt with the affairs of any other state, and general agreement had been maintained; now events in countries outside the five-Power group led Metternich to seek to widen the scope and authority of the Concert, and gave play to divergent views and policies.

In 1820 there were revolutionary movements in both the Spanish and Italian peninsulas. In Spain the ultra-reactionary government of Ferdinand VII. was assailed by a revolt marked by two features characteristic of Spanish political history for many years thereafter—it began in January with a military rising under two popular generals (animated less by political principles than by discontent at service conditions) and it was quickly followed by local risings organised by revolutionary juntas. There was a general demand for the re-establishment of the constitution of 1812, and Ferdinand readily assented. But though he appointed a moderate ministry, he gave it no support against the attacks of the reactionaries—the nobles, and most of all the clergy—on the one side and the extreme revolutionaries on the other; and the whole administration remained chaotic. The Spanish movements had their repercussion upon Portugal. The king still remained in Brazil; the British army of occupation, deemed necessary because of the friction between Portugal and Spain, was

commanded by Beresford, who acted as Viceroy. The Portuguese were discontented at the absence of the court and the implied predominance of Brazil; there were grave domestic grievances; the country was in serious economic distress; and when in April, 1820, Beresford sailed to Brazil to confer with the king, a revolutionary junta was set up at Oporto, which was quickly followed by another at Lisbon, and the two combined to establish in October a provisional government which was loyalist but bent on constitutional reform and the reassertion of Portugal's predominance in the empire.

In Italy revolution began in Naples. In that kingdom there existed the widespread secret society of the Carbonari, which, formed originally to drive out the French, had now spread to other parts of Italy and was directed against any foreign domination over the Italian peoples; and there were the numerous officers of the army of Murat, who had many service grievances, despised the restored monarch and were feared by him. Both Carbonari and Muratists desired the establishment of some form of representative government. In July, 1820, a young lieutenant, Morelli, raised a revolt: the king and his ministers gave way almost without a struggle, and Ferdinand I. signed a decree establishing for Naples and Sicily (where a similar rising had taken place, aiming at first at independence but subsequently accepting continued union with Naples) a constitution modelled on the Spanish constitution of 1812.

By this time the Eastern Powers had taken alarm. The Concert had been constituted solely to safeguard the territorial arrangements made at the Congress of Vienna, and it could not be seriously contended that the events in the southern peninsulas imperilled those arrangements—except on the assumption that constitutional changes in any state would open a new era of revolution. But having shaped the instrument, Metternich was resolved to use it,

especially as he now dominated the Emperor Alexander, who had indeed been the first to suggest joint action. He knew that the two Ferdinands were merely playing a part, that neither had any respect for oath or pledge, and that appeal by them to the Concert, and thereby apparent adherence to the line of action laid down at Aix-la-Chapelle, could readily be arranged.

The first step was the convening of the Congress of Troppau, which met in October, 1820. But at once the conflict of opinion appeared. Austria asked for consent to the dispatch of an army to Naples, to restore the unfettered authority of Ferdinand I. Russia and Prussia agreed, but Castlereagh was not prepared to acquiesce in the proposed extension of the scope of the Concert, and France was at this time content to follow his lead. The three Eastern Powers issued a circular which declared that "any state of the European alliance in which a revolution takes place ceases by that very fact to be a member of the alliance, and is excluded from it until it gives guarantees for the maintenance of legal order. . . . The Powers pledge themselves to refuse to recognise illegal reforms, and in order to bring back into the European alliance any such state they reserve to themselves the right to make use of friendly means, and if necessary to use coercion." But both the United Kingdom and France refused to adhere to what Castlereagh described as a "code of international police" based on an assumed right of intervention by the Concert in the affairs of independent states, and Castlereagh, who knew that in this he would have the full support of the British Parliament, protested strongly and publicly. Whilst regretting the general uncertainty and danger arising from the growth of democratic opinions and demands, he declared that a policy of intervention by the Concert would be "as dangerous to avow as impossible to execute"; that Great Britain had guaranteed only the territorial, and not

the political, system of Europe and, whilst desirous of continuing in harmony with the Great Powers, could not be bound by their decisions, and must retain independence of action. But the three Powers, though shaken, continued their course. Ferdinand of Naples had been invited to meet the representatives of the Great Powers; he had been allowed to leave his kingdom for the purpose, under instructions and a pledge to do nothing to imperil the constitution to which he had sworn. The Congress was transferred to Laibach, whither all the Italian states were invited; it reassembled there in January, 1821, and Ferdinand at once broke his pledge. He annulled the constitution of Naples; a draft constitution for his realm, prepared by Metternich, which abolished representative assemblies and separated the administrations of the two Sicilies, was accepted by him; a large Austrian army marched through Italy to the south; there was but little resistance, and by the end of March, 1821, Ferdinand had been re-established in complete and illimited sovereignty.

Meanwhile there had been a rising in Piedmont, aiming primarily at the establishment of a constitution based on the Spanish model, and directed also against foreign authority in the peninsula. It brought about the abdication of the king, but his brother and successor, Charles Felix, refused to accept the new constitution and appealed both to his royal subjects and to the Great Powers. With an Austrian army in Italy, and the collapse of the Neapolitan resistance, all hope for the Piedmontese reformers vanished; they were suppressed, there were many executions, the universities were closed for a year. A conspiracy at Milan, the centre of the Austrian dominions in Italy, in 1820, failed disastrously.

So far Metternich was triumphant, and he would readily have pursued the same course with respect to Spain, with the full support of the Russian Emperor and of Prussia.

But before the resistance of Castlereagh, who in a circular dispatch had repeated his protest against the policy of the Troppau pronouncement, and the reluctance of France, the attempt was postponed. The elections of 1822 in Spain returned a majority of advanced reformers, who forced the king to choose a ministry from their ranks. The ultra-royalists rose in revolt, and clerical support gave them a great following among the peasants. The government was too weak to suppress the rising; but the rebels were not strong enough to succeed alone, and turned for help to the "ultras" of France, who after some years of conflict with the more moderate royalists had obtained power in 1820, with the Duc de Richelieu as their nominal, and Villèle as their real leader, had re-established the censorship, and revised the electoral law in their own interest. Louis XVIII. was getting old; his brother and heir had long been the recognised chief of the "ultras"; the attitude of the French government towards the affairs of Spain underwent a complete change —it was anxious to intervene.

The Congress of Laibach had decided upon a further Congress to be held in the following year at Verona. As the time approached it became evident that the Congress would have to deal with two grave problems, the condition of Spain and the French desire to intervene there, and a Greek revolt against Turkish rule. As regards Spain, Alexander of Russia had long been anxious to send military help to King Ferdinand; Metternich approved the object, but deprecated action by Russia alone; Prussia did not count seriously but would follow Austria. The importance of the problems to be discussed decided Castlereagh to attend in person; he had drawn up his own instructions when long years of overwork brought their penalty, and a mental breakdown ended with his suicide on August 12, 1822. His place as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was taken by George Canning.

§ 3. *The Policy of Canning*

The new minister had been brought up as a Whig, but had quickly passed into the Tory party, in alarm at the excesses of the French Revolution and the violence of the democratic movement. The younger Pitt, struggling to carry on the government almost single-handed, and sadly lacking in effective support in debate, was attracted by Canning, for whom a parliamentary seat was found in 1792, at the age of twenty-two. From that time he was an unswerving supporter of Pitt; after holding various offices from 1796 to 1801 he resigned with his leader in the latter year, re-taking office in Pitt's last, and brief, ministry. For two and a half years (1807–1809) he was Foreign Secretary in the Portland administration, a period distinguished by the bold seizure of the Danish and Portuguese fleets to prevent them from falling into the hands of Napoleon, and the replacement of Pitt's policy of formal coalitions against France by aid to any state rising against Napoleon—whence came the Peninsular campaign. Cabinet quarrels, which incidentally brought a duel with Castlereagh (then War Secretary), led to his resignation in September, 1809. When in 1812 Lord Liverpool formed his long-lived government, Canning was again offered the Foreign Office; to his lasting regret later he refused, because he was not also to have the leadership of the House of Commons, and he remained out of office until 1816. In that year he accepted the post of President of the Board of Control for India, and held it until 1820, when he resigned on a question of domestic politics. In 1822 he was about to leave the country to assume the office of Governor-General of India when on Castlereagh's death Lord Liverpool offered him the Foreign Office.

In domestic politics Canning was of the more liberal wing of the Tory party. Strongly antagonistic to the

monopoly of power claimed and long held by the Whigs, he supported the policy of George III. and favoured the real participation of the monarch in government and the selection by him of the ministers, subject only to the restraining influence and, within a prescribed field, the control of Parliament. To parliamentary reform he was firmly opposed, believing that it was unnecessary to tamper with the legal constitution, especially as public opinion was rapidly finding increased expression and influence by means of the Press. "He who speculating on the British constitution should content himself with marking the distribution of acknowledged technical powers between the House of Lords, the House of Commons, and the Crown, and assigning to each their separate provinces—to the Lords their legislative authority, to the Crown its veto (how often used?), to the House of Commons its power of stopping supplies (how often, in fact, necessary to be resorted to?)—and should think he has thus described the British Constitution as it acts and is influenced in its action; but should omit from his enumeration that mighty power of Public Opinion, embodied in a Free Press, which pervades and checks, and perhaps in the last resort nearly governs the whole, such a man would surely give but an imperfect view of the government of England as it is now modified, and would greatly underrate the countervailing influences against which that of the executive power has now to contend." To this power of public opinion he did more than formal homage; a powerful speaker in the ornate style of his time, described by Byron as, "our last, our best, our only orator," his speeches in the House of Commons in exposition of his policy were addressed less to that House than to the nation. Starting from this premise, and from the doctrine that "the business of the reformer as legislator is to redress practical grievances, not to run after theoretical perfection," he was a firm advocate of Catholic

emancipation, of which the withholding was a real and much-felt grievance, whilst opposed to the repeal of the Test Acts directed against the nonconformists, since they were often ignored and in any event were no longer a cause of serious political agitation. He gave active help to the movement for the abolition of slavery in the British possessions, but not by sudden liberation; and during his last period of office he steadily supported the commercial and customs tariff changes of Huskisson and the administrative reforms of Peel.

The foreign policy of Canning had been anticipated to a substantial extent by Castlereagh in the closing years of his life; the real difference lay in the vigour with which the policy was pursued and the point to which it was carried. Castlereagh, with the long years of common action in the struggle against Napoleon ever in his mind, was reluctant to break with the other Powers of the European Concert; Canning was ready, if need be, to do so. Castlereagh had confined himself to protests against, and refusal to participate in, any policy of intervention; Canning was prepared in the last resort to intervene against the other Powers. Castlereagh in the desire to maintain peace had been disposed sometimes to attach more importance to the interests of Europe than to those of Great Britain; with Canning British interests came first. But it was Canning's good fortune that in the three groups of events in which he was most actively concerned in his last period of office he found the other Powers unable to reconcile their divergent interests, and whilst serving the cause of political freedom and national liberty abroad he could serve also the direct and immediate interests of Great Britain. And in comparing his work with that of his predecessor it must be remembered not only that he had these specific opportunities which were withheld from Castlereagh, but also that with the lapse of years, the fading of the fears of a new revolu-

tionary movement, the revival of commerce and industry, the reforms of Huskisson and Peel, and the improved economic and social conditions (unsatisfactory though these were in some important respects) which followed thereon, Parliament and the ruling classes in Great Britain were more optimistic and less disposed to take alarm at liberal movements abroad.

The Congress of Verona met in October, 1822, the British representative being the Duke of Wellington. The French government's inquiry as to the likelihood of assistance if they intervened in Spain met with a favourable response from the three Eastern Powers, Metternich preferring French to Russian action there, though reluctant to adopt a policy divergent from that of Great Britain. Wellington maintained steadily the British doctrine of non-intervention, and his withdrawal from the Congress was the inevitable consequence of the action of the other Powers, who instructed their ambassadors to warn the Spanish constitutional government to modify its course, and if the warning were unheeded to withdraw from Spain, and also promised France moral and material support. Canning pointed out to the French ministry the dangers of a new Peninsular War, he pressed the Spanish government to make some modifications of the constitution to mitigate French hostility, but he would do no more. The Spanish ministry was not conciliatory, and in spite of the reluctance of Louis XVIII. and some of his advisers, the French "ultras" had their way. In April, 1823, a French army entered Spain "to reconcile that fine kingdom with Europe," in Louis XVIII.'s words, "to preserve the throne of Spain for a descendant of Henry IV.," and to set Ferdinand VII. free "to give to his people institutions which they can hold only from him." It met with no effective resistance, and was welcomed by the reactionary classes and the masses of peasantry whom they influenced, and autocracy was re-established. Ferdi-

nand annulled every act of the constitutional government, all who had sat in the Cortes or held office under the overthrown ministry were banished permanently from Madrid and its neighbourhood, military commissions were set up, thousands were cast into prison or driven into exile, there was a severe censorship of the Press.

So far the crusade against the movement which Metternich detested had achieved a striking success, but he could not review the position without disquietude. For the Concert which had dominated Europe since 1814 had received from Great Britain's action at Verona a heavy blow, relations between its members were greatly strained, and the tension was being rapidly increased by events elsewhere.

In Portugal King John VI. had returned from Brazil and accepted the constitution resulting from the revolution of 1820. A reactionary party under his second son, Dom Miguel, opposed the king and his constitutional ministry, and sought help from France: the liberals turned for aid to Great Britain. When the king overcame the opposition and in 1822 directed the preparation of a definite constitution, Austria, Russia, and Prussia protested and France threatened. John VI. died; his eldest son, Dom Pedro, who had been created Emperor of Brazil without renouncing his rights of succession to Portugal, granted a new constitution and appointed a regency. His claim was disputed by Dom Miguel, on whose behalf Ferdinand of Spain was eager to intervene. France would have taken the same course, but was deterred by Canning's resolute attitude. He had to choose between the doctrine of non-intervention and the loss of the long-established British prestige, and did not hesitate. In answer to the appeals of the Portuguese ministers he sent a British fleet to the Tagus, "not to rule, not to dictate, not to prescribe constitutions, but to safeguard and preserve the independence of an ally." The action was decisive; Spain gave way and recognised the re-

gency, which now governed in the name of Dom Pedro's daughter, to whom he resigned the Portuguese crown.

Meanwhile Spanish hopes and the policy of Metternich had suffered a still heavier defeat. The revolt of the Spanish possessions in Central and South America had continued with ever-increasing success, and it was evident that unaided Spain could not recover her authority there. At Aix-la-Chapelle Alexander had suggested some action by the Concert to repress republican movements beyond the seas, but the idea was abandoned before Castlereagh's declaration that Great Britain could take no part in such an adventure. There was widespread sympathy in this country with the Latin-American revolt, largely because Spain still tried to keep the trade with her possessions closed and was seizing British ships which sought to break the monopoly, and by the time that the Congress of Verona was convoked Castlereagh was moving towards the recognition of the new states. With him it was "a question of time rather than principle," and after the French invasion of Spain it seemed to Canning that the time had come. Believing that successful French intervention in Spain would be followed by an attempt to help the re-establishment of Spanish rule in the revolted colonies, and knowing that Alexander still cherished the idea put forward at Aix-la-Chapelle, Canning warned the French government that any such action would cause British intervention on the other side, and that French assistance in bolstering up the Spanish trade monopoly would be actively resented. When France had succeeded in Spain, Canning, being without support in Europe, turned to the United States and intimated to the government of President Monroe that he was prepared to act vigorously in opposition to the schemes of the Eastern Powers and France and Spain, if assured of United States support. His overtures were accepted, though with some reserve, since there was an impression, as Adams, the United States

Secretary of State, wrote, that "this movement on the part of Great Britain is impelled more by her interest than by a principle of general liberty"; the United States recognised the independence of the new republics, and announced that it would actively resist any attempt of the European alliance to impose its system on the revolted states. In his presidential message to Congress in December, 1823, Monroe laid down the doctrine which bears his name. By the end of that year British consular agents had been appointed in most of the states formed out of the Spanish possessions, and in 1824–5 the independence of Buenos Aires (the Argentine), Colombia, and Mexico was formally recognised by Great Britain by means of commercial treaties. In face of the attitude of the British and United States governments all thoughts of intervention on behalf of Spain faded away. During these same years the diplomatists were harassed by another problem, arising outside the Europe with which the Congress of Vienna had dealt, and more inimical than any other question to the continuance of the Concert. Canning's policy in the Spanish, Portuguese, and Latin-American questions had gravely shaken and crippled the Concert, but the Great Powers still held together, though with some difficulty. A revolt in the Turkish Empire, begun in 1821, was destined to become the crucial issue of European politics, and by making open and acute the hardly-repressed differences between Austria and Russia, to cause the break-up of the Concert.

The revolt of the Greeks, the most advanced in civilisation and in economic development of all the Christian races subject to the Sultan, was instigated in part by the success of the Serbs, whose rising in 1815 had resulted in quasi-independence under Milosch Obrenovitch, and in part by the difficulties of the Sultan with his vassal, Ali Pasha of Janina. It began, apart from an abortive rising in the Danubian principalities, with the slaughter of the whole

Turkish population of the Morea; it speedily became a bitter social and religious war, waged on the Greek side by guerilla bands, with little effective discipline and much personal rivalry. By January, 1822, the Greek mainland had been cleared of the Turks, and the independence of Greece was proclaimed. Had the Great Powers acted firmly, all would have been over; but they did nothing. The interests of two of them were in direct conflict. Russia had designs, already traditional, of territorial expansion at the expense of the Turkish Empire, and claimed treaty rights of protectorate over all Christian subjects of the Sultan, most of whom were of the Orthodox faith, and similar but vaguer rights as to the Danubian provinces; these gave a basis for a policy of intervention which Alexander was eager to adopt. Austria, though not averse from territorial expansion, had no special ambition of the kind at this time, but regarded it as essential to prevent the aggrandisement of Russia, her dominance of the Balkans, and her consequent control of the Danube. Metternich could not openly support a Mohammedan power against Christian subjects whom it oppressed, but his fundamental principles prevented him from aiding rebel subjects against their "lawful" ruler, and the political interests of Austria made him anxious to prevent Russian intervention on their behalf. His whole effort, therefore, was to isolate the combatants, to treat the conflict as "beyond the pale of civilisation," and leave the Greeks to their fate.

Canning was at first disposed to the same course; Great Britain, he wrote, was "bound in political justice to respect, in the case of Turkey, that national independence which, in case of civil commotion, she would look to have respected in her own." And he limited his action at the outset to endeavours to induce the Sultan to make such concessions, in the matters in dispute with Russia, as would deprive Alexander of all excuse for intervention. But the continuance

of the rebellion and the damage done to British shipping in the Levant by Greek privateers induced him in March, 1823, to recognise the Greeks as belligerents, that there might be some recognised government to be held responsible. Interpreting this as an attempt to supplant Russian influence in the Balkans, Alexander proposed joint action by the Powers to establish three Greek states under Turkish suzerainty but with the guarantee of the Concert. This was violently opposed by the Greeks, disliked by Canning, who was unwilling to bind Great Britain to joint action, and regarded by Metternich as certain to mean Russian control of the three weak states. So the struggle went on, and the tide ran strongly against the Greeks. Their desperate plight brought union in 1825 under Capo d'Istrias, but in that year Greece was invaded from the north by a Turkish army and from the sea by the forces of the semi-independent ruler of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, who had come to his suzerain's aid. By June, 1827, the Greeks were almost crushed.

But meanwhile public opinion in Europe in favour of the Greeks was becoming pronounced—it had always been strong in Great Britain, and the apparent triumph of the Sultan, and threatened depopulation of the Morea, drove the European governments to realise the need for action. Moreover, a new and powerful figure had appeared on the European stage. Alexander of Russia had persisted in the idea of coercing Turkey, but had long held his hand in view of the opposition of Austria and France and Canning's insistence that intervention should not go beyond diplomatic representations. At last he announced his intention of of acting alone, but before there was time to show his customary weakness he died (December, 1825) and was succeded by his brother, Nicholas I., young, vigorous, and resolute, and free from the long-established influences which had swayed his brother. To prevent Russia from acting alone, Canning had immediately opened negotiations with

the new ruler; the Greek leaders had been induced to accept a scheme of something less than complete independence, and in April, 1826, Great Britain and Russia agreed that the former, with Russia's support, should offer that solution to the Sultan, and, should it be rejected, that they would take action jointly or separately, "to establish a reconciliation." Nicholas had already sent to the Sultan an ultimatum in respect of Russian grievances, but the Sultan gave way on that matter in October and for a time it seemed as if the Greeks would be left in the lurch, especially as Canning still asserted that the methods employed to carry out the Anglo-Russian agreement must be purely pacific. But the situation could not continue; in France the "Ultras" were in control of the government and eager to aid the Greeks; and the insurgents themselves, now their situation was desperate, formally appealed to Great Britain. Unless Canning took some decisive step Franco-Russian joint action was certain, and British prestige in the Levant would be irretrievably damaged.

The Anglo-Russian pact took more definite form; at conferences in London France ranged herself with Great Britain and Russia, whilst Austria and Prussia withdrew. The treaty of London (July, 1827) pointed, as Metternich said, "to no other definite result than the political emancipation of the Greeks." The three signatories bound themselves to impose an armistice on the combatants; an Anglo-French squadron was sent to Greece to compel the withdrawal of the Egyptian army; the accidental battle of Navarino (October 20, 1827) destroyed the Turkish fleet and committed the Allies irrevocably. The Sultan remained obdurate. Canning, prime minister of Great Britain for a brief period, had died (August 8) a few weeks before the naval battle; the short ministry of his successor, Wellington, was nerveless, and its weakness encouraged the Sultan to resist. But Canning's action had been decisive. France

and Russia were in full agreement, Great Britain could not go back, Prussia was not much concerned, and Metternich found himself powerless. Nicholas declared war on Turkey in May, 1828, and the end came with the treaty of Adrianople in September, 1829. Greece was given independence, though with unduly restricted boundaries, and soon became an hereditary kingdom; Serbia received independence also—an accomplished fact being thereby recognised—subject to an annual tribute and the presence of some Turkish garrisons; reforms were promised for Moldavia and Wallachia, which were to have native rulers elected for life; the Dardanelles were henceforth to be open to all foreign shipping. Russia had won in the Balkans a predominance which, had Canning lived, would never have been allowed to her.

Metternich wrote that "the event of October 20 begins a new era for Europe." The Concert had broken down: weakened by the discord over Spain and by British action in respect of Portugal and Latin-America, it had been rent asunder by the conflict of interests in south-eastern Europe. Framed solely to prevent the revival of imperialism in France and to defend especially the territorial arrangements of 1815, efforts had been made, chiefly by Metternich, to widen the range of its authority. These efforts had not been approved by all the Great Powers, and had indeed caused grave conflicts of opinion; the result had been failure in regard to Portugal and Latin-America and growing discord within the Concert, which thus was less able to resist the disintegrating influences of the Greek revolt; and the Concert was now to show itself powerless to fulfil its chief original purpose.

§ 4. *The Failure of* 1830

The Restoration monarchy in France had fallen more and more under the control of the extreme royalists. The charter granted by Louis XVIII. had set up a chamber of hereditary peers and a chamber of deputies meeting annually; all legislation required the assent of both houses, but the approval of the lower house alone was necessary for the budget; the choice of ministers rested with the king. The franchise was very limited, the electors numbered less than ninety thousand, and the real power was in the hands of the large employers and landowners. The king sought to rely on a moderate "centre" party, and when the first elections after the Hundred Days produced a great majority of extreme royalists came at once into conflict with them, as they were eager to force upon him a ministry of their own persuasion. The moderates, though favouring a constitutional monarchy, were consequently impelled to maintain the monarch's right to choose his own advisers. Flushed by their success at the polls the "Ultras" at first pressed for an extension of the franchise; the moderates distrusted a wide electorate. Reduction of the membership of the lower house and manipulation of the elections enabled the ministry to secure a moderate majority and maintain its position until 1820. But despite every effort to make the new régime acceptable to France, the opposition grew: it came from the reviving though still insignificant republican party, with whom the imperialists became allied, and from the "Ultras," supported by all the clerical forces. In 1820 the moderate party broke up, and a large section went over to the "Ultras," who obtained in that year a majority in the legislature and remained in power until 1827. They re-established the censorship and strengthened the control of the Press; they altered the franchise to suit their own electoral purposes;

they increased the number of bishoprics and aided the monastic orders; the policy of high protection inherited from Napoleonic times was maintained first in the interests of the manufacturers and then extended to agriculture under pressure from the landowners; the king was forced to intervene in Spain. The accession in 1824 of the Comte d'Artois, long the recognised leader of the "Ultras," as Charles X., seemed to strengthen their position; but the hostility aroused by their policy increased rapidly. Republicans and imperialists, eager to overthrow the Bourbons, though uncertain as to what should take their place, the moderate liberals supported by the middle classes of the towns and a growing Press, and the great industrial employers alarmed at the influence of the landed aristocracy, combined to overthrow the ministry of Villèle in 1827 and forced on the king the moderate ministry of Martignac. But this he speedily dismissed and replaced by an "Ultra" ministry under Polignac. The elections of 1830 strengthened the opposition, but in spite of the urgent warnings of Metternich, who favoured the policy but doubted the ability to carry it through, Charles X. would not yield. He and his ministers by ordinance dissolved the chamber of deputies, limited the franchise and altered the electoral system, and imposed new restrictions upon the Press. At once the republican organisations of Paris rose in revolt; after three days' fighting (26–29 July) Charles gave way, but it was too late to save his throne, for he had identified himself with the policy of his ministers. The republicans, led by the veteran Lafayette, had been vigorous, but had no form of government ready; Thiers, the leader of the moderates, put forward Louis Philippe, Duc d'Orleans, head of the younger branch of the Bourbons, first as lieutenant-governor of the realm and then, when that proved acceptable, as king. In August Louis Philippe was proclaimed King of the

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French, ruling as a strictly constitutional monarch, and with the tricolour as the national flag in place of the Bourbon lilies.

The revolution in France had immediate effect in the Netherlands. From the first there had been friction between the Belgian and Dutch provinces of the kingdom established by the Congress of Vienna. The failure to obtain parliamentary representation and participation in the administration in proportion to their numbers, and the compulsory use of the Dutch language for official purposes were grievances felt by all the Belgians; the Catholic clergy resented the freedom of worship secured by the constitution, and had a traditional hostility to the House of Orange; the Belgian liberals resented the control of the Press. In 1828 all parties united to demand a separate administration for the Belgian provinces; in August, 1830, instigated by events in France, a revolt broke out and at once became general. A national congress proclaimed the independence of Belgium. The Dutch king appealed to the courts of Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and London, for help against his revolted subjects and to maintain the territorial arrangements of 1815.

France was anxious to help the Belgians, partly to break the work of the Congress of Vienna, and partly because of the hope that thereby Belgium might be brought under its influence and direction—the actual incorporation of the Belgian provinces was, of course, desired, but was regarded as impracticable owing to the certain opposition of Great Britain, which sympathised with the Belgians, but was resolved to prevent the recurrence of French control of the Scheldt, and therefore favoured Belgian independence and hoped by support thereto to counteract French influence. Russia was occupied elsewhere. Prussia was ready to give help to the king of the Netherlands. Austria hesitated. Metternich desired to repress revolution in Belgium as

everywhere else, to maintain the sanctity of the territorial arrangements of 1815, and to keep a strong barrier against France in the north. But he had lost his nerve; to him the request of the Dutch king for material aid appeared "most ill-advised," and the only possible course was to secure that Belgium should not be completely incorporated in France. Talleyrand appeared again on the diplomatic stage; through his efforts the British and French governments came together and convened a conference of the five Great Powers at London, which, in December, 1830, recognised the independence of Belgium and fixed the boundaries of the new state, excluding from it Luxemburg, which had joined the revolt but was to be left to the king of the Netherlands. Metternich in vain opposed these arrangements as made without the concurrence of the king, who refused to accept them and invaded Belgium. The Belgians appealed to Great Britain and France for help, and, desirous of a French connection, offered the crown to a younger son of Louis Philippe, who privately encouraged the offer while publicly rejecting it on his son's behalf. The conference refused its sanction, and in June, 1831, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg was accepted by the Belgians as their king on the nomination of the western Powers. The way was thus clear for Anglo-French intervention; France sent an army, and the British and French fleets blockaded the Dutch ports. But it was not until December, 1832, that the Dutch garrison at Antwerp surrendered, and the independence of Belgium was finally secured, all the five Great Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of the country. The negotiations regarding Luxemburg dragged on until 1839, when a treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands gave a small part of the territory to Belgium, the remainder being left to the king of the Netherlands as an independent grand-duchy.

The Belgian rebellion had been the crucial trial of the Concert of Europe created in 1814 and enlarged by the

admission of France four years later. It had failed to meet the test and had broken down completely, and the authority of its founder, Metternich, was henceforward limited in effect to the Austrian Empire and the Germanic Confederation. There he was to persist for sixteen years longer in his policy of resistance to all attempts at constitutional reform and all recognition of the new movements at work in Europe, until his overthrow by a widespread and uncontrollable outbreak of the forces which he had for so long laboured to repress.

CHAPTER III

The Period of Gradual Change

The fifteen years which followed the Belgian settlement were a period of comparative quiet in the international politics of Europe, and unmarked by territorial change; there were clashes of policy which modified the groupings of the Great Powers from time to time, and relations were occasionally highly strained, but the peace of Europe was never seriously menaced. The interest of the period lies mainly in the internal history of certain countries, in the continued democratic and nationalist strivings, and the rise of new economic and social problems and forces.

§ 1. *France and the Monarchy of July*

In France the Revolution of July, 1830, marked the final disappearance of divine right monarchy. Louis Philippe held practically an elective kingship; created by the middle class, he pursued an essentially middle-class policy. His government sought peace abroad, and for this relied largely in the earlier years upon an "entente" with Great Britain; at home it sought security by the promotion of material prosperity, such modest reforms as would meet the views of the bourgeoisie (the electorate was doubled, the hereditary peerage abolished, the censorship of the Press removed, the system of primary education extended and improved) and the repression of democratic movements, whether political —the revival of the republican party, or economic—the rise of trades unions. It was uninspired and dull; its foreign policy was nerveless and in the latter part of Louis

Philippe's reign became entirely discredited in French eyes. The king kept power as far as possible in his own hands, with ministers chosen by himself, and relying for a parliamentary majority upon bribery of the small electorate and the distribution of offices to the deputies, so that the opposition, which grew steadily throughout the reign, but especially during the long ministry of Guizot (1840–1848), was inevitably directed against the king himself. That opposition was very diverse. There were the more liberal monarchists, led by Thiers; there were the republicans, increasing rapidly owing largely to the influence of the historical writings of Michelet and Lamartine on the great Revolution; and there were the imperialists who, small in numbers at first, began to be an important factor in French political life as the weakness of Louis Philippe's foreign policy became manifest. A new force, the outcome of economic changes and the growth of French industrialism, made its appearance with the rise of Socialism, inspired by the teaching of St. Simon, Fourier and Proudhon, and the apparently more immediately practicable programme of Louis Blanc. And finally there were the clericals, whose activity was based on hostility to "liberty of education." The opposition had no common policy, but the monarchy found after a time little effective support anywhere—gradually it alienated all the nation except a small class too weak to give it effective aid. When during the struggle for parliamentary reform, demanded alike by republicans, socialist or other, and liberal royalists, rioting began in Paris, the king's courage failed him; he abdicated, and the monarchy of July collapsed ingloriously in February, 1848.

§ 2. *Mazzini and Italy*

After the abortive Carbonari risings which had caused the Congress of Troppau, Italy remained outwardly quiescent

for several years. The Carbonari had no clear aim other than the expulsion of the Austrians, except possibly a confederation of the Italian states, and no conception of any method other than secret conspiracy, and their somewhat fantastic organisation gradually declined, whilst after the Austrian military intervention in Naples the repressive policy of the Italian rulers became still more pronounced. The diversity of racial types in the peninsula, the absence of any common social organisation or political institutions, the deadweight of alien rule, the ignorance and poverty of the greater part of the population—all these made it inevitable that the conception of national unity and community of interest would be of very gradual growth, and that the advance towards better conditions would be slow.

The revolution of July, 1830, in France encouraged the Italian liberals, who hoped for French aid against Austrian intervention. In February, 1831, there were risings in the little state of Parma with its half-million peasant population, where the archduchess had persistently refused to her subjects any share in the administration, which was, however, intelligent and not unprogressive; and in the duchy of Modena, with a population of similar size under an ignorant despotism limited only by an equally ignorant priesthood. More ominous was a revolt in the Papal states, which had two and a half million inhabitants, ranging from the well-to-do peasants and active artisan class of Romagna and the Marches to the poverty-stricken dwellers in the country west of the Apennines, and the unemployed aristocracy and idle populace of Rome, and were ruled by a succession of Austrian popes and a faction-torn college of cardinals, assisted by an administration bigoted and corrupt, a legal system obsolete and unintelligible, a political police which had developed espionage to a height unknown even in Naples, and a drastic censorship of the Press and university teaching. The revolts made rapid progress at

first, but there was no unity of purpose; Austria promptly intervened, especially in support of the temporal power of the Pope; the hopes of French aid were not fulfilled. The risings were suppressed; the representations which the Great Powers made to the Pope as to the removal of the more obvious grievances of his subjects were ignored. There was, however, one reassertion of France's interest in Italian affairs. When the Austrian troops entered the Romagna, the centre of the revolt against the Pope, France sent an "observation force" which occupied Ancona; she dared not do more, and the Austrians occupied the Romagna and the French held Ancona until 1838.

The failure of 1831 finally discredited the Carbonari, but now there appeared a new revolutionary force and a national leader, Mazzini, who had founded Young Italy to work for Italian unity in a republic, and to do this by a great educational campaign. It was to be more than a political party; it was to be an organisation for moral, as well as material, progress by securing liberty for the individual and encouraging voluntary association for common ends. It proclaimed itself republican, because elective monarchy breeds anarchy and hereditary monarchy despotism, because there were "practically no monarchical elements in Italy" in the absence of a dynasty of Italian princes with some glamour from the past, because Italian tradition was essentially republican, and because republicanism is the only form of government which ensures freedom and equality for its citizens. It stood for political unity, because without it there could be no true nation and no real strength, so badly needed by a state surrounded by powerful neighbours, and federalism would keep her in political impotence like that of Switzerland, and "because Europe is undergoing a progressive series of transformations which is gradually and irresistibly guiding European society to form itself into vast and united masses." This was the

creed of Young Italy, and it was inspired by a strong religious fervour which made Mazzini a great missionary, wherein lay his true service to Italy. For as a practical leader he was weak and ineffective; his idealism made him unable to see things as they were, or realise the difficulties of the task; he underestimated the strength of Austria, and exaggerated the power of enthusiasm, dreaming that volunteers, ill-armed and untrained, could overthrow the Austrian armies. Thence came an unreadiness for compromise or wholehearted co-operation with those working on other lines for Italian unity, and after a life spent through all manner of hardships and suffering in devoted service to Italy, and after unity had been achieved, there was an end in loneliness and disappointment, because that unity was not as he had planned.

The great work of Young Italy was educational, spreading by every possible means through all the country the ideas of unity and republicanism; its immediate political action was futile. Two badly-planned and ill-equipped raids from Marseilles and Switzerland in 1833 and 1834 were easily crushed, and were followed by the demoralisation of the party, many executions, and the prolonged exile of Mazzini in England in poverty and physical distress. But the liberal movement continued, and with it the idea of unity made progress, though there was still no agreement as to the form which unity should take. In Piedmont-Sardinia there was a hope for union under the House of Savoy, with consequential advantages to the northern state: elsewhere some cherished the idea of a confederation under the presidency of the Pope. King Charles Albert of Piedmont was a nationalist, but had lost the liberal creed which he had held, however weakly, in his youth: now he was opposed by reactionaries and revolutionaries alike, and distrusted by the moderate liberals. Weak, absolutist, and much under clerical influence, he had yet sufficient independence

to resist Austrian dictation, and to strive to improve his army and prepare a war-fund, in the vague hope that it might sometime and somehow be used for Italy. And under British influence he began in 1847 some constitutional and administrative reforms. In the Papal States no improvement could be looked for, and no leader of an Italian Confederation could be found so long as the Popes were Austrian and the policy of the Vatican was under Austrian control. But in June, 1846, the Pope died, and prompt action by the Italian cardinals, who had been chafing at Austrian tutelage, secured the election of Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti, an Italian, as Pope Pius IX. The election aroused much enthusiasm in Italy, especially as the new pontiff was supposed to be favourable to reform in the government of the Papal States. But Metternich was not alarmed—to him a reforming pope was "an impossible thing"; and though he never underestimated the personal force of Mazzini he believed that his teaching had not greatly affected the mass of the people, and against any movement in Austrian Italy he relied on the absence of any widespread national enthusiasm, the diversity of aims of the Italian parties, and the military power of Austria. In Lombardy he feared only the aristocracy, who indeed played a memorable part in the Italian struggle for unity and independence.

In 1847 there was much unrest in Italy. A severe winter had caused grave economic distress, which gave rise to serious discontent among the working classes: in the middle class there was growing resentment at the absence of political rights and the pettiness of repression. The kingdom of the Two Sicilies, covering three-eighths of the soil of Italy, consisted of two states held together by a single government, but differing in traditions, social conditions and aspirations, and violently antagonistic to one another. In Naples the government had reached the heights of tyranny and the depth of inefficiency. The administration and the courts

were utterly incompetent and corrupt; the political police was ubiquitous and omnipotent; bad government and the absence of proper roads had the result that over much of the country agriculture was neglected; the peasants were heavily taxed and poverty-stricken; the trading class was small and without influence; brigandage was rife; the population of Naples was demoralised by the lavish expenditure of the court. Sicily was in not much better condition, but its population was more virile. Revolt was always simmering there, and on January 12, 1848, six weeks before the fall of the monarchy of July in France, there was a general rising, with a demand for administrative separation from Naples and the "English Constitution" of 1812. The Bourbon government of the island collapsed, and by the end of the month held only Messina and a few forts. It was the beginning of a storm which was to sweep over all Italy.

§ 3. *The German Confederation*

In the German Confederation there was up to 1848 no progress towards a closer union, and in the separate states constitutional reform came very slowly. The Federal Diet was effective only as an obstacle to change; it was ill-constituted, and the rivalry between Austria and Prussia completely paralysed it. Though his influence in Europe was greatly diminished after 1831, Metternich was still dominant in the Confederation, largely because of his personal influence over Frederick William III. of Prussia. That monarch had failed completely to keep the promises made during the national struggle against Napoleon; the grant of a constitution was indefinitely postponed, Prussia was without a parliament, and the provincial assemblies exercised little check on the crown and bureaucracy. But the grievances of the country were not of the kind from which other European peoples suffered during these years under au-

tocracy; the administration was regular, taxation was moderate, there was an efficient and national educational system, the laws courts were impartial. The real grievance, felt increasingly by the industrialists of the Rhineland and Westphalia, and by the large professional and university classes, was the refusal to them of any voice in matters of state and the prevention of all free discussion of public affairs. This was true of the majority of the smaller states also, especially in North Germany. In 1837, when the personal union of Hanover with Great Britain came to an end at the accession of Queen Victoria, her uncle, who succeeded to the Hanoverian throne as Ernest I., promptly abolished the recent constitution and dismissed the university professors who protested against that arbitrary action. The rulers of the southern states—Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, Saxe-Weimar—had adopted a more liberal policy and allowed public opinion some means of expression, and in the great "free cities"—Frankfurt-on-Main, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck—there was an active public life. The universities kept alive the idea of national unity, but as to the form which that unity should take there was no agreement; some believed it impossible except under Prussia, some desired it without the predominance of any one state, a few dreamed of a republic.

The intolerable economic conditions resulting from the existence of thirty-nine states, each with its own customs system, had led in 1819 to arrangements between Prussia and the smaller states whose territories formed enclaves in her midst, whereby a common customs policy was adopted, and the southern states, finding themselves endangered between the Prussian union and Austria, also drew together. Then the groups sought to coalesce; there were difficulties owing to the particularism of the southern states and the claims of Prussia, and conflicting economic interests, but

by January 1, 1834, there had been established a Zollverein, or Customs Union, of seventeen states having a population of twenty-three millions, with a common tariff against all other states, whether foreign or German. The union was renewed in 1841 for twelve years, and by 1848 had received several new members. Austria stood aloof at first, but Metternich gradually realised that the economic leadership of Prussia in the Zollverein might give her in time the political leadership also. In 1841 Austrian participation was seriously considered but deemed impracticable, because of the special position of Hungary, and because Austria was highly protective whilst the Zollverein policy was decidedly liberal. Thereafter Austria's aim was to force an entry into the Zollverein or to destroy it by playing on the smaller states' fears of Prussia; the Prussian object was always to keep Austria out. The formation of the Zollverein, besides giving a great stimulus to the economic development of Germany, was a long step towards political union, though it was not designed to that end.

Meanwhile the growing liberal movement in Prussia was encouraged by the accession in 1840 of Frederick William IV., who was believed to have progressive sympathies. He mitigated the censorship of the Press, and abolished it as regards books; he summoned representatives of the provincial assemblies to discuss the question of a state loan; he appointed a commission to draw up a constitution, and in 1847 convoked at Berlin a Landtag, or joint meeting of all the provincial assemblies, giving it the right to vote new taxes and present petitions, but not to enact laws. Conflict arose with the government, and the Landtag broke up. There was widespread dissatisfaction, and at the news of the Revolution of February, 1848, in Paris, there was a rising in Berlin, quickly followed by one at Munich, where the king of Bavaria abdicated and his successor hastily

promised reform. There was a general movement throughout Germany, and the Federal Diet could only yield to the storm.

§ 4. *The Austrian Empire: Hungarian Nationalism*

The Austrian Empire was divided administratively into two great divisions, one comprising Hungary and the other states attached to the crown of St. Stephen, which were under the Emperor as king of Hungary, and the other including Austria proper, Bohemia with its dependencies, Galicia and Bukovina, which were under the Austrian monarchy. In the empire as a whole the German element had control; German was the official language. It was Metternich's policy to rule in the Austrian territories by royal officials, the provincial assemblies of nobles being little more than a formality, and by a Press censorship and an active political police to restrict drastically all opportunities for criticism of the government or expression of racialism. But such a course was not practical in Hungary, where there was a tradition of self-government by means of country assemblies and a central diet, which even Metternich thought it expedient to convene in 1825 (after thirteen years' abeyance), when an attempt to levy taxation without its concurrence had broken down. Transylvania and Croatia had subordinate administrations, and the former had a diet of its own, which was encouraged by Metternich as a check on the Hungarians. The diversity of races and conflict of interests made a close union of the constituent states of the empire impracticable—a federal solution was alone possible—and it was easy for the emperor and his ministers to play off one nationality against another, especially where the races were intermingled in the same territory.

In German Austria there was a movement for constitutional reform, especially after 1830, which, though without

means of effective action, was sufficient to disquiet the government. In Bohemia nationalism was raising its head, mainly in the form of a movement, of which the founder was the Abbé Dobrowsky, to promote the study of the Czech language, literature, and history—a study which gradually evolved the idea of Panslavism, to be a common movement of the Slav races, headed by the Czech, against German and Magyar control. In Galicia the Polish national sentiment was still strong, and events in Russian Poland were watched with the keenest interest.

In Hungary there was a united demand for the extension of Magyar self-government, and the recognition of Magyar as the official language, after a struggle lasting from 1836 to 1844, was a decisive victory over the centralising policy of Vienna. On domestic matters the Magyars were divided: a small group of enlightened nobles, with the great body of the nation, sought the abolition of the feudal privileges, including exemption from taxation, of the nobles and the establishment of really representative institutions, whilst the large landowners and the half-million nobles generally clung to their rights, and desired reform only in the relations of Hungary with the crown. The Magyars had always been intensely loyal to the Hapsburgs, even when in conflict with their ministers.

The reform party became very active after 1832. A small section followed Count Szechenyi, a great nobleman, whose primary aim was economic reform and improved conditions for the peasantry, but the large majority followed two men who first appeared in the diet elected in 1832, and were destined to play great parts in the history of their country. These were Francis Deák and Louis Kossuth. Both were of the lesser untitled nobility; both had been trained for the law. Deák's remarkable legal knowledge and information as to Hungarian conditions made him a leader from his earliest appearance. Kossuth did not at

first make a mark in the diet itself, but began soon to issue a journal (lithographed, published and distributed secretly), which reported and criticised the debates, and contributed largely to co-ordinate the action of the reformers in the county assemblies. The liberals demanded a constitutional law, a reformed commercial code, improved means of communication, greater freedom for the peasantry, liberty of the Press, and religious equality (many of the smaller nobles being Protestant). Deák strove hard for agrarian reform, but little could be done—most of the peasants' burdens remained unlightened and the nobles kept their exemption from taxation. This was the result of class rivalry within the Magyar state; the other efforts failed before the resistance of the Imperial government, which dissolved the diet in 1836. The reformers then made the county assemblies their campaign ground, and Kossuth established a new journal to report the discussions there; in May, 1837, he was arrested on a charge of treason, and after two years' delay, spent mostly in solitary confinement, he was tried and sentenced to four more years' imprisonment. But the national temper was rising, and the Diet, which met in 1839, led by Batthyány in the upper house and Deák in the lower, refused to grant money or do anything until Kossuth and other prisoners were released. The government was forced to grant an amnesty in April, 1840: the Diet voted supplies, obtained some agrarian reforms (the peasants were given power to purchase their holdings), and was dissolved.

Kossuth was now a popular hero. In 1841 he undertook the editorship of the *Pesth Journal*, and he passed more and more to the radical wing of the reform party. His language and attitude became increasingly violent, and hints at a complete break-away from Austria caused grave discord among the liberals, many of whom believed that in face of the Slavs union with Austria was in the best interests of the Magyar nation. In the new Diet convened in 1843 the great

issue was that of general taxation, but whilst dealing successfully with that the reformers took a disastrous step—the use of the Magyar language was made compulsory in the debates of the Diet, in the administration, and to some extent in education. Deák, for personal reasons, was not in this parliament; the leader of the reformers was Kossuth, and the language policy was his. It was the first clear indication of his limitations and of an attitude which was to prove fatal to the Magyar cause. Claiming national rights for the Magyars, he and they would not recognise the rights of the races subordinate to them. In Transylvania the bulk of the population was Rumanian (or, more strictly, Wallach), but was unrepresented in the Diet, and was now demanding concessions in this respect from the Magyars. In Croatia, proud of its historical independence, there was a literary movement, which as in Bohemia and so many other modern instances was the first stage in the revival of nationalism. The Croats were represented in the Hungarian Diet, and the language decision struck as directly at them as at the Germans. Szechenyi's warning that "to impose our language by force is to provoke revolt" was unavailing. An attempt of the Imperial government to replace locally elected officials by crown nominees rallied the two wings of the opposition, and in March, 1847, a manifesto, signed by Deák and Kossuth, asserted the freedom and independence of Hungary and the necessity of constitutional government, but declared that the liberals were not hostile to union with Austria, if on a basis of complete equality. It also set forth a programme of internal reform which included the complete incorporation of Transylvania with Hungary, a proposal made solely in the interests of a Magyar minority. By this time the Imperial government was everywhere breaking down; there was unrest through all the Hapsburg dominions, and Metternich's long tenure of office and persistent policy of negation had resulted in a bankruptcy of

statesmanship. The Hungarian Diet, which met in November, 1847, under the leadership of Kossuth, but restrained by the more moderate and cautious counsel of Deák, revived all the old demands and pressed the policy of Magyarisation. At the critical moment came the news of the revolution in France, and of the revolt in Southern Italy, followed immediately by risings in Lombardy, and—most significant of all—an outbreak in Vienna itself. The Imperial government was overwhelmed: Metternich hastily resigned, and after thirty-nine years of undisputed control of Austrian policy was compelled to flee from the country; and the court, in the extremity of its peril, eagerly assented to the Hungarian demands and allowed the establishment of a responsible ministry for Hungary and the attached territories.

§ 5. *The Polish Problem*

The Congress of Vienna had divided the territories, available for redistribution, in which the Poles were the predominant race, between Prussia (which recovered its province of Posen), Austria (which had Galicia), and Russia (which received the remainder of the Napoleonic grand-duchy of Warsaw). The city of Cracow, with some surrounding territory, had been left as a Free City with an aristocratic constitution, and with its independence guaranteed, but subject to Austrian supervision. In Prussia, and to a far greater extent in Russia, there were other large areas formerly part of the ancient kingdom of Poland and with populations mainly Polish. Thus any Polish national movement in the territories of any one of the three eastern Powers must inevitably react on the two others, whilst the existence of the Free City provided a convenient centre for agitation. The General Treaty of Vienna had declared that the three Powers would grant "a representation

and national institutions" to their respective Polish territories, subject, however, to the overriding principle that the concessions to the Poles would be "regulated according to the degree of political consideration that each of the governments to which they belong shall judge expedient and proper to grant them."

Prussia adopted at first a conciliatory policy. The Polish nobles were given a larger share in the local administration, a Polish viceroy of Posen was appointed, a provincial diet representative of nobles, town burgesses and peasants was established in 1824, means of communication were improved, and the policy of peasant emancipation already applied in the Polish-peopled province of West Prussia was extended to Posen, where the peasant holdings were converted as to two-thirds in each case into freeholds. But this irritated the lesser nobles; the Roman Catholic clergy were hostile to a Protestant government; and though the mass of the Polish subjects of Prussia were at this time little influenced by racial sentiment, the two classes mentioned kept up an agitation against Prussian rule which gradually won many adherents.

In spite of the warnings of Castlereagh and the protests of Austria and Prussia, Alexander I. of Russia had persisted in giving to his new kingdom of Poland a constitution (November, 1815), which set up a nominated upper house and a lower house elected by the "nobles" and the burgesses of the towns; the Diet was to meet every two years, and to have power to vote new laws and taxes, but not to initiate legislation or control ministers; liberty of the Press, freedom from arbitrary arrest, employment of Poles only in the administration were alike guaranteed; Poland was to have its own separate army and distinctive flag and coinage. It was an honest effort on Alexander's part, but gave satisfaction nowhere. The Polish nationalists resented the exclusion from the constitutional kingdom of the

other Polish territories of Russia, and the liberals were thrown into opposition by the acts of ministers who had no sympathy with the policy and had recourse to the usual methods of Russian administration. Such Russian public opinion as could be said to exist was offended by the grant to Poland of institutions denied to Russia itself, where conditions remained unchanged. Alexander's liberalism was mainly sentimental; he was quickly disappointed and discouraged by what he deemed ingratitude. His sympathy was gradually alienated from the Poles, especially by the growth of secret societies; his successor, Nicholas I., though he took no immediate action, and allowed himself to be crowned as King of Poland in May, 1829, was from the first antagonistic. The diet did not meet between 1825 and 1830, and then came into conflict with the ministers. The opposition was in two camps—the moderates, consisting of clergy, officials, and landowners, whose policy was the strict observance of the constitution of 1815, and an advanced section, recruited chiefly in the universities, which was avowedly republican. When the news of the French Revolution of July, 1830, reached Warsaw, there was a rising in which the extremists at once got the upper hand.

The rebels were not united—inability to sink personal rivalries was an historical characteristic of the Poles. But the viceroy and his ministers were panic-stricken and paralysed, and the Poles came together for a time under General Chlopicki, a moderate, formed a provisional government and attempted to negotiate with Nicholas. An appeal was made to Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia for support in demanding the maintenance of the provisions of the Vienna treaty and their application to all the Polish subjects of Russia. Nicholas refused all negotiations, and the Polish diet, dominated by the advanced section, declared that the Romanoffs had forfeited the throne. Russian armies invaded Poland, and the tide turned quickly against the

rebels. No diplomatic help was forthcoming. In England the Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, was willing to protest against the violation of liberties guaranteed at Vienna, but asserted that the actual Polish constitution had not been guaranteed, and Polish independence would be a direct breach of the Vienna treaty. In France, though public opinion was very sympathetic, the government of Louis Philippe would do nothing alone, and in any event could have done little. Austria under Metternich maintained a strict neutrality. The Prussian government gave active support to Nicholas by preventing its Polish subjects from aiding the rebels. The revolt ended with the fall of Warsaw, and drastic coercion followed. The constitution of 1815 was abolished; and though an organic statute, which substituted a nominated council for the Diet, promised a separate administration, and guaranteed some political privileges and the rights of the Catholic church, all outwards signs of a Polish state disappeared. The administration was made dependent upon St. Petersburg, and assimilated in all respects to that of Russia; the university of Warsaw and most other educational institutions were suppressed; and every effort made to weaken the position of the Catholic church. The same policy of russification was pursued in Lithuania, where the Polish language was replaced by Russian in the schools and the university of Vilna was closed. There were small, isolated, and easily-suppressed risings in 1833, but thenceforward, though a subterranean agitation continued, Russian Poland was outwardly quiescent for a full generation.

The events of 1830–1 in that country had an immediate reaction in Posen. No rising took place there, but many of its Polish inhabitants joined the rebels across the frontier, and this gave the Prussian government an excuse for a change of policy and the beginnings of an attempt at germanisation, which followed the lines of Nicholas's rus-

sianising methods. German was made the sole official language, the administrative system of the purely German provinces was applied so far as practicable to Posen. German colonisation was inaugurated by restricting to Germans the purchase of the confiscated estates of those who had aided the Polish revolt. The religious houses were treated as centres of anti-German propaganda and suppressed. After 1840 there was some mitigation of this régime, chiefly in respect of the use of the Polish language, but no substantial change.

In the Polish-peopled territories of Austria there was little movement for thirty years after 1815; the Poles of Galicia were only one of the many races that made up the Hapsburg empire, and their position was no worse, if no better, than that of the other races. Cracow, however, lying between Austrian and Russian Poland, was a centre of continual disturbance, and as early as 1835 the three eastern Powers were contemplating the suppression of the Free City. In 1845 a so-called "Polish National Government" was set up there, and a general rising of the Poles was planned. Nothing happened in Russian Poland; in Prussia the movement of the secret revolutionary clubs, which had been forming for some time past, collapsed with the arrest of the leaders; in Galicia the Polish landowners did rise, and called upon the peasants, who were Ruthenes, to follow them. The Austrian government sent an army against Cracow, the city was captured, and Metternich declared the republic annexed to the Austrian empire (November, 1846), an act which Europe accepted without question. In Galicia the Ruthenes, encouraged by the Austrian authorities, turned against their Polish overlords; many of the latter were massacred, and there was much destruction of property. Attacked from above and below, the revolt collapsed.

§ 6. *Switzerland: the Struggle for Constitutional Reform*

In one state of Europe, which stood in the main apart from international politics, there was during this period a successful struggle for constitutional reform. The Swiss Confederation was a loose union of twenty-two cantons which retained each a large measure of independence, limited only by an agreement for combined action in foreign affairs and an undertaking to refrain from aggressive action against one another. The constitution of the cantons varied greatly, but most of them were aristocratic or even oligarchic, whilst in the others the towns were dominant; in the Catholic cantons ecclesiastical privileges were far-reaching. When after the events of 1822–3 numbers of political refugees entered Switzerland, the Diet, under pressure from the Powers, established control of the Press and police surveillance of the refugees. But gradually a liberal party grew up which sought to place the cantonal governments on a more democratic basis, and widen the scope of the federal pact. In 1829 there were reforms in Luzern and Appenzell, and, in the following year, under the stimulus of the French revolution of July, the movement gained substantial success in Zurich and eight other cantons. There was a growing popular agitation in favour of a strong central government, and this called into being a party (whose strength lay in the Catholic cantons) which wished the federation to be as loose-knit as possible, whilst there was also a reaction (markedly successful in Schwyz and Zurich) against the changes made in the cantonal constitutions. There had been in Switzerland since 1818 a marked development of clericalism, under the influence of the Jesuits, and its whole weight was thrown against the reformers. In 1841 proposals were mooted in Protestant cantons to dissolve the houses of the Catholic orders in Switzerland, and

seven of the cantons (headed by Luzern) formed in 1843 the Sonderbund to defend the orders and resist any extension of the powers of the federal Diet. Four cantons, led by Berne, resolved to expel the Jesuits: a violent controversy broke out, and the federal government tried unsuccessfully to mediate; the liberals were arming, the governments of the reactionary cantons were also ready to use force. Then in July, 1847, the Federal Diet decreed the dissolution of the Sonderbund, and the expulsion of the Jesuits; the cantons of the Sonderbund seceded and prepared for armed resistance. The issue as to the scope of the federal government was the same as that which was fought out in the United States less than two decades later, and as there negro slavery, so here the position of the Jesuits was the occasion rather than the cause of the conflict.

The French government openly sympathised with the Sonderbund, as did Austria—Metternich proposed that the Great Powers should remonstrate with the Swiss government, and threaten armed intervention if they were unheeded; Louis Philippe proposed a European conference, with intervention later if necessary. The British Foreign Secretary, Palmerston, could not well reject the conference proposal, for the Swiss Confederation was the work of the Congress of Vienna, but he privately warned the Swiss government to act quickly. It did so; when late in November, 1847, Palmerston followed Metternich's example and accepted the French suggestion, it was too late for intervention. In the preceding week the federal army, under General Dufour, had defeated the Sonderbund forces, and Zug and Luzern had surrendered. A revision of the constitution, on the lines of closer union and with a more democratic basis, was commenced, and all fear of foreign interference disappeared with the outbreak of revolution in France in the following February.

§ 7. *The United Kingdom and Sir Robert Peel*

Throughout the whole period from 1815 to 1848 there had been constant unrest in all the great states of continental Europe—with the exception indeed of Russia proper, where the vast mass of the population was sunk in ignorance and apathy—and in some of the smaller states also. Everywhere there was a demand from the people for a larger share in the conduct of public affairs, a growing dissatisfaction with the restriction of political power to an oligarchy, whether social or official, and in the subject or disunited peoples a growth of national consciousness. With this political unrest, in part a cause of it and enormously complicating the problem, was social unrest arising from the changes in economic conditions and the consequent new distribution of wealth and the rise of an industrial proletariat. To the resultant demands the government of continental Europe—whether in the states which had representative political institutions of a kind, as France, or in those which were controlled by an intelligent bureaucracy, as Prussia, or in those where absolutism was unchecked and unenlightened, as the Austrian Empire and some Italian states—did nothing but oppose a dogged resistance, making concessions only in the last resort with an ill grace and in the narrowest compass; and this policy of negation, after calling forth sporadic and always unsuccessful revolts, led at last to the widespread revolutions of 1848.

Meanwhile in the United Kingdom similiar demands for political reforms were being made, and similiar economic forces were at work, with greater intensity. The country had been faced at the end of the Napoleonic war with a series of grave problems fraught with serious danger to the state if they were not dealt with courageously and in a

spirit altogether different from that displayed by continental governments. There was the Catholic question: the union of the British and Irish parliaments had taken place at the beginning of the century, but the mass of the people of Ireland, like their co-religionists in Great Britain, were excluded from political rights, in that they could not hold office or sit in Parliament. The dissatisfaction of the Catholics rapidly increased after the war, and Ireland was on the verge of rebellion. There was the question of Parliamentary reform, and the problem of state economic policy whose solution largely depended upon it. The industrial revolution, which had commenced in the second half of the eighteenth century, had been hastened and intensified by the long war, and had caused the formation of a class of large manufacturers at the side of the landowners and merchants, the bringing together of dense aggregates of factory workers, and the shifting of the centre of gravity of England from the south to the manufacturing midlands and north. Until these changes the wealth of the United Kingdom had been mainly agricultural, the landowners had been depositaries of political power and had shaped the economic policy of the state. Now the manufacturing and trading classes were increased largely in numbers and enormously in wealth, but there had been no corresponding readjustment of political power, and economic policy, as exemplified in the Corn Laws, was still dictated by the agricultural interests. Moreover the over-rapid industrialisation of England and violent trade fluctuations had created a large class of mine and factory workers, whose conditions were extremely miserable, whilst the rural workers, deprived by the growth of the factory system of the "domestic" employment they had long enjoyed, had been reduced to grievous distress. The anti-combination laws passed during the panic caused by the French revolution were still

in force, and sporadic disturbances served as their justification.

Yet, though the country came perilously near to rebellion, far-reaching political changes were brought about peacefully. That this was so was due partly to the existence of parliamentary institutions which, as Canning pointed out, did afford to public opinion an opportunity (incomplete, but none the less real) of influencing the acts of rulers; partly to the tradition that force was only the last resource; and partly to the fact that the practice of parliamentary government had produced a line of statesmen trained to measure the forces at work, and when convinced that change was inevitable, disposed to guide it rather than maintain a futile resistance or stand aloof. Of these statesmen the most conspicuous, and in some respects the most typical, was Sir Robert Peel, whose fortune it was to have to deal with the three great problems of Catholic emancipation, parliamentary reform, and economic policy.

The son of a wealthy manufacturer of the second generation, who, though a vehement Tory, was a pioneer in factory legislation, Peel had entered Parliament in 1809 at a very early age, like many of his leading contemporaries there. Three years later, when only twenty-four, he became Secretary for Ireland, and held that office for six years. Retiring then, he did not resume office until 1822, when he accepted the post of Home Secretary and held it, except during the short premiership of Canning, until 1830, distinguishing himself as a capable administrator and reformer in respect of police, prisons, and criminal law. In the Liverpool ministry he lent steady support to the foreign policy of Canning and the economic reforms of Huskisson. Then after Canning's death Peel, as leader of the House of Commons, was confronted with the first great crisis of his career. He was a typical parliamentary statesman; pos-

sessed of a sound judgment, great administrative and financial ability and extraordinary power of work, he was gifted not with foresight but with a remarkable insight into immediate conditions, skill in dealing with concrete facts and what Disraeli called "a dangerous sympathy with the ideas of others"—a quality which that critic ascribed to a deficiency in self-confidence, concealed by a somewhat egotistical manner. Keenly sensitive to the movement of public opinion, he was as courageous in resisting it when he deemed it mistaken, as he was in following it against his political associates when he believed it to be right.

The situation in Ireland was critical; under O'Connell the Catholic Association was showing its full strength. Peel's tenure of the Irish Office, and steadfast support of Protestant ascendancy (which had caused his election for Oxford University in 1817) marked him out as the leader of resistance to the Catholic demands. But the position had changed; rebellion in Ireland seemed at hand, the government distrusted the police and troops there. Peel had made up his mind that the Catholic claims must be conceded —it was "better to encounter every eventual risk of concession than to submit to the certain continuance, or rather perhaps the certain aggravation, of existing evils." He would have preferred to stand aside and leave to the liberals under Lord Grey and Lord John Russell, or to the small group of Catholic sympathisers in the Tory party, the passing of the requisite legislation, but it was certain that neither of these could hope to carry it against the resistance of the King, the House of Lords, and the Established Church. The only chance was for the trusted leaders of the Tory party to take the responsibility. Peel resigned his university seat, failed of re-election there, but was returned elsewhere, and introduced the Bill. It was fiercely resisted, but the ministry stood firm, and the Catholic Emancipation Act became law in April, 1829.

Meanwhile agitation for parliamentary reform continued unabated. The Wellington ministry resigned, and was succeeded in November, 1830, by the Whig ministry of Grey, and except for a very brief period Peel was in opposition for eleven years. His position was at first very difficult; the recognised leader of the Tory party, which was violently opposed to any constitutional change, he was himself convinced that a measure, yielding everything that really mattered in the reformers' demands, must pass, or revolution, which might sweep away much more, was certain. He led the resistance, but when the temper of the country became apparent, he and Wellington induced the Lords to give way; and after the passage in 1832 of the Reform Act, the first great step in the democratising of Parliament, he strove to shape his party to the new conditions and, in his own words, "to lay the foundation of a great party which, existing in the House of Commons and deriving its strength from the popular will, should diminish the risk and deaden the shock of collisions between the two deliberative bodies of the legislature."

The Whigs remained in office until 1841, but their power steadily declined after 1835, despite the eager support of the youthful Queen Victoria from 1837 onward. The reforming ardour shown by the first parliamentary vote for primary education (1833), the recasting of the poor-law administration (1834), and the reorganisation of municipal government (1835), was followed by reaction. There were continued difficulties in Ireland, where a campaign for the repeal of the Union had begun. There were colonial troubles, especially in Canada. The foreign policy of Lord Palmerston was severely criticised. There was a growing radical party which distrusted the Whig government and was distrusted by it; and there was a secession of the more moderate liberals, who were approximating to Peel as he was drawing nearer to them. He could have overthrown

the ministry, had he accepted an alliance with the radicals for that purpose, but he preferred to wait until the general election of 1841 gave the Tories a majority. Then he took office, with some of the old Whigs in his ministry, for which the main problem was the economic condition of the country, now passing through a period of financial disorder, trade depression and widespread industrial distress, bad harvests and famine in Ireland. The task was of a kind eminently congenial to what Cobden called "Peel's politico-economical mind," and in the conversion of the debt, the Bank Charter Act, the establishment of the income-tax, the abolition of export duties, and the simplification, reduction, or abolition of import duties, Peel could claim to be following the Tory tradition, as recently exemplified by Huskisson. By 1845 he had practically adopted the policy of free trade, except on the vital issue of the Corn Laws. He had long defended them on the ground of the national necessity of self-sufficiency but when it became apparent that even high protection was not having the desired effect, and that the consumers were suffering, he began to have doubts. "The general repeal of prohibitory duties," he wrote, "and the recent application of the principle of free trade to almost all articles of import from abroad, made the Corn Laws the object of more searching scrutiny and more invidious comment, and narrowed the ground on which their defence could be based." Yet in spite of the activity of the Anti-Corn Law League, led by Cobden, the policy of agricultural protection might have been maintained, for trade had revived and industry was active, wheat prices had fallen steadily, and the lot of even the agricultural labourers showed some improvement, but in the autumn of 1845 came the failure of the Irish potato crop, which for Ireland meant famine. Peel made up his mind that the Corn Laws must be suspended, and that their reimposition later would be impossible. The ministry were not unanimous and he resigned, but the Whigs,

though they had long advocated the abolition, were not strong enough to take office and carry it: for that the votes of the moderate Tories were absolutely necessary, especially in the Lords, and these could be secured by Peel alone. The position was the same as with Catholic emancipation: Peel resumed office to carry by the votes of a reluctant party a measure which he had long opposed, but now deemed inevitable. Then his ministry was overthrown (June, 1846) by a combination of radicals, Irish nationlists, and malcontent Tories, and the four years to his death (July, 1850) were passed at the head of a small group of personal adherents in an independent support of the Whig ministry of Lord John Russell, which he regarded as a ministry of free trade defence. During those four years he saw the states of Europe harassed by internal upheavals which threatened their very existence, and knew that the United Kingdom's freedom from like troubles was due in large measures to his own statesmanship.

§ 8. *The Grouping of the Great Powers*

Before we close this survey of the period from 1832 to 1848 there are two other matters which require notice chiefly because of their effect on the grouping of the Great Powers, and particularly on the relations between Great Britain and France. The events of 1827 and the immediately following years had put an end to effective co-operation between the five Powers which had constituted the Concert of Europe, though formal homage was still done to the principle on which it was based, and replaced it by a system of "ententes" between the various members of the group. So long as Metternich continued in office, Austria carried Prussia in her train; Russia under Nicholas I. was concerned more and more exclusively with Eastern affairs; and the two constitutional states of the west naturally drew

together. They had taken joint action in Greece, and, after some divergence of views, in Belgium also; but their co-operation was never very cordial.

The first marked disagreement was over a phase of the Turkish problem. The Pasha of Egypt was almost independent of the Sultan, but had gone to his aid in the Greek revolt, and soon after claimed as reward the governorship of Syria. The Sultan's refusal was followed by the invasion of Syria by Egyptian armies, and a threat to Constantinople (1832–3). The ruler of Egypt was encouraged by France, which had a traditional interest in Syria, and especially the Holy Land, dating from the Crusades and the foundation of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, and exemplified most recently by the campaign of the first Napoleon. France had always aimed at predominance in the eastern Mediterranean, and now sought to secure it by extending the dominions of Mehemet. Great Britain was strongly opposed to any further weakening of the Turkish power, but was not disposed to act: Russia sent an army which checked Mehemet's advance, but he remained governor of Syria, and by the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833) Russia obtained practically the military protectorate of Turkey and the closing of the Dardanelles against all non-Turkish warships other than her own. In 1839 the Sultan tried to dispossess his vassal, and was disastrously defeated. Mehemet was bent on pushing his advantage to the utmost; France was sympathetic to him; British policy, with Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office, regarded the maintenance of the Turkish Empire as essential to the preservation of the European balance of power, by preventing the territorial aggrandisement of Russia or Austria, and held that to remove all cause for intervention —and the conflict of interests which would at once arise— Syria must be kept under the Sultan's rule and the desert be the barrier between the Sultan and his ambitious subject.

Russia policy on this point coincided with British—a strong military power in Syria and Asia Minor would be an obstacle to Russian aims. Austria and Prussia took the same line, the former because her goverment was anxious that Russia should not again acquire special credit with Turkey, and Prussia because of Austrian influence. The French efforts (Thiers was in power) on behalf of Mehemet were unsuccessful; for a time the French government seemed inclined to give him military aid, but in July, 1840, the other four Powers pledged themselves by the Convention of London to force the Egyptian ruler to accept the Sultan's terms. Combined operations by the British, Austrian, and the Turkish fleets overcame his resistance; French public opinion was very angry, but king and parliament shrank from a hopeless war, and the Treaty of London (1841) was signed by all five Great Powers. By its terms any separate protectorate, whether by France or Russia, over the Christians in Turkey was repudiated; the Sultan recovered Syria, Palestine, and Crete (occupied by Egyptian troops since the intervention in Greece), and the Dardanelles and Bosphorus were declared closed to all foreign ships of war so long as Turkey should be at peace.

French foreign policy had incurred a bad defeat; the Anglo-French "entente" had been severely strained, and it was now to be completely broken by events in Spain. In 1833 Frederick VII. had died, leaving by a Pragmatic Sanction the Spanish throne to his infant daughter Isabella, under her mother's regency. His brother, Don Carlos, disputed the validity of the Pragmatic Sanction, which had re-established female succession; he was supported by the monastic orders and the clergy, a large body of military officers, the towns of Castile, and the Pyrenean provinces, which clung to their old special rights and privileges and resented the centralising policy of the liberals. The regent sought in consequence support from the constitutional

parties: she granted a constitution (1834) closely resembling that of the Restoration monarchy in France—the ministers, nominally responsible to the parliament (Cortes) in fact controlled it by manipulating the elections—but the more advanced section of the liberals, whose strength lay mainly in Barcelona and Saragossa, and in Andalusia, were far from satisfied. For five years (1834–9) the unfortunate country was harassed by guerilla warfare, marked by great ferocity, between the Carlists and the supporters of the regent (the Christinists), whilst the latter were distracted by struggles between the two wings of the party. In the height of the conflict the advanced section was called to office (1837) and revised the constitution, increasing the power of the Cortes. The Christinists were helped by Great Britain and France, the Carlists by the other three Great Powers, with money, arms, and volunteers. At last disruption crept into the Carlist party: the Pyrenean provinces were induced to make peace by a guarantee of their local privileges. The most successful of the Christinist generals, Espartero, became virtual dictator, ousting the regent (who retired to France), and held power until 1843, when a coalition of all parties overthrew him. The regent was recalled, but a more liberally disposed soldier, Narvaez, acquired the real authority and retained it till 1851, with the constitution of 1834.

In 1846 Isabella and her younger sister would both be of marriageable age, and marriages which would secure an undisputed succession and interest some strong Power therein seemed desirable. The regent wished for alliances with French princes, but Great Britain, in accordance with traditional policy, declared that she could not permit so close a family union between France and Spain. Prolonged negotiations ended in a compromise (1845), whereby Isabella was to marry a Bourbon prince, and if there were children of the marriage her younger sister would then be

wedded to a younger son of Louis Philippe. Then France put forward an Italian Bourbon candidate; Great Britain proposed his brother. Guizot inspired the regent with distrust of the British government, and largely at his instigation the marriage of Isabella and the French candidate, Don Francisco d'Assisi, and of her sister with a son of Louis Philippe took place simultaneously. It was a deliberate breach of faith, intensified by the fact that Don Francisco was known to be unlikely to have children. The Franco-British "entente" came to an abrupt end, and France reaped no benefit, for Don Francisco's character soon caused a separation from his wife, and Isabella, angered by the action of the French government and the marriage into which she had been forced, looked for sympathy and support to the liberals, who were much under British influence.

The Concert of Europe had thus by 1848 entirely dissolved. The disintegrating force of competing ambitions had been too powerful to allow of the continuance of an organisation (if so definite a term can properly be applied to so loose-knit an arrangement) of which the sole original purpose was the maintenance of a particular distribution of territory, determined by principles from which the world was moving away even at the very time the distribution was made. That in itself was sufficient to imperil seriously the prospects of the Concert from the very first; they became hopeless when Metternich endeavoured to extend its purposes and use it to maintain also the application of an antiquated theory of government. The experiment had failed because the Concert had refused to perceive the inevitableness of change, and had sought to dam altogether the movement of political progress instead of guiding it into well-banked channels; and the result was the revolutionary flood which swept across continental Europe in 1848.

CHAPTER IV

The Revolutions of 1848

§ 1. *France, and the Second Republic*

The revolution of February, 1848, came upon Paris itself, and still more upon France, as a complete surprise. The fall of the monarchy of Louis Philippe was due less to the attacks of its enemies than to its own inherent weakness. It was the end of monarchy in France, but its destroyers had nothing ready to take its place. The advanced parties which had made the revolt—the political republicans led by Lamartine and the Socialists led by Louis Blanc—united to form a provisional government; this proclaimed the Second Republic, of which a British diplomatist could write at the time with much truth that nobody liked it or was in the least prepared for it. France, however, followed the lead of Paris, as it had always done and was to do for another forty years. The republicans had made the revolution of 1830, but had then been too weak to seize power; now they were strong enough to do that, but neither sufficiently numerous nor united to retain their hold. Directly the task of organising the new republic was taken in hand, the divergence of aims between the political and social republicans became apparent. Louis Blanc had his way at first. There was a grave financial and industrial crisis; the provisional government publicly undertook "to guarantee the existence of the worker by labour, to guarantee work to all citizens"; national workshops were opened in Paris, and workmen poured into them—within two months

there were one hundred thousand to be provided for, and the task being hopeless the idle crowds became a serious menace. Universal suffrage had been established, and a national assembly convened. The Socialists were conscious that the peasants, who constituted the mass of the electorate, were opposed to them, and endeavoured by demonstrations and violence to delay the elections, but they were unsuccessful: the assembly, elected on the 23rd April, contained a great majority of moderates, a substantial part being non-republican. The extremists caused riots in some large towns, and a second revolution seemed imminent in Paris. But the assembly, and the executive commission which it appointed, and from which the Socialist leaders were excluded, stood firm. It gradually closed down the national workshops, dismissing the non-Parisian workmen with a small bonus, substituted piece wages for day wages, and expedited provincial and other local public works, and drafted workmen compulsorily from Paris to them; this provoked a rising (June 23) which General Cavaignac, to whom the Assembly had given dictatorial powers, suppressed after four days' fierce street fighting.

The rising was a crucial event in the history of nineteenth century France; though the Socialists were crushed, it awakened fears of a recurrence of the early scenes of the great revolution and caused a violent reaction. The Assembly drew up a constitution which provided for a unicameral legislature and gave the executive power to a President, both to be elected by universal suffrage. The presidential election took place on the 10th December; Cavaignac, who had crushed the Socialist insurrection and had since shown moderation and statesmanship, received one and a half million votes, Lamartine obtained a mere handful, but Louis Napoleon, nephew of the great emperor, received nearly five and a half million. The new President's life had hitherto been passed in obscurity, interrupted only

by two melodramatic and futile attempts to lead an imperialist movement in France. The second failure and the resultant imprisonment taught him the unwisdom of that course; thereafter he was content to wait in exile in the belief that he would one day be called to the throne. The revolution of 1848 gave him the hoped-for opportunity; he returned to France and was elected to the National Assembly, where he was careful to play an inconspicuous part. But once his candidature for the presidency was known all the forces of reaction gathered round him. His strength, in his own words, was "in an immortal name, and in that only"; but to the overwhelming majority of the people of France it represented a strong government, internal order, and foreign glory. His election was the end of the Republic, though the form was allowed to continue for three years.

§ 2. *The German Confederation, and the National Assembly*

A fortnight of rioting in Berlin in March, 1848, induced Frederick William IV. of Prussia to grant liberty of the Press and summon an assembly, based on universal suffrage, to prepare a constitution for his kingdom; in Bavaria Louis I. abdicated, and his successor promised large reforms; and the smaller German rulers hastened to take a similar course. The party which with little encouragement had been working for German national unity believed that its opportunity had come, and an assembly of all who had sat in any German parliament was convened at Frankfurt. It had no legal authority, but the bewildered Federal Diet, with the Austrian government too much harassed by its own troubles to take action, hastened to give effect to the wishes of the assembly, and ordered the election by universal suffrage of a constituent assembly from all the lands held by German Powers, including, therefore, the whole of the kingdom of Prussia, Bohemia, and the Slav-inhabited territories of Austria, but

not Hungary and its dependencies. The movement was so strong that the German princes allowed the elections to take place. The new parliament met at Frankfurt on May 15, and after prolonged and stormy discussions appointed the Archduke John of Austria to be "administrator of the Empire" until the selection of a permanent chief. The Federal Diet yielded its powers to him and was suspended. The Archduke created a ministry responsible to the parliament, but it had no means of enforcing its decisions —it had no money and no troops of its own, but must rely for these on the rulers of the individual states, who were not disposed to support vigorously an authority which most disliked and all distrusted. The parliament consisted, inevitably, chiefly of men without experience of parliamentary procedure, administration, or diplomacy, and spent its time largely in theoretical debates. It resolved on a federal constitution, but was at once faced with two fundamental problems, which were in fact inseparable—what territories should be comprised within the federation, and who should be its head?

The assembly decided that the new union should include only territories with populations predominantly German, and the tie between the German and non-German lands of any state could be only the person of the ruler. This decision, objectionable to Prussia, was impossible for Austria. She was desirous of bringing in all the subjects of any German state, and there was a party (the *Grossdeutschen*) which favoured this solution, partly because of readiness to pay any price for German unity—though recognising that the federal ties could not be so close as in a purely German state, and partly because Austrian predominance seemed preferable to Prussian. The other party (the *Kleindeutschen*), eager to secure a really effective union, held that non-German peoples must be excluded even if this meant that the German subjects of the Austrian

Empire must also be left out. The Prussian government naturally supported the "small Germany" policy, since under it the King of Prussia would be unchallenged head of the Federation: if the "greater Germany" policy were adopted the headship must go to the Austrian Emperor. After a prolonged struggle the Kleindeutschen had their way; the Frankfurt parliament voted that the president should bear the title of Emperor and the office be hereditary, and on the 28th March, 1849, it offered the imperial crown to the King of Prussia.

But by this time reaction had taken place in Prussia, and the Austrian position had greatly changed. The Prussian assembly to frame a constitution was elected almost simultaneously with the Frankfurt parliament, one result being that the greater attraction of the latter weakened the quality of the gathering at Berlin. The large majority therein were moderate and constitutional royalists; there was a small republican party which favoured a federal Germany; and a party, representative of the eastern landowners, was bent on maintaining its privileged position, the personal powers of the monarch, and the fullest possible autonomy for Prussia in any Germanic union. With this ultra-conservative party the King's brother and heir, the Prince of Prussia (afterwards William I.) identified himself, and he was followed by the military class. The assembly adopted a constitution modelled on that of Belgium, guaranteeing individual freedom from arbitrary arrest, limited rights of association, and freedom of worship, and establishing a parliament with control of finance and the right to initiate legislation, and the responsibility of ministers to it. The King approved, but was already passing under the influence of the reactionaries, encouraged by events in Austria; conflict arose between the assembly and the ministry of officials; the royal troops re-occupied Berlin, and the

assembly was dissolved. The King then granted a temporary constitution closely resembling that prepared by the assembly, but reserving to the crown power to legislate by ordinance. A new parliament quickly came into conflict with the crown, and was dissolved (April, 1849): an electoral law, established by ordinance, put the voting power in the hands of the propertied classes, and in the resulting lower chamber officials were in a majority. That chamber accepted from the King (January, 1850) a constitution for the realm of Prussia which was liberal in form and largely so in fact, but with ministers responsible to the king and a legislature very subject to royal pressure.

The dissolution of the second parliament was largely due to its support of the offer made by the Frankfurt parliament to Frederick William IV., who after some hesitation had rejected it. With his deep-rooted belief in the divine right of kings, especially Prussian kings, he was reluctant to accept a crown from a democratic assembly; the Kings of Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, and Würtemberg were openly hostile; the Austrian government had recovered its authority within its own dominions, its armies were flushed with victory, and it would never willingly yield the leadership of Germany. Frederick William's refusal meant the end of the Frankfurt parliament: its attempts to assert its authority and maintain the federal constitution which it had devised failed in the absence of material force; small republican risings on its behalf in various parts of Prussia, in Saxony, Baden and the Bavarian Rhineland only weakened its position; reduced in numbers by numerous withdrawals and removed to Stuttgart, it lingered on to an inglorious end. The republicans were completely overthrown, and many fled from the country.

The Prussian government had meanwhile proposed that the federal constitution prepared at Frankfurt should be

revised so as to remove its more democratic features, hoping thereby to make it more acceptable to the rulers of the smaller states and possibly to secure their acquiescence in a Prussian presidency. But the Austrian government was now in the hands of a strong man, Prince Schwarzenburg, and convened an assembly of the state governments to re-establish the old federal diet. Prussia on its side convened an assembly at Berlin. The issue was again between a "greater Germany" under Austrian leadership and a "smaller Germany" under Prussian presidency. Austria was ready for war; Prussia's allies fell away; Schwarzenburg insisted on the dissolution of the Prussian league and recognition of the Federal Diet, and the Convention of Olmütz (November, 1850) marked the complete humiliation of Prussia. Austria dominated the Diet; the fundamental rights enunciated in the Frankfurt constitution of 1849 were annulled; and though the various states as a rule retained the forms of constitutional government, these were modified effectively by the dissolution of recalcitrant chambers, control of the Press, suspension of trial by jury and the arbitrary exercise of the wide powers long included in Germany under the term "police."

Yet something had been gained by Germany from the experiences of these years. It had been shown conclusively that effective union of the German people was impossible so long as Austria should be able to enforce her claim to inclusion, that Prussia alone could provide the military strength by which that claim could be defeated, and that the resistance of most of the other princes could in existing conditions be overcome only by force. And Prussia had at last obtained a constitution which with all its shortcomings did distinguish her from the states with which she had so long co-operated, Austria and Russia, in that it recognised the rights of subjects to participate in the work of government.

§ 3. *The Conflict of Nationalities in the Hapsburg Dominions*

The Austrian Empire seemed in the middle of 1848 to be on the verge of complete disruption. The government was demoralised by the demonstrations in Vienna in March, which followed on the revolution at Paris and the news of the unrest at Berlin. After the resignation and flight of Metternich hasty efforts of the usual kind were made to avert disaster, but freedom of the Press and the issue of a constitution were insufficient. The Emperor Ferdinand withdrew from Vienna; a liberal ministry was formed and a constituent assembly convened, which drew up a more advanced constitution and abolished the privileges of the nobles. The imperial government had also granted to the Magyars of Hungary almost complete independence, with parliamentary government. But everywhere in the Hapsburg dominions there were racial movements. In Bohemia a national Czech government was formed, and an imperial patent in April recognised the Czech as a nation; in Croatia there was a vigorous movement to obtain independence from Hungary, and the new governor, Jellachich, was ready to lead it; the Serbs, under the patriarch Raïatchich, also revolted against the Magyars; and so did the Rumanians of Transylvania, who were violently opposed to the complete union with Hungary which the Magyars desired but were almost equally hostile to the Austrian Germans. Lombardy and Venetia had also risen in rebellion.

In all this confusion the Austrian Empire was saved by two things. One was the army, of which George Meredith wrote: "The same policy which played the various states against one another in order to reduce all to subserviency to one central head, erected a privileged force wherein the sentiment of union was fostered until it became a nationality

of the sword." The other was the conflict of nationalities, the extreme claims of the races struggling for independence, and the resultant bitter rivalries. The Austrian-German liberals, in office at Vienna, would yield nothing to any of the other races: the nationalist Magyars refused to recognise the claims of Croats or Serbs or Rumanians.

In face of the absorption and magyarising policy of the Hungarian government, and the proposals being formulated at Frankfurt for a German parliament—in which the non-German territories of the Austrian monarchy (other than Hungary and its dependencies) were to be represented but would assuredly carry little weight—an effort was made to draw the Slavs together, and a Pan-Slav congress met at Prague in May, 1848. Its president was the Czech historian, Palacky; the Czech formed the majority of the delegates, but there were also Moravians, Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenes, and Slavs from the south. It had the tacit approval of the imperial government, which was preparing to use the Slavs against both Germans and Magyars, and its proceedings were marked by repeated declarations of loyalty to the Hapsburgs and repudiation of the idea of a Pan-Slav state. The conveners of the congress (who were mostly Czech) had already issued a proclamation announcing that—

"We solemnly declare that we are resolved to remain loyal to the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine, which reigns over us by virtue of hereditary right and constitutional principles. We are resolved to maintain the integrity and independence of the empire by every means in our power. We repel all the accusations of separatism, pan-Slavism, and pro-Russian tendencies which may be brought against us by evil-disposed calumniators. . . . Our national independence and our union depend on the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Austrian empire. The task which we essay is essentially conservative, and there is nothing to cause inquietude to our fair-minded and liberal fellow-citizens of other nationalities."

This kind of language was due no doubt to the desire to keep on good terms with whatever government there might be at Vienna, but it also expressed accurately the prevailing sentiment. The congress organised itself into three significant groups: the first was a Czecho-Slovak group, including Czech, Slovaks, Moravians, and Silesians, in the second were the Poles and Ruthenes, and in the third were the Slavs of the south—Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and lesser races. A manifesto to the peoples of Europe was prepared which condemned the tyranny of extreme nationalism, instancing the treatment of the Irish by the British, of the Slavs by the Germans, of the non-Magyar peoples of Hungary by the Magyars; it declared the aims of the Slavs to be the transformation of the Austrian Empire into a confederation of national states enjoying equal rights but maintaining the unity of the empire; it appealed for the righting of an ancient wrong—"the partition of Poland, which weighed upon the policy of the governments as an hereditary curse"; it protested against the prussianising policy of the Berlin government; and it expressed the hope that the Slav subjects of Turkey would soon form national states. An address to the Emperor was drawn up, formulating the claims of the various races represented. The Czech were content with what they had already gained; the Moravians sought similiar rights, and joint meetings of their own and the Bohemian Diets on matters of common concern; the Poles of Galicia asked for the same treatment; the Slovaks and Ruthenes sought from the Magyars recognition as a nation, with the right to the free use of their own languages in schools and colleges; the Croats desired a guarantee of their continued autonomy; the Slovenes sought to form a national state (Slovenia) with its capital at Laibach, and Bohemia, Moravia, and the Slovenes protested against inclusion in the Germanic confederation. The demands thus stated were to be submitted to the various

Slav Diets, but before this could be done disturbances occurred in Prague, the imperial garrison attacked the town, and the congress gradually dissolved (June 28). For the time it had achieved nothing practical; its significance is that it was the first overt declaration of the aspirations of the non-Russian Slavs, and that its Pan-Slavism was moral and not political in the sense of seeking to establish a Pan-Slav state.

The imperial government had found a general, Windischgraetz, who organised an army, took Prague, and quickly crushed the Czech. The Emperor returned to Vienna, and now the Hungarian problem became acute. Under the constitution granted by Ferdinand the Magyars had formed a coalition ministry under Count Louis Batthyány, with Deák as minister of finance and Kossuth as minister of justice. Legislation was enacted (March, 1848) providing for an annual Diet elected on a wide suffrage, the abolition of all exemptions from taxation and of all feudal dues (with state compensation), and judicial reforms. In this Deák took an active part, but he looked forward with the gravest apprehension. To the dangers arising from the military strength of the imperial government, and the possible intervention of Russia (which he already foresaw), there were added the lack of real harmony in the Magyar ranks and the ill-advised attitude of the great majority towards the Slavs within the Hungarian borders. That attitude, as we have seen, had already angered the Slavs; soon the Serbs were in open revolt, and, after fruitless negotiations with the Hungarian government, the Ban of Croatia, Jellachich, took the field against it, with the public disavowal and private encouragement of the Austrian government. The Magyar ministry asserted its loyalty to the House of Hapsburg, and its readiness to give it support in Italy; but it was resolved to resist the Slavs, and when the imperial approval of Jellachich became more manifest, and Batthyány and

Deák at a personal interview had failed to move the Emperor, the ministry resigned, and a committee of defence was formed (September), with Kossuth as its president. From this Deák stood aside; he was still a constitutionalist and firm believer in the necessity of the Austrian connection, from which he saw that Kossuth and his followers would shortly break away. So he kept aloof, to the great advantage of his country later.

The Emperor proclaimed Jellachich governor of Hungary, but an invasion of that country by the Croat leader was defeated. A new rising in Vienna was crushed by the combined armies of Windischgraetz and Jellachich, who then began a joint invasion of Hungary, aided by risings of the Rumanians in Transylvania and the Slovaks in the north. The Austrian goverment, master again of its capital, supported by the southern Slavs, and victorious in Bohemia and northern Italy, was resolved to crush the Magyars, and, as the Emperor Ferdinand had sworn to observe the Hungarian constitution, he abdicated in favour of his nephew, the long-lived and ill-fated Francis Joseph, then a youth of eighteen (December, 1848). The Hungarian Diet refused to recognise the change unless the new monarch took the same oath. A last effort was made by the more moderate Magyar leaders, Batthyány and Deák, to reach a settlement, but the imperial government insisted on unconditional surrender, and in March, 1849, formally incorporated Hungary in the Austrian dominions. War began, and for a time the Magyars were successful under Görgei and Bem (the latter in Transylvania). Then on the 14th April, Kossuth, who was now practically dictator, issued a declaration of Hungarian independence—a bold stroke of doubtful expediency, for no form of government had been determined upon. Kossuth himself favoured a republic, but the Magyars generally were at heart aristocratic and monarchical, and the declaration did not rally the nation as he

had hoped. The young Emperor appealed to Nicholas of Russia, and that monarch, anxious to pose as protector of of the Slavs, readily found that "the internal security of his empire was menaced by what was passing and preparing in Hungary: every attack upon the integrity and union of the Austrian empire being one on the existing state of territorial possession, which is in accordance with the spirit of treaties, the balance of power in Europe, and the safety of his own states." Against the combined attack of Austrian, Slav, and Russian armies the Magyar government struggled in vain. In an attempt to obtain the sympathy so long alienated it proclaimed the equality of all races within its territory, but it was too late. The abdication of the dictatorship by Kossuth was followed by the surrender of the army (11th August). A reign of terror under Austrian military rule began—Batthyány (moderate as he had always been) and other leaders were executed; and when it ceased the imperial government entered in Hungary, as throughout its dominions, upon a régime of centralisation and germanisation, with the suppression of all local liberties, stringent Press control, and an unrestrained political police. The constitutions granted in 1848 disappeared.

Kossuth, Bem, and other Magyar leaders had escaped to Turkey, which, backed by Great Britain and France, refused to surrender them; thence the ex-dictator passed to England and the United States, where his powerful eloquence on the theme of Magyar independence aroused much popular sympathy but failed to move the governments. Thereafter to his death in 1894 he remained in an exile, at first compulsory, and then, when better times came for Hungary, self-imposed.

§ 4. *The Failure of Revolution in Italy*

The Sicilian rising in January, 1848, was followed immediately by revolts in all parts of Italy. In Naples Ferdin-

and II. yielded at once, and granted as in Sicily a constitution with responsible government. So did Charles Albert in Piedmont-Sardinia and the young grand-duke in Tuscany, where the administration had never been characterised by the harshness and intolerance which had been so conspicuous in the other states ruled by non-Italian princes. In Parma and Modena there were rebellions which drove out their rulers and set up popular governments. In the Papal States Pius IX., whose election had aroused a popular enthusiasm which was already waning with the decline of belief in his sympathy for Italian nationalism and reform, so far fulfilled expectations as to form a ministry under Cardinal Antonelli in which lay members predominated; but this did not satisfy the popular demand, the Pope would not go further, and drifted swiftly towards reaction.

Meanwhile the north of Italy had risen against Austrian rule: Milan led the revolt, and there the republican and monarchist parties coalesced to set up a provisional government. The Austrian governor, Marshal Radetzky, unsupported from Vienna, which was in the throes of revolution, could do nothing, and Lombardy and Venetia were quickly freed, the Austrian forces holding only the fortresses of the Quadrilateral (Peschiera, Mantua, Verona, Legnago). Venice declared itself a republic. But Lombardy and Venetia could not maintain their freedom without help, and appealed to the rest of Italy. The grand-duke of Tuscany was more or less sincere, and sent a small force. The King of the Two Sicilies, engaged in posing as a constitutional monarch but rapidly recovering his power owing to the weakness of his liberal ministers, dared not openly stand aloof, and dispatched an army to the north with orders not to hasten. The Pope put aside the great chance of taking the leadership of Italy, and, whilst allowing the papal forces to move northward, forbade them to pass beyond his frontiers. Economic distress in his states intensi-

fied the political unrest; Pius was increasingly alarmed, and the protests of the German episcopacy, his reluctance to break with Austria, and fear of the rising democracy, led him in April to issue an allocution declaring that he, who "loved with an equal affection all peoples, races, and nations," could take no part in a war against a Catholic power. A storm of indignation throughout the Papal States led him, however, to dismiss Antonelli and take a less reactionary chief minister.

Though volunteers poured into the revolted provinces, effective aid could come only from the trained army of Piedmont-Sardinia. Charles Albert wavered, but under the pressure of popular enthusiasm declared war on Austria, and his army entered Lombardy (25th March). But the whole Italian movement was crippled by uncertainty of purpose. Charles Albert did not come forward as a national leader. To him, and many of his subjects, the main object was the aggrandisement of Piedmont by the creation of a North Italian kingdom. But Lombardy and Venetia did not desire mere annexation to Piedmont; a popular vote there, as in Parma and Modena, had declared for it, but this was due largely to the belief that only so could Charles Albert's help be secured. The republicans were of two minds; some were prepared to modify their immediate ideals, because at the time, as Crispi said, the monarchy would unite, the republic would divide the nationalists, but others were tenacious of their republican creed. Of the latter the leader was Mazzini; professing that during the struggle there must be a truce to party conflict, that unity was the first essential and the form of government could be settled later, and enthusiastically encouraging the volunteers, he was incapable of translating his declarations into deeds. He would support Charles Albert only if the king declared for complete unity, and his violent attacks on the Piedmontese merely created discord. The war was mismanaged from

the first; the Piedmontese army advanced very slowly, Radetzky was allowed to retreat to the Quadrilateral and time was wasted in attacks upon its fortresses, and when at last the Austrian general took the offensive his success was rapid. On August 6 Milan surrendered: Charles Albert's army retired from Lombardy and an armistice was arranged.

Mazzini strove to bring about a new rising in the north, but it was hopeless, and he turned to Rome. The papal authority was collapsing; the Pope had committed the administration to Rossi, but even that nationalist and reformer could not allay the unrest, or obtain the support of an assembly which could legislate only with the consent of the College of Cardinals, and could not do anything which affected the clergy in any way or was contrary to the canon law. In November Rossi was murdered; popular demonstrations demanded a democratic ministry and a constituent assembly; the Pope fled to Gaeta. A provisional government was formed, which was placed under the pontifical ban, and under the influence of Antonelli, who was to dictate papal policy for eight and twenty years, Pius IX. appealed to the European Powers. Spain proposed a congress, and Austria and Naples agreed; but France, under Cavaignac, and, later, Louis Napoleon, refused to take any action so long as the person of the Sovereign Pontiff was safe. Nothing was done; the republicans obtained control, and on February 9, 1849, issued a proclamation deposing the Pope from the temporal government of the Roman states, though guaranteeing to him independence in the exercise of his spiritual functions; announcing that the form of government should be a pure republic, with "the glorious appellation of the Republic of Rome"; and declaring somewhat vaguely that the new state would "bear towards the rest of Italy the relations demanded by the common nationality." Mazzini was invited to Rome, and became its dictator, seeking to organise a truly democratic republic and

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prepare for the national war which he still believed possible. But the time for that had passed. The violent military repression in Lombardy, the terrorism of the Austrian administration, the crushing weight of taxation and the prevalent economic distress there had kept alive the agitation in Piedmont, where a general election had returned a strong democratic majority, eager to renew the war. But the chance of genuine co-operation from any other Italian state had vanished; reaction was triumphing in Naples, Sicily was absorbed in its own affairs, the designs of Piedmont were generally suspect, the royalist Piedmontese disliked the republican tendencies of the central Italian states, and of Rome and Venice. Foreign intervention in support of Piedmont was unlikely; French aid, even if forthcoming, was distrusted because of France's known ambitions as to Nice and Savoy, whilst the British government, which in 1847 had tried to persuade the Italian princes to make some concessions, and in 1848 had endeavoured to keep Charles Albert from war, had been alienated by his refusal to make any compromise with the government at Vienna. But despite all this, and although the army was much shaken by the ill-success of the previous year, Charles Albert and his ministers resolved to renew the war. The result was disaster; completely defeated at Novara (23rd March, 1849) Charles Albert, in the most dignified act of a disappointing and disappointed career, and in order to obtain an armistice preliminary to peace, abdicated in favour of his son, Victor Immanuel. Strong demonstrations of public opinion in France and a resolution of the National Assembly there, promising full support to the government in any action to prevent Austrian designs on Piedmontese territory, were effective; Piedmont was left intact, and the new King, despite Austria's protests, maintained the representative institutions which his father had granted.

Venice still maintained its independence, but it was in an

isolated and helpless position, though it held out against the Austrians until late in July. But the attention of Europe was concentrated after the battle of Novara on the Roman Republic, which stood firm under the inspiration of Mazzini and with the help of a large body of volunteers from all parts of Italy, among whom was Garibaldi, a sailor who had won a great reputation as a guerilla leader in South America. In February Cardinal Antonelli had formally appealed to all the Powers, especially such as were Catholic, for their moral interposition and armed intervention on behalf of the Pope, since only in this way could "the pristine order be reinstated in the dominions of the Church and the Holy Father restored to the free exercise of his full authority, as is imperiously required by his sacred and august character, and for the interests of the Universal Church and the repose of the inhabitants." Austria after Novara was ready, under Schwarzenburg's guidance, to re-assert herself as the guardian of the old régime in Italy; the King of Naples had suppressed the Sicilian revolt and was eager to co-operate with the Austrian government to restore the Papal authority in Rome.

But now came French intervention. Its motives were complex. Louis Napoleon, now President of the Second Republic, had long sympathised with Italian aspirations, so far at least as they were directed against foreign domination, and was desirous of aiding their realisation; he was eager to inaugurate his presidency, and take a step towards the throne which had always been his goal, by some striking achievement; and it was a traditional postulate of French foreign policy that Austria must not control the Italian peninsula. A counter-move to Austria was dictated by all three motives. But a large body of opinion in France regarded temporal power as a fundamental requisite for the Papacy, and the restoration of Pius would gain for the President the support of the clericals—support which was

needed for his domestic schemes. It was recognised that reforms in the administration of the Papal States were necessary, and Louis Napoleon hoped, as previous French governments had done, that these would be made by the Pope of his own free will. Recalling the occupation of Ancona in 1832, the President and his chief minister, Odilon Barret, resolved on sending to Rome an expeditionary force—thereby gratifying the army—whose chief would be a mediator between the Pope and his subjects; it would restore the Pope, but on condition of reforms; it would be a guarantee of those reforms to the people of Rome, whom it would safeguard against repressive action by the Pope or the Austrian and Neapolitan armies sent to support him; and it would check Austria's design to police the peninsula. It was the first example of the tortuous Napoleonic policy which was to bewilder Europe for two decades; and it failed. For its success depended on the willingness of the Pope to make reforms and of the Romans to accept French mediation. But Pius would promise nothing, and the Roman Republic would not admit the French army under Oudinot—it issued a solemn protest against the invasion of its territory, and repulsed with loss an attempt of the French general to obtain entrance (30th April). De Lesseps, who was to achieve fame in a quite different way twenty years later, was sent from Paris to endeavour to negotiate with Mazzini and his colleagues an arrangement which would permit the peaceful entry of the French army, but Oudinot and the military party were eager to avenge their repulse, the Pope was intransigent, the French clerical party became more and more exigent, the Roman republicans had lost all faith in France, and the negotiations failed. A Spanish force landed in Italy; an Austrian army marched down from the north, capturing Bologna in May and Ancona in June; a Neapolitan army moved from the south; Oudinot was reinforced and early in June attacked

Rome. The siege lasted twenty-five days, and was marked by great heroism on the part of the defenders, under the daring leadership of Garibaldi, but the issue was never in doubt. The city was captured; Garibaldi, with many of his volunteers, escaped through the encircling armies; Mazzini, utterly broken down, remained for a time strangely unmolested and then made his way unhindered into France. The Pope was restored, but a French force was left "to maintain order," and the consequences of this were to weigh heavily upon Louis Napoleon for twenty years, and to bring disaster to him and France.

The reaction was triumphant. Piedmont-Sardinia seemed reduced to impotence; the rule of Austria over Lombardy and Venetia appeared more firmly riveted than ever before; Tuscany had recalled its grand-duke, whose inclination to reform yielded to the representations of the other Italian rulers; in Parma and Modena the old order was restored; the Sicilian revolt had been crushed, and there and in Naples was a régime of unintelligent despotism and blind repression; the Pope refused to listen even to the mild suggestions of France, and the Papal States reverted to a system of government which a few years later could be described with truth as the opprobrium of Europe. The Italian movement of 1848–9 had failed because of the indiscipline and inadequacy of revolutionary action and volunteer forces, the lack of any common purpose, the conflict of ambitions, and the want of statesmanship which could harmonise the rival interests, co-ordinate effort, and counter the diplomacy of the enemies of Italian freedom and unity. In Piedmont alone, with its representative institutions and constitutional government, and its Italian dynasty, lay any hope for Italy; and from Piedmont a new movement was soon to come.

CHAPTER V

Napoleon the Third—The First Epoch

§ 1. *The Time and the Man*

The period from the Congress of Vienna to the revolutionary years 1848–1849 had been one of international peace, except in the south-eastern corner of Europe, of efforts towards the modifications of the absolutist régime prevalent in so many continental countries, of the development of racial consciousness with resultant attempts on the part of subject peoples to attain independence, and of divided peoples to secure national unity. The statesmen of the continent had been almost without exception ultra-conservative; they had striven to repress, or where that proved impossible, to restrain the liberal and nationalist movements; and their persistence in that course had led to the revolts of 1848–1849, which had failed largely through want of leadership and the lack of adequate material resources. In the years since the Congress the principle of nationalism had compelled acceptance in the case of the Greeks and the Belgians, but had suffered heavy defeat in Germany and Italy, where unity had been sought, and in Hungary and Bohemia, where the object had been national recognition; and some progress had been made towards the development of popular and constitutional government in Switzerland and especially in Prussia and Piedmont—where parliaments survived the revolutions which had brought them into being, but elsewhere little had been gained and in the Austrian empire something had been lost.

The twenty-two years which followed were a period of almost constant war between Great Powers, of large territorial changes, and of the triumph of nationalist movements under the leadership of statesmen and soldiers. During those years, as in the period immediately following the Congress of Vienna, a small group of men dominated European politics, but they differed from their predecessors in that whilst their aims were divergent they were all bent on sweeping changes in the organisation of Europe. Of this small group the central figure was Napoleon III., under whose rule France was the arbiter of Europe. His policy was largely personal; it was not always approved by his ministers—sometimes it was not even known to them—or regarded with favour by his subjects; it was often tortuous and obscure; it bewildered foreign offices, which for more than half his reign deemed him a far-sighted statesman and a master of diplomatic craft; but it was of supreme importance for Europe, alike in its apparent successes and in its failures.

Louis Napoleon, nephew of the great emperor and son of King Louis of Holland, had been born in 1808: exiled with his dethroned parents after the fall of the Empire, he had been until 1848 a wanderer in Italy, Switzerland, England, and the United States. As a young man he was an enthusiast for Italian liberty, and took part in a rising in 1831; he served as a captain in the Swiss artillery; twice, in 1836 and 1840, he endeavoured to raise revolts in France against the government of Louis Philippe—the first caused his banishment to America, the second cost him five years of imprisonment in a French fortress, whence he at last escaped to England. Returning to France after the February revolution as a "simple private citizen" he had secured election, because of his name, to the National Assembly, and again, because of his name, had been chosen President of the Second Republic, which from that moment was doomed.

The legislative assembly elected in May, 1849, contained a great majority of royalists whose various sections were led by Thiers, Berryer and Montalembert, and at first directed its energies towards crushing the republicans, but then the President and assembly came into conflict. The monarchists became alarmed at the obvious intention to restore the Empire, and endeavoured to limit the executive authority of the President. On the 2nd December, 1851, Louis Napoleon arbitrarily dissolved the assembly and ordered a new election based on universal suffrage. The army was ready to follow the President; the leaders of the opposition parties had been arrested, and thousands of other arrests in Paris and throughout France followed within a few days; attempts at armed resistance were ineffective. A new constitution was submitted to the people of France which vested the executive power in the President alone; he was to choose the ministers, who were to be responsible solely to him, a council of state nominated by him would prepare laws, a legislative chamber elected by universal suffrage would discuss and vote them; a senate appointed by the President would be the guardian of the constitution. It was approved by seven and a half million votes against less than six hundred and fifty thousand, and thereafter it was certain that the hereditary Empire would speedily be re-established. A plebiscite of December, 1852, approved the resolution of the Senate which declared Napoleon III. Emperor of the French.

During the years of exile and poverty Louis Napoleon had been sustained by the conviction that his destiny was to rule over France, some day, as his uncle had done; a visionary and dreamer, he believed his uncle's mantle to have fallen on himself. He had formed a conception of the Empire as the ideal régime for France, shown to be so by the failure of the three forms of government which had succeeded it since 1815—the Restoration monarchy, ruled by the traditions of the past; the monarchy of July, with no tra-

ditions and no ideals; the Republic, with ideals which caused it to ignore both the past and the present. The Empire was to reconcile progress with order, and could do so because it would be an autocracy based on universal suffrage. But conditions had changed since the First Empire; great wars had been necessary then to compel its recognition by Europe; the new Empire must seek peace and industrial and commercial progress, and afterwards the extension of political liberty on democratic lines. But until the time for that extension had come, the Emperor must be autocratic ("the characteristic of democracy is to personify itself in a single man"), since only so could he act in the name of the whole nation and impose order on the warring factions. And he had in fact received an absolutist authority at the hands of universal suffrage. The magic of his name, the general dissatisfaction at the loss under Louis Philippe of France's prestige in Europe, the discredit of the republicans from their factiousness and the resultant fear of wide-spread social disorder, and the non-success of parliamentary institutions since 1815—all these had caused universal suffrage, which in France meant the vote of the peasantry, to entrust almost unrestricted power to Napoleon III., relying on him to repeat his uncle's work and give France internal stability and foreign renown.

An acute student of social and economic questions, with liberal views, the Emperor honestly desired peace and industrial development, sympathised with the Italian cause, and was not ill-disposed towards the movement for German national unity. But he was also an adventurer, driven at first by the desire to carry on the Napoleonic tradition and play a conspicuous rôle in Europe, and thereby incidentally to distract the attention of the people of France from the despotism which he deemed necessary to consolidate his position, and later by the absolute necessity for striking successes abroad in order to recover his waning prestige at

home. So he endeavoured to drive hard bargains and obtain territorial concessions as the price of the support even of those with whose aims he sympathised, or of neutrality towards those to whom he was antagonistic, and plunged into distant military adventures, so that throughout his reign France was almost constantly at war, on a greater or lesser scale. The conflict of the two men—the idealist and the calculating and cynical intriguer—if indeed there were only two who were Napoleon III., was the cause of an inconsistency and incoherence which bewildered France quite as much as Europe, isolated her in the hour of crisis, and wrecked the Empire.

§ 2. *The Domestic History of the Second Empire*

The domestic rule of Napoleon III. falls into three periods. In the first the doctrine of autocracy was vigorously applied. The constitution was that approved by the plebiscite; the ministers were answerable only to the Emperor; the legislature was elected by universal suffrage, but the elections were manipulated by "official" candidatures, prohibition of public meetings, and tampering with voting papers, and the resultant body was a mere register of the imperial will. The republican and Socialist chiefs were in prison or exile, the royalist leaders kept out of public life; the Press was under stringent censorship; the universities were closely supervised; the central control of the local administration was made more strict. On the other hand there was great activity in respect of public works, of which far-reaching schemes for the improvement of the capital were the most conspicuous; railways and telegraphs were extensively developed; the organisation of public assistance was improved; the customs duties on materials for industry and on foodstuffs were reduced. Under the close alliance of the government with the clerical party numerous churches

were built or restored, councils of bishops were permitted to assemble, and their relations with the Holy See were less restricted. The pomp of the First Empire reappeared at the court of Napoleon III. and his Spanish wife, and an example of lavish expenditure was set to France.

The transition period began with the Italian war of 1859, and the resultant breach with the clericals. In the imperial council there were two parties—the conservative advocates of autocracy and supporters of the temporal power of the Pope, amongst whom was the Empress Eugénie, and a more or less liberal group led by Prince Napoleon, the Emperor's cousin. As the clericals fell away from him the Emperor was forced to seek the support of the other party, and modify his régime. The scope of debate in the Senate and legislative assembly was widened, the control of the Press mitigated, a limited right of combination granted to the workmen. But the most important event was the commercial treaty of 1860 with the United Kingdom. Napoleon III. was a convinced believer in the doctrine of free trade, but after his first successes the efforts which he made to moderate the highly-protective tariff failed before the resistance of the legislature under pressure of the industrial towns, and as his power to make commercial treaties was unrestricted he used it to carry his economic opinions into effect. But that was not the only motive for the treaty. At the end of 1859 France was politically almost isolated. She had been at war with Russia, and later with Austria; the new kingdom of Italy distrusted Napoleon; in the United Kingdom his action at the end of the Russian war had caused much resentment and his later proceedings much alarm. The commercial treaty enabled Napoleon to make extensive reductions of customs duties, it had a favourable effect on British opinion, and it was a demonstration to Europe of the imperial "will to peace"—both these purposes being served by 1864 by similiar treaties with Belgium, the

German Zollverein, Italy, and Switzerland. Sweeping changes in French fiscal policy were also made by the abolition or reduction of duties on many materials, the removal of export prohibitions and abandonment of export premiums, and the mitigation of the differential treatment of foreign shipping. This break with the traditional economic policy of France was disliked by the great majority of the French, and was made by Napoleon's personal will, inspired partly by political motives, but mainly by convictions derived from a study of recent British policy, and particularly the reforms of Sir Robert Peel. The example of France was followed by most continental states, and in the decade following 1860 Europe was covered by a network of commercial treaties which, with their reciprocal reductions of customs duties and grant of "most favoured nation" conditions in matters of trade and commerce, gave a great stimulus to the economic development of the continent.

The changes made in the imperialist system did not satisfy the growing opposition, composed of very diverse elements. There were the clericals, strong supporters of autocracy, but bitterly hostile to Napoleon's Italian policy; there were the liberals, led later by Ollivier, who desired to maintain the Empire but to remove its more autocratic features; there were the royalists, led by Thiers and increasingly disposed to make common cause with the reviving republican party, whose chiefs had returned from exile; and there were the Socialists who were gaining in influence since the commencement of the new scientific Socialism and the formation of the "International" by Karl Marx and others in 1864, and found a fruitful field for propaganda in the growing industrial proletariat. And after 1860 Napoleon's foreign policy won no successes to offset the growing unpopularity of his domestic régime, which after 1866 became so great as to imperil the continuance of the dynasty.

So the Emperor resolved to throw himself on the support of the moderate liberals, whose programme included the responsibility of ministers to parliament, freedom of public meetings, and abolition of all special laws as to the Press. In 1868 he yielded on the two latter points—a concession which greatly facilitated the republican campaign against him. The elections of 1869 returned a majority of moderate imperialists; Napoleon, ill in mind and racked by incurable disease, gave way, and called their most conspicuous member, Ollivier, to office as minister-president. The constitution was revised, the powers of the legislature were widened, a real council of ministers was formed, with its members appointed by the Emperor but responsible to the legislature in the sense that they might be impeached—they were not dependent for office on a parliamentary majority. The new constitution was approved by a vast majority in a plebiscite on the 8th May, 1870; ten weeks later war was declared against Prussia; seven weeks later still the Second Empire was at an end.

§ 3. *The Eastern Question Again*

The first great international problem after 1850 was a new form of the Eastern Question. The complete loss of Serbia and Greece, the autonomy of Moldavia and Wallachia under their native Hospodars, and the practical independence of Egypt had produced among the Turks a party, including the Sultan Abdul Mejid himself, which believed that only large measures of reform could save the Ottoman Empire from much further loss. This policy was strongly pressed by the British government, whose representative at Constantinople, Stratford Canning, used all his great powers to save the Turkish state by inducing its rulers to adopt wholeheartedly measures for the security of the lives and properties of the Sultan's Christian subjects, the develop-

ment of Turkey's economic resources, the rearrangement of taxation, and the reorganisation of the army. One obstacle was the unyielding conservatism of the great body of the Turks; another was the attitude of the Emperor of Russia, who did not believe the policy to be feasible, but was bent on preventing it, since a regenerated Turkey would defeat Russia's hopes of advance both in south-eastern Europe and in western Asia. Russian influence at Constantinople was always used against the reformers, and the rivalry with Great Britain became acute.

In 1848 a rising took place in the Danubian provinces, the demands being for universal suffrage and a larger popular share in the administration. Russia claimed the right or duty under the treaty of Adrianople to maintain order in the principalities, and proposed to the Sultan a joint military occupation. Stratford Canning, to deprive her of any excuse for intervention, urged the Sultan to make concessions to the rebels and refuse the Russian proposal. But the British foreign minister, Palmerston, was not prepared to adopt the ambassador's advice and make a defensive alliance with Turkey against Russia; and so, though French diplomacy at Constantinople supported Canning, the Sultan agreed to a temporary joint occupation of the principalities by Russia and Turkey. On the other hand, when in 1849 Austria demanded from Turkey the surrender of the Hungarian refugees and was supported by Russia, Great Britain and France persuaded the Sultan to refuse, and to maintain the refusal in spite of an ultimatum from the Emperor Nicholas. Canning, on his own responsibility, promised British support to the Sultan if war with Russia should result; the home government endorsed his action, France took the same line, there was a combined naval demonstration, and Austria and Russia withdrew their demand.

Then in 1850 there began in Palestine a dispute between

the Latin and Greek Christians as to the guardianship of the Holy Places: and the rival ambitions of France and Russia in the Turkish Empire quickly became involved. Since 1535 the custody of the Holy Places had been entrusted to the Roman Catholic Church, represented by the French, but the anti-clerical policy pursued during the revolutionary period and the later preoccupations of the governments of France had enabled the Greek Orthodox Church to encroach upon the Catholic privileges. Disputes between the two ecclesiastical groups became frequent, and now Louis Napoleon, President of the Second Republic, intervened to demand the restoration to the Latin Christians of all their rights. The Sultan's offer of an inquiry was accepted on conditions that would have ruled out any claim by Russia to be heard on behalf of the Greek Catholics. The struggle was for predominant influence in the Turkish Empire, and from that question the British government could not disinterest itself.

Nicholas I. tried hard to obtain British support. The ministry of Lord Aberdeen was in power, with Lord John Russell at the Foreign Office (Lord Palmerston was in the ministry but at the Home Office), and the Emperor counted on its disinclination from war. He regarded the break-up of the Turkish Empire as inevitable, and was willing to deal with it in co-operation with Great Britian; his plans embraced the formation of more Christian states in the Balkans, additional territory for Russia along the Black Sea and the occupation (if only temporary) of Constantinople, "compensation" to Great Britain in Egypt, Cyprus and Crete, and the restriction of the Turkish power to Asia Minor. The British government rejected the Russian overtures. It did not believe, or persuaded itself that it did not believe, in the inevitableness of a break-up of Turkey; it feared the consequences of Russian progress, either in territory or influence, in the Balkans, and a Russian

footing upon the shores of the Mediterranean, and of any weakening of the barrier offered by the Turkish Empire to the Russian advance towards the overland route to India; and distrust of Russia was deep-seated in Great Britain. Agreement was impossible, and the British government claimed that differences with the Sultan and territorial readjustments should be matters for joint action by the Great Powers, and not be dealt with by some of them separately with the Sultan. Nicholas I. would not agree to such a course; he would deal with Turkey alone; he proposed an absolute Russian protectorate over the Greek Christian subjects of the Sultan and a Russo-Turkish defensive alliance —the two together would have given Russia almost complete control—and on the Turks' refusal diplomatic relations were broken off. The Sultan, in accordance with custom at such crises, issued a proclamation confirming the rights of his Christian subjects; Nicholas sent an army across the Pruth to occupy the Danubian principalities; attempts made by the Great Powers, especially Austria, to arrange a compromise failed owing to the obstinacy of the two antagonists. The British and French fleets passed through the Dardanelles in September, 1853, as a counter-demonstration to the Russian entry into Moldavia and Wallachia; new negotiations were unavailing, and at the end of November a small Turkish squadron in the Black Sea was destroyed by a Russian fleet.

Then Napoleon III. intervened. His motives were, as always, very complex. He resented the coldness of Nicholas's recognition of his new imperial dignity; he was anxious to secure the support of the French clerical party, violently hostile to the Greek Orthodox claims to the Holy Places; he was eager to maintain the Napoleonic tradition, to inaugurate his reign by some striking diplomatic—perhaps military—success, and also to restore French prestige in the eastern Mediterranean; he wished to secure some political

alliance for France. And he was swayed by some vague principles which were expressed in a conversation with an English statesman in 1853, when he said that "if England were to sink, France must be sacrificed to the Northern Powers, and that if his uncle's prophecy respecting the Cossacks were not physically realised it would be so morally; that even Austria was the Czar's valet, since he had saved her in Hungary; that although wearing different forms of government, England, France, Sardinia, Spain, and Portugal all had the same foundations for their government, namely public opinion and the will of the people, more or less developed, whilst the other great European states and Italy had no law but the fancy of the divine autocrats who ruled them." So he ranged himself on the side of Turkey and Great Britain. Nicholas remained defiant: and on March 27, 1854, after his definite refusal to evacuate the principalities, Great Britain and France declared war.

The obstinacy of Nicholas was due to the belief that the right moment for a blow at Turkey had come. He counted on Austrian support in return for his help in Hungary in 1849; he expected Prussia to be at least benevolently neutral, because of his personal influence over Frederick William IV.; he did not believe in any close co-operation between Great Britain and France; he doubted to the last if the pro-Turkish, or rather anti-Russian, sentiment of the British cabinet were strong enough to drive it to war; and he hoped for military action against the Turks by Greece and Montenegro. But Austria was never grateful, and feared Russian predominance in south-eastern Europe and control of the lower Danube. Prussia was afraid that support to Russia might cause her to be attacked by France along the Rhine, and was interested in the maintenance of the freedom of the Danube, and the Prussian minister-president, Manteuffel, was strong enough to prevent the king's sympathy from translation into action. Greece's eagerness

to attack Turkey and annex the Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, was restrained by an Anglo-French occupation of the Piræus (1854–7); and Montenegro alone could do nothing useful. So Nicholas found himself isolated, and his position rapidly became worse. For Austria demanded the withdrawal of the Russian army from the principalities; faced by the ultimatum from Vienna, and the fact that an Anglo-French expedition was on its way to Varna for the same purpose, the Emperor yielded and withdrew his troops, and the principalities were occupied by Austria, to hold them for the Sultan until the conclusion of peace.

The avowed object of the war was attained, but the Allies resolved to continue. Their declared aims were the complete abolition of any Russian protectorate over the principalities and Serbia, freedom of navigation on the Danube, revision of the treaty of 1841 as to the Dardanelles, and abandonment of the Russian claim to a protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Sultan generally. Their real object was to cripple Russia and remove her menace to Turkey. So they embarked on the Crimean campaign, which became concentrated in the siege of Sevastopol. The siege was long drawn out; the Allies had not expected, and were not prepared for, a prolonged defence through a hard winter; but despite friction between the Allied commanders, and the sufferings of the armies, their grip was not relaxed. Better weather conditions, improvements in British military organisation after the fall of the Aberdeen cabinet (January, 1855), and its replacement by a ministry under Palmerston, the intervention of Piedmont, which sent a well-equipped army, the energy of a new French commander (Pélissier), better co-operation of the Allied leaders, and the failure of Russian relief efforts, brought the surrender of Sevastopol on the 9th September, 1855.

By that time the political situation had greatly changed. Prussia had early adhered to the "four points" of the western

Allies, but was not disposed to take further action. Austria wavered: she had taken vigorous action in respect of the principalities, and signed a treaty with Great Britain and France to act together in all dealings with Russia, but her real interest was clearly to keep on as good terms with her eastern neighbours as were compatible with regard for her supposed interests in the Balkans. So when the western Allies rejected in the course of 1855 some modifications of their demands which Austria proposed, the Vienna government declared its obligations fulfilled and returned to neutrality. Napoleon III. was tiring of the war, with its very incomplete success (the fall of Sevastopol meant very little)—it had never been popular in France: in Great Britain, where Russophobia was generally rampant, there was similar disillusion, but the British government was dissatisfied with the military achievement, and with a reorganised army was prepared to go on—but it could not do so alone, and despite an exchange of royal visits it had no confidence in Napoleon. Austria, inspired by him and with Palmerston's approval, put forward fresh peace proposals in the form of an ultimatum, and found Russia in an unexpectedly, and to British ministers disappointingly, pliant mood—the Emperor Nicholas had died early in 1855, and been succeeded by Alexander II. The result was the Congress of Paris in January, 1856. Its meeting in Paris was a triumph for Napoleon, who appeared as the president of an European Congress and the arbiter of Europe. The five Great Powers were represented, with Sardinia, and of course Turkey; on every important issue the French influence was thrown on the side of Russia.

By the treaties which emerged from the Congress the Danubian principalities obtained complete independence in internal affairs—a national convention in each was to decide their definite organisation; Russia ceded to Moldavia the southern part of Bessarabia and the delta of the Danube,

thereby being removed from the river; the navigation of the Danube was declared free to all nations, the mouths being placed under the control of an international commission; and the Black Sea was neutralised, its waters and ports being closed against the navies of the riverain Powers as well as of all other states. The six other Powers represented declared Turkey to be admitted to participate in the public law and system of Europe, undertook to respect the territorial integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, guaranteed in common the strict observance of that engagement, and announced their intention to "consider every act calculated to do injury thereto as a question of general interest." The Sultan communicated to the Congress a firman issued by him which gave liberty of worship and equality of rights to all Ottoman subjects without regard to religious creed, admitted Christians to military service and re-organised the fiscal system, and the Powers duly disclaimed any right to intervene, jointly or severally, between the Sultan and his Christian subjects. It was the triumph of the policy of Stratford Canning. The problem of the Dardanelles was dealt with by a separate convention, which confirmed the convention of 1841, which had closed the Straits to the warships of all nationalities. Finally Great Britain, France, and Austria bound themselves together by a special treaty to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire.

The Congress of Paris was a personal triumph for Napoleon III.; his position and authority, at home and abroad, were no longer questionable. He had saved Russia from serious humiliation, and secured the practical independence of the Rumanians who inhabited the Danubian principalities. Great Britain was disappointed: the Black Sea had been neutralised, but it was obvious that Russia would denounce that stipulation—an intolerable one for any riverain Power—at the earliest opportunity: the Russian

peril had been put at a greater distance from Turkey, but was certain to be renewed unless the Turks set their house in order—a task which, despite many professions, was never seriously undertaken and so far as concerned the declarations relating to the equality of creeds could not be undertaken without completely changing the basis of the Turkish state. And the Turks knew perfectly well that the Western Powers cared less for reform than for the barrier against Russia, and were not likely to adopt any methods of enforcing reform which might weaken the Turkish Empire in any way. Russia, turned back for the time being, directed her efforts elsewhere—to the Far East; and the war brought home to her rulers the need for the internal reforms to which Alexander II. devoted himself. Austria's policy had alienated Russia, which had saved the Hapsburg Empire in 1849 but would not move to help it in the crisis which arose ten years after the Congress of Paris.

§ 4. *Napoleon, Italy, and Cavour*

It was not only in the case of the Rumanians that Napoleon had shown at the Congress his sympathy with nationalism; he had manifested it also in respect of Italy. There reaction had since 1849 prevailed everywhere except in Piedmont-Sardinia, and that kingdom had been crippled by an unsuccessful war resulting in an empty exchequer and a heavy burden of indemnity. The ministry of d'Azeglio was moderately liberal, harassed on one side by the clericals and on the other by the advanced liberals and republicans. The political significance of the new king, Victor Immanuel, was as yet unrealised; of his courage there was no doubt, and his intention to be a constitutional monarch and sympathy with Italian unity had been openly avowed; but he had not yet shown the qualities which made him later almost an ideal national leader and a steadfast supporter of the great

statesman who soon gained his complete confidence. That statesman was Cavour.

Born in 1810 of a noble family of Piedmont, which was conservative and clerical, Camillo Benso di Cavour was early inclined to liberalism, and, falling under suspicion of holding even more advanced views, he left Italy and studied in Switzerland and Great Britain. On his return the unpopularity of his family kept him out of public life, and his energies were devoted chiefly to the promotion of agriculture and to pamphleteering on economic subjects. At the end of 1847 he was one of the founders of the *Risorgimento* journal, he took an active part in the struggle for a constitution, and was returned to the first Piedmontese parliament. His opposition to the renewal of the war cost him his seat, but after Novara he was again returned and became prominent among those who undertook the reorganisation of the state. In 1850 he entered d'Azeglio's cabinet as minister of agriculture; the reluctance of his chief to break with the moderate conservatives, and Cavour's inclination towards the advanced liberals made their co-operation difficult; Cavour was the stronger force, and after some hesitation on the part of the king he became minister-president in November, 1852.

Cavour's cast of mind was entirely practical; abstract theory and speculation were alien to him. He had an extraordinary capacity for work; his political courage was unfailing and edged with audacity, yet he never openly outran public opinion. Avowedly an opportunist, he was ready to take advantage of any chance, and to accept allies and help anywhere, to attain his ends. He was not an attractive man, either in his appearance, which was hard and ungainly, or in manner; he had scarcely any intimate friends; though extraordinarily lucid in speech he had no oratorical power or other gifts to fire the popular imagination; and it was

not until the very end of his life that he enjoyed real popularity.

Italian unity was Cavour's ultimate goal, but following his principle that "the rule in politics is to be as moderate in language as one is resolute in act" he publicly disclaimed any strong belief in its practicability—a course which made him suspect to Mazzini, who, however, trusted few besides himself. To Cavour's judgment, spasmodic and uncoordinated risings of untrained volunteers appeared hopeless; the era of conspiracies had passed; liberation and unity could be obtained only by disciplined effort. His immediate object was to make Peidmont-Sardinia strong, and an example of constitutional government and sound administration, so that if ever the time came when with reasonable prospect of success a decisive blow for Italian liberty and union could be struck, she would be ready. He might hasten the time, but the primary need was to be prepared for it. The first stage might be the formation of a North Italian kingdom under the house of Savoy; but though a strenuous supporter of that house, Cavour realised that Piedmont-Sardinia must be absorbed in Italy—thus differing from his great contemporary, Bismarck, who thought of a united Germany as an aggrandised Prussia.

The policy of Cavour at the outset was then to create a strong state—by the development of constitutional and parliamentary government, and the assertion of the supremacy of the state over the church, which involved the abolition of clerical immunities; by the liberation of trade and commerce, his measures including the reduction of import duties, treaties of commerce with the chief European countries (especially Great Britain), the promotion of railways, which would contribute powerfully towards the unification of Italy, and the reorganisation of the finances; and by the preparation of the army. In foreign affairs

he sought to obtain for Piedmont-Sardinia recognition as a European Power and as the representative of Italy, and for that purpose, and in order to obtain allies, to take advantage of any conjuncture which European politics might offer, and as his more remote objects he aimed at the expulsion of the Austrians and the destruction of the temporal power of the Pope—both pre-requisites for Italian unity.

The domestic policy met with swift success. At the commencement of Cavour's ministry there was much economic distress, with consequent political unrest, but recovery and progress came; the parliamentary system worked smoothly, both the reactionary and revolutionary elements declined, there was a general rally round the constitutional monarchy; and by 1856 Piedmont-Sardinia was a compact and well-ordered state.

The first step in Cavour's foreign policy was taken in respect of Lombardy, where the drastic rule of Radetzky, heavy taxation, and other economic troubles, accentuated by the ravages of disease among the silkworms and the vines, led to an attempted rising at Milan, which was promptly suppressed. The Austrian government sequestrated the property of exiles and emigrants, and as his protests were unheeded the Piedmontese king withdrew his representative from Verona.

Then came the Crimean war, and Cavour's great opportunity. Piedmont's direct interest was small, and artificial at that, but her indirect interest was great. Support to the western Allies would give her a claim on their sympathy, if no more; it would help to weaken Russia, which had aided Austria in 1849, and might do so again; it would promote discord between Russia and Austria, which was willing to support Great Britain and France, but only if secure from attack in Italy; it would give Piedmont a right to participate in any peace conference, and so take a place

among the leading European states. The policy succeeded, and though at the Congress of Paris Cavour's efforts to obtain some territorial gain for Piedmont, to get the Austrian forces out of Romagna, and secure for that part of the Papal States some measure of autonomy were fruitless, he obtained—by the strong support of the British representative, Lord Clarendon—an opportunity of directing the attention of the assembled European statesmen to the condition of Italy, and he was able to sound the British and French governments as to the measure of support which they would give to vigorous action against Austria. The British ministry under Lord Palmerston was sympathetic—the Prime Minister himself was strongly favourable to Italian national aspirations, and years earlier Gladstone's letter of 1851 to Lord Aberdeen on the Neapolitan prisons had been sent officially to every foreign ministry in Europe—but was not prepared to go beyond diplomatic support. From France Cavour expected little, particularly in view of Napoleon's action at Rome seven years earlier, but he quickly discovered that effective help might come from that quarter. The Emperor was nursing an Italian policy of his own, confiding little to his ministers. The Austrian government learned of this, and hastened to adopt a more conciliatory course in Lombardy. But Italian feeling was rising fast, and the Piedmontese government lent support to Lombard agitation and protested against the repressive action which that agitation called forth. Orsini's attempt on Napoleon's life in January, 1858, which for a time threatened the relations between France and Piedmont—and incidentally caused the fall of the Palmerston ministry in Great Britain—so far from weakening Napoleon's Italian sympathies, roused him to decision, and in July he met Cavour at Plombières.

That interview was decisive. Napoleon was ready to support Piedmont, provided that an adequate diplomatic pre-

text could be found for the war, which must be conducted by regular armies and not by revolutionary guerillas. A kingdom of Northern Italy was to be formed of Piedmont and Sardinia, Lombardy and Venetia, Parma and part of the Papal States; Tuscany and Umbria were to form a kingdom of Central Italy; the Pope was to keep Rome and a small territory besides. Napoleon's price was the cession to France of Savoy and Nice, thus satisfying a traditional French ambition, and the marriage of his cousin, the Prince Napoleon, to Victor Immanuel's daughter—a condition dictated by the same considerations as had brought about the First Napoleon's marriage to the daughter of the Austrian Emperor, namely, the desire to enter the family circle of the older dynasties.

The agreement was kept secret until the 1st January, 1859, when a remark of the Emperor to the Austrian ambassador was interpreted throughout Europe as the sign of an approaching storm. In Great Britain the Tory ministry of Lord Derby (who had replaced Palmerston in the previous February) was unsympathetic towards the Italian nationalists, but felt impelled to impress on Austria the need for some concessions. Russia was crippled, and out of humour with Austria; the smaller German states were pro-Austrian, but in Prussia (where the Prince of Prussia was now regent) the government was not unwilling to see Austria weakened, and would do nothing to save her North Italian possessions, so the Confederation remained neutral.

In Italy Mazzini suspected both the fact of the French alliance and the price to be paid for it; he still believed that Italy could free herself by herself, and hated Napoleon. But in this he had few followers. Garibaldi, already a popular hero, warmly approved the alliance; a simple soldier, utterly devoid of political intelligence, he paid no heed to Mazzini's warnings, and was eager to fight. Cavour, with an almost united public opinion—as Garibaldi said, parties

had disappeared and the minister was omnipotent—had only to find the pretext for a rupture with Austria. In Lombardy the attempts at reform of the Archduke Maximilian were constantly thwarted from Vienna; the British ministry's efforts to persuade the Austrian government to remove all excuse for war—by making reforms and inducing its satellite rulers in Italy to do the same, and by modifying the treaties with Parma and Modena which gave it the right to intervene—were unavailing. The Austrian chancellor's remark to the British ambassador—"I hear an 'Italian' question much talked of. I know of no 'Italian' question. I can understand a Danish or a Swedish, but I recognise no 'Italian' question"—sufficiently indicates the attitude at Vienna. In partial excuse it must be said that the Austrians were convinced that Cavour and Napoleon were resolved on war, and that no concessions would conciliate them—an opinion which was certainly well-founded. The British government fell back on the suggestion of a European congress; but Piedmont was arming, Austrian troops poured into Lombardy, and Austria called on Piedmont to disarm. The refusal to do so except as a part of a general disarmament was followed by the Austrian declaration of war (29th April, 1859).

Five French army corps entered Italy, with Napoleon himself at their head; the Austrians were defeated at Montebello and, after a drawn battle at Magenta, continued their retreat, and the allied monarchs entered Milan. The Austrian Emperor, Francis Joseph, hastened to take command of his armies, which were defeated simultaneously by the French at Solferino and the Piedmontese at San Martino on the 24th June. Then suddenly Napoleon, without consultation with Cavour, proposed an armistice, in order to negotiate a peace. The battles had been by no means decisive, the great military strength of Austria was almost untouched, and Napoleon knew that the French leadership

had not been distinguished, and that the organisation and equipment of his armies were unsatisfactory; the clerical party in France had taken alarm and was violently attacking the Emperor; Prussia had mobilised her armies along the Rhine; and events in the centre of the peninsula were alarming Napoleon, since they seemed to presage the union of all Italy under Victor Immanuel. Cavour, angry, but probably not greatly surprised, could for the moment only submit, and when by the peace of Villafranca (11th July) Austria ceded Lombardy to France to be transferred to Piedmont, but kept Venetia, he resigned in recognition of the popular disappointment, which was, however, quickly swept away by events in central Italy.

In that portion of the peninsula the outbreak of the war had been followed in Tuscany by the flight of the grand-duke, occupation by a French army corps, and the formation of a provisional government under Ricasoli (a Tuscan sent from Piedmont) which favoured Italian unity. Modena and Parma, abandoned by their rulers, accepted at once the authority of a representative of Victor Immanuel. After Magenta, Romagna revolted from Papal rule, and appealed to the Piedmontese king. After the peace of Villafranca, in spite of the discouraging attitude of the Piedmontese government with Cavour out of office, the four states formally offered their crowns to Victor Immanuel. But with the French armies still in Italy, and Napoleon's policy more obscure than ever, the offer could not be accepted. It is not necessary to describe in detail the complicated negotiations of the next four months in respect of the central states. Austria desired the restoration of the princes, but was not prepared to renew the war solely on their behalf. The four states all by plebiscite declared for union with Piedmont. Napoleon was reluctant to see Piedmont further aggrandised, and the French clerical party was exerting all its strength to induce him to veto any

reduction of Papal territory, but he was still at heart in sympathy with the Italian nationalists, and he could not well deny the validity of the plebiscite without impugning the basis of his own authority. So the treaty of Zurich (November, 1859), which completed the peace of Villafranca, left the problem of Central Italy unsolved. The tide there was running strongly for unity. Cavour had returned to power. In Great Britain the Whigs were back in office, with Palmerston as Prime Minister and Lord John Russell at the Foreign Office. Napoleon made a last effort, and, adopting one of his favourite methods of testing opinion, he issued an anonymous pamphlet, "The Pope and the Congress," in which he argued that political expediency and Catholic theology alike required that the Pope should possess temporal power and thereby be independent of actual or potential control by any government: "if the Pope were not an independent sovereign he would be a Frenchman, Austrian, Spaniard, or Italian, and his nationality would deprive his pontificate of any claim to universality." But his territory must be small, because it was in the interest of the Papacy that the sovereign pontiff should not be troubled by the common day-to-day problems of administration which arise in all but the smallest states, and, as his legislation must be based on theological dogmas, and his activity would be paralysed by tradition, political progress in his state was impossible, and it was unfair to condemn any large number of people, as his subjects, to political stagnation. So Napoleon urged the summoning of a Congress at which the Pope should renounce Romagna, and the Powers guarantee to him the remainder of his territories. But the argument of the pamphlet, of which the anonymity was only thinly veiled, was not one to appeal to Pius IX. and the Secretary of State who directed his policy; and after a vain search for alternatives Napoleon gave way. In March, 1860, Victor Immanuel accepted the sov-

ereignty of the four central states, and the treaty of Turin ceded Savoy and Nice to France. The anger of the nationalists at the surrender of any Italian territory was largely overcome by satisfaction at events in the south.

In Sicily, where the hostility to Neapolitan rule never abated, a republican propaganda, directed from Genoa by a committee of which the leaders were Mazzini, Bertani, and Crispi (who was to play so large a part in later Italian history), brought about a rising at Palermo in the first week of April, 1860. The committee urged Garibaldi to go to the aid of the islanders with a volunteer force. The guerilla chief hesitated—he doubted the strength of the movement and the endurance of the Sicilians, and he desired to head a rising at Nice against the French annexation—but at last decided to go. He asked Victor Immanuel for troops, but with Napoleon on one side, and Austria's unbroken military strength on the other, Cavour dared not give him open support; but no effort was made to prevent the expedition, which indeed could not have started without Cavour's connivance. To the British government he explained, two days after Garibaldi had set out, that the Piedmontese government had not encouraged the hazardous adventure and regretted a precipitancy which might prove unfortunate for Italy; but respecting Garibaldi's motives they had felt unable to restrain his effort to improve the lot of the Sicilians, and if these rallied round him no attempt would be made by the government of Victor Immanuel to control or direct their choice as to the use to which their independence should be put.

Garibaldi reached Sicily with his thousand and seventy-two volunteers drawn from all classes, and proclaimed himself dictator in the name of Victor Immanuel. Twenty-three thousand royal troops were on the island, but they were paralysed by a bold landing and daring surprise marches; within a month the adventurer was completely

master of the island, and with volunteers pouring in from all Italy he prepared to attack the kingdom of Naples. Mazzini urged him to proclaim a republic, and Cavour was in great difficulties. He feared the influence of Mazzini and Crispi, the former's agent in Sicily; he was anxious to annex Sicily, but realised that an attack on Naples might bring Austria again into the field. The young king, Francis II., was making desperate appeals to the Powers, and especially to Napoleon. The latter refused to do anything unless the Neapolitan ruler would agree to complete independence for Sicily, a constitution for Naples, and an alliance with Piedmont. He pressed Cavour to agree to these terms, and the Piedmontese minister negotiated only to gain time, relying upon the determination of Garibaldi and believing that in the last resort he could count upon Great Britain. Meanwhile Umbria and the Marches were on the verge of revolt against the Pope, aroused by Mazzinian propaganda and irritated by the exactions of Pius IX.'s volunteer army under the French general, Lamoricière. Cavour resolved to send an army there under Victor Immanuel himself, and he wrung a reluctant assent from Napoleon.

Garibaldi had crossed to the mainland; the Neapolitan troops were disorganised and many deserted; there was no effective opposition, and on the 7th September the invader entered Naples. Mazzini urged him to march north and attack Rome, and he was ready to do so. Cavour sent an ultimatum to the Pope demanding the disbandment of Lamoricière's army as a standing offence to Italian sentiment, and on its rejection the Piedmontese army entered the Papal territory (10th September). The crisis had come. A diplomatic storm broke upon Cavour. Russia and Prussia protested against the violation of international law by the unbridled ambition of Piedmont. Under pressure from the clericals, who saw in the conquest of Naples only the prelude to an attack on Rome, Napoleon withdrew his

ambassador from Turin—though he recognised the impossibility of turning back the tide. Austria was threatening, but a dispatch of Lord John Russell (October 27), with its uncompromising defence of the risings in southern Italy, and full endorsement of Italian aspirations towards unity, put an end to all idea of outside intervention. The Piedmontese army had pushed on; Lamoricière's force had been broken; the one danger lay in disunion. Garibaldi was eagerly preparing to march on Rome—he was still being urged by Mazzini to proclaim a republic in the south, or at least to keep the dictatorship of Naples and Sicily until Rome was secured; he disliked and distrusted Cavour, who believed that the Roman question would settle itself within a few years, and that an attack on Rome would arouse all the Catholic Powers to vigorous action, whilst Napoleon would not intervene (a French force was still at Rome, as it had been for more than a decade), and Great Britain would find it difficult. Garibaldi and Mazzini were no match for the Piedmontese statesman; Cavour obtained authority from the parliament of Piedmont to annex central and southern Italy; Victor Immanuel marched south to intercept Garibaldi's army, which was moving northward on Rome. The king and the guerilla leader met on the 26th October at Teano, and Garibaldi hailed Victor Immanuel as King of Italy, and abandoned his designs on Rome. Plebiscites in Naples and Sicily declared almost unanimously for "a united Italy under the house of Savoy."

Unification was almost complete. Venetia remained to Austria and Rome to the Pope, supported by French troops; but their incorporation was only a question of time. But there were grave problems to be solved. Piedmont was not altogether ready to merge its identity in that of the new state; there were great social, economic, and administrative differences between the various parts of Italy—Cavour himself said that to harmonise north and south was harder

than fighting Austria and struggling with Rome; law and administration needed to be unified, and the relations between the new state and the clerical power must be settled; brigandage was rife in the south, professedly in the name of the expelled Bourbons. Now the one man capable of dealing with these problems with ample knowledge, steady judgment, and skilled hands was removed. Cavour was only fifty-one, but he was worn out. On the 25th May, 1861, he spoke in the Italian parliament, asserting his belief that Italian unity and liberty required the complete overthrow of the temporal power, and would be fully realised only when Rome became the capital—an end not attainable without the consent of France and the conviction of the Catholic world that it would envolve no enslavement of the Papacy. Twelve days later he died. The fervour and idealism of Mazzini, the daring guerilla genius of Garibaldi, the calculating but large-minded statesmanship and unwavering resolution of Cavour, aided by the mingled liberalism and personal ambition of Napoleon, had together made united Italy; but it was of the qualities of a Cavour that the new state was to have most need in the coming years.

§ 5. *Napoleon's Position in* 1861

At the beginning of 1861 Napoleon's reputation and influence were at their height. His hold on France seemed secure—few foreign observers realised its inherent weakness. His armies had waged two important wars in which, despite the weakness of French strategy and defects of organisation, the valour of the French soldiers had given to the Emperor and his allies a semblance of victory sufficient to obtain for them substantial political gains. After the Crimean War Napoleon had played the leading part at the peace congress held in his capital, and had secured the goodwill of the sovereign of the very state against which the war had been

waged. During and after the war numerous visits of other European rulers to Paris had signified his admission to that "family circle" of princes which still counted for so much, both socially and politically. The war in northern Italy had enabled him not only to indulge his sympathies with liberalism and nationalism, but to appear as the benefactor of Piedmont-Sardinia whilst showing magnanimity to Austria; and the later developments in the peninsula, in which he acquiesced only reluctantly, since they were so rapid as to embarrass him gravely, yet enhanced his reputation—the vacillations and tergiversations of his policy appeared as the astute moves of a master-diplomatist to those who judged only by the immediate outcome, a united Italy and a substantial territorial gain for France.

It was not alone in Europe that success attended Napoleon's arms and diplomacy. In 1856 difficulties of long standing between the British and Chinese governments came to a head—they arose from the desire of the former to break down the Chinese policy of isolation and compel the opening of China to trade, combined with failure to understand the country and its people; and the two governments drifted into war. France's interests were smaller than the British, but Napoleon co-operated with the ministry of Lord Palmerston in the series of negotiations, interspersed with military and naval operations, which culminated in the joint Anglo-French expedition that after considerable fighting destroyed the Summer Palace near Peking, and in the treaty of the same month which opened more ports to foreign trade and authorised the appointment of British and French consuls in China. In the same year disturbances in the Lebanon district of Syria and massacres of the Christians there caused France and Russia to convene a conference of the Powers at Paris, which tried to bring pressure upon the Sultan to carry out his promised reforms, and authorised Napoleon to send an army to "restore order" in Syria—a

task easily accomplished and welcome to Napoleon as appealing to a traditional French interest and as reviving French prestige in the Levant. And the beginning of the same year had been marked by the signature of the Anglo-French commercial treaty, which was of appreciable immediate value to French trade and industry, and was the precursor of several other treaties of a similar kind.

And then the tide turned. The decade which had opened on the whole so auspiciously was to be for Napoleon a long series of diplomatic failures, ending in military disaster and the downfall of both himself and his dynasty. It was to be a prolonged and fatal duel with Otto von Bismarck.

CHAPTER VI

Napoleon the Third—The Second Epoch

§ 1. *The Impotence of Prussia*

During the period in which Napoleon III. had been raising France to the hegemony of Europe, Prussia had sunk into impotence. Though Frederick William IV. had not ventured to accept in 1849 the hereditary crown of a German Empire from which Austria should be excluded, he and his ministers still hoped to secure the predominance of Prussia in the Confederation, and put forward proposals for a federal government with restricted powers. But at a conference at Erfurt in March and April, 1850, these were rejected owing to the opposition of the Austrian Chancellor, Schwarzenberg and a Saxon minister, Beust, who aimed at forming a union of the "middle states" to hold the balance between Prussia and Austria, though with leanings towards the latter. Still the Prussian ministers continued their efforts, until their diplomacy met with two disastrous defeats.

The first of these was over the problem of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which with the smaller duchy of Lauenburg were possessed by the King of Denmark as Duke, their union with that kingdom since 1721 being purely dynastic. Schleswig and Holstein were indissolubly united —that fact was rarely disputed; but whereas Holstein had been from time immemorial a German fief, and (with Lauenburg) had entered the Germanic Confederation in 1815, Schleswig had never had any connection with the old German Empire and had not entered the Confederation. So the

King of Denmark was subject to the control (such as it was) of the Federal Diet as Duke of Holstein and Lauenburg, but not as Duke of Schleswig. The half-million inhabitants of Holstein were almost all Germans; of the somewhat smaller population of Schleswig rather more than half were Danes or Frisians, the remainder being Germans. After 1815 a nationalist party in Denmark desired to strengthen that small state by unifying the monarchy; the Germans of Holstein and Schleswig sought to maintain the autonomy of the duchies, and looked to the Confederation for help. In 1840 it became apparent that the direct line of succession to the Danish throne would shortly fail. In Denmark the succession could be through females, but in Schleswig and Holstein the succession was limited to the male line. The undoubted heirs to the Danish crown were the Glücksburg princely family, but they inherited through the female line, and their claim to the duchies was disputed by the Augustenburg family. When in 1844 Christian VIII. (1839–1848) declared Schleswig an integral part of the Danish Monarchy, the Diet of Holstein claimed that the duchies were independent, that succession there could be only in the male line, and that the duchies were in an indissoluble union. Into the prolonged and highly-involved legal, historical, and genealogical arguments which ensued it is unnecessary to enter; it is sufficient to point out that the real issue was whether one duchy with an entirely German population and another in which Germans formed at least two-fifths of the inhabitants were not to lose the autonomy they had long enjoyed and be absorbed in a unified Danish state.

Christian VIII. died at the beginning of 1848, and his successor, Frederick VII. (1848–1863), was forced by the Danes to promise a national assembly to draw up a constitution unifying the kingdom and the duchies. The latter revolted, and there was much indignation in Germany, where

the nationalist movement was in full tide. The moderate Danish nationalists seem to have been willing already to abandon Holstein if they could keep Schleswig, but the Germans of both duchies were fiercely hostile, and the Duke of Augustenburg placed himself at the head of a revolt. The Danes acted vigorously, and the rebellion was nearly crushed when Frederick William IV. intervened, at the instigation of the national assembly at Frankfurt, as the champion of the rights of German nationality. Prussian armies entered the duchies and conquered almost the whole of the Danish peninsula. Other European Powers, particularly Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden, then took action, and compelled an armistice; at a conference at London Denmark offered a separate administration for the duchies, but insisted on the recognition of their dynastic union with the kingdom. Prussia refused to abandon the claim of the Augustenburgs, but the break-up of the Frankfurt parliament, which weakened her position, and the attitude of Nicholas I. of Russia, brought about in July, 1850, a peace under which the Danish king, as Duke of Holstein, was authorised "to restore order in the duchies," with or without the participation of the Confederation. Two years later, at another London conference (March, 1852) a compromise was reached; the Powers affirmed the European necessity of maintaining the integrity of the Danish realm, and recognised the right of succession of Prince Christian of Glücksburg, and Frederick VII. promised a modified form of home-rule to the duchies.

The second blow to Prussian prestige followed quickly upon her failure in Schleswig-Holstein. The elector of Hesse-Cassel, in conflict with his parliament and people, had established martial law. A rising followed; the elector fled and appealed to the German Diet, which caused federal troops to be sent, in the familiar phrase, "to restore order." The King of Prussia, fearing an Austrian hegemony over

the smaller states and a federal occupation of Hessian territory, which was the connecting link between the two parts of the Prussian monarchy, sent an army which barred the way of the invading troops. A conflict seemed imminent; but Nicholas of Russia threatened to attack whichever of the German Powers began the conflict, Prussia could not secure the support of the smaller states, which disliked her schemes of federal reform, and the Prussian minister, Manteuffel, was no match for the Austrian Schwarzenberg, who appealed to the particularist sentiment of the German princes. So in November, 1850, there was signed the convention of Olmütz, whereby Prussia agreed to withdraw her forces from Hesse-Cassel, to offer no resistance to the federal troops, and indeed to co-operate with Austria in aiding the elector to maintain order. In regard to Holstein, where revolts continued, Prussia agreed to send commissioners to require the rebels to cease hostilities.

The convention of Olmütz appeared to mark the complete collapse of Prussian influence in the Confederation, and revival came only gradually. The death of Schwarzenberg, in April, 1852, removed the ablest of Austrian ministers; Otto von Bismarck, Prussia's representative on the federal council (*Bundestag*) began to rise to authority with her ministers; but the chief improvement came from the development of the Zollverein. That union had steadily expanded: Austria, whose statesmen were long curiously indifferent to economic matters, had ignored its progress, but now began to realise its potential political importance, and seriously to attempt to force an entrance into the Zollverein, or alternatively to destroy it. The agreements on which it was based came up for renewal in 1853; the southern states favoured the admission of Austria, Prussia opposed it. Austria planned a separate union of herself and the southern states; Prussia had a similar scheme for the north. But the southern states, which had derived real advantages from the Zollverein,

would not throw them away for an uncertainty; and a compromise resulted. By agreements in 1853 the Zollverein was extended (especially by the inclusion of Hanover) and renewed for a period of twelve years; Austria was excluded, but many of the customs-duties were abolished or reduced, and it was determined that in 1860 a joint commission should be appointed to prepare a scheme for the entry of Austria into the Zollverein. The agreement was formally a defeat for Prussia, but it was evident that no practicable scheme could be framed unless in the interval the finances of Austria could be so reformed as to make her customs-revenue less important to her, and Prussia refrained from a trade policy so liberal as to be quite incompatible with Austrian sentiment. There were two alternatives before the Zollverein: one was union with Austria, complete free trade within the area so formed, and fairly high tariff rates—this had the support of the protectionists, whose exponent was Friedrich List, the advocates of a "greater Germany," and the southern states; the other was moderate protection and commercial treaties with the western Powers—a policy which commended itself to the Prussian agriculturists, the merchants, and the Hanse and Baltic seaports, and for political reasons to the anti-Austrian party. The financial embarrassment of Austria was increased by the cost of mobilisation during the Crimean War period, and by the Italian War; and there was a strong movement in northern Germany towards free trade, which was stimulated by the Anglo-French commercial treaty at the commencement of 1860. The Prussian government saw its opportunity; it carried the Zollverein into the treaty system which was extending over Europe, and thereby closed the door against Austria.

During the six years following the convention of Olmütz Prussian foreign policy was undistinguished. In the eastern crisis its conduct had been ill-defined and vacillating. In

Switzerland Neufchâtel, though a constituent state of the Swiss Confederation, was under the sovereignty of the King of Prussia; a royalist faction there attempted to separate it from the Confederation and obtain its incorporation in Prussia. The Swiss government repressed the movement; Frederick William IV. at first threatened war, but when the Confederation prepared for a vigorous defence Great Britain and France intervened, and under their pressure the Prussian monarch renounced his rights over Neufchâtel (May, 1857). During the Italian War more vigour was shown, and the mobilisation of the Prussian armies along the Rhine after the battle of Solferino was one of the chief causes of Napoleon's sudden overtures to Austria. But by this time the foreign policy and the whole government of Prussia was passing into stronger hands.

§ 2. *Bismarck*

In January, 1861, the Prince of Prussia, who had been regent for nearly four years, succeeded his brother under the title of William I.; in September, 1862, he chose as minister-president Otto von Bismarck, his ambassador at Paris, in the main because he could see no other man capable of handling the Prussian parliament successfully. Parliamentary institutions had not worked well in Prussia since 1852; they were not in consonance with the traditions of the realm, or with the spirit of the bureaucracy and army, and their chances of success had been largely diminished by the factiousness of parties. This had strengthened the conviction of the new king, who had been an unpopular figure in 1848–9, that consistency in policy and a parliamentary government were incompatible. William I., who was sixty-three at his accession, was the true type of Prussian soldier, narrow in outlook and difficult to persuade, but, once convinced, resolute and loyal to those whose policy he

had adopted; with a strong assurance of the divine right of the Hohenzollerns, but an equally strong sense of monarchical duty. His chief interest at his accession was in army reorganisation, and it was in this that he encountered opposition from the parliament, in part reluctant to vote the money required, in part determined to be consulted on every detail, in part merely factious. When the conflict became acute Bismarck was sent for.

Otto von Bismarck had been born in 1815 in Brandenburg, the kernel of the Prussian monarchy, and of a landowning family; he thus belonged to the class whose pride of race, strong class interest—social and economic, narrowness of outlook and almost unreasoning loyalty had made it a potent instrument for the long line of strong rulers who had built up the Prussian state. He received the semi-legal training required for the public service, and did spend a few years in the state administration. He then retired to a country life, but reappeared in 1847 as a member of the united Diet, where he was distinguished by uncompromising opposition to the revolution, advocacy of repressive measures, vigorous defence of royal authority, and indifference, if not hostility, to German unity, at least as then conceived. From 1851 to 1859 he represented Prussia in the federal council at Frankfurt, where he became convinced that the federation was "galling" to Prussia "in times of peace, and absolutely dangerous to her existence at critical periods," and took the measure of Austria. As ambassador at St. Petersburg from 1859 to 1862 he established there relations which were to be vitally important to his policy. Then for a few months he was ambassador at Paris and came to know the true character of Napoleon III.

The predominant characteristic of the new minister was intense loyalty to the house of Hohenzollern, and then to the Prussian state which that house had created. German unity appealed to him only as an extension—the greatest

yet conceivable—of the power of the Hohenzollerns and Prussia; on any other terms he had no use for it. Clear-sighted and without illusions, he never misjudged his own work and seldom the character of the great majority of his countrymen; his aims were materialist, never touched with idealism; with a masterful spirit and an iron will which would brook no opposition, but would break everything and everybody that it could not bend to its purpose, and with the hauteur of his class, he was contemptuous of public opinion, though careful to influence it through a subsidised Press and journalistic hangers-on; possessed of a wide knowledge of men and playing by preference upon their weaknesses, he was a consummate master of diplomatic intrigue. He was endowed with immense powers of work; confident of himself and distrustful of all except a very few, he was avid of authority, at first for the use to be made of it and later for its own sake; master of Germany for eight-and-twenty years he trained no successors, fearing lest he should be supplanted.

As regards domestic politics, Bismarck himself wrote within a month of taking office: "As to internal affairs my most urgent duty is to preserve and to strengthen the power of the crown against the increasing influence of the representative chamber and the parliamentary officials. I consider that this task can be accomplished without departing from the positive injunctions of the constitution. I shall endeavour to spare as much as possible the feelings of sticklers for constitutional forms, and to return as soon as possible to constitutional courses, always bearing in mind, however, that our constitutional oath places 'fidelity to the king' first." The immediate issue was army reform, and the refusal of the parliament (*Landtag*) to vote the requisite funds. Bismarck resolved to raise money and spend it without legislative authority, relying on the doctrine that the crown was responsible for the defence of the state, and could

take all measures necessary thereto. The conflict lasted for several years; it gained him the unswerving confidence of the king; it misled European opinion as to his position in Prussia; and with Bismarck's support, Roon, the minister of war, and Moltke, as chief of the staff, reorganised the army and made it the finest of its generation.

But the main interest of the first sixteen years of Bismarck's rule lies in the achievements of his foreign policy, which aimed primarily at the aggrandisement of Prussia, if possible by the union of Germany under her leadership, which would eventually mean her control. That necessitated the expulsion of Austria from the Confederation; it also required at least the temporary impotence of France.

§ 3. *The Roots of Franco-German Rivalry*

Ever since the Reformation, which had swept the north but had relatively small effect upon the south with its different racial elements, there had been a tendency towards a cleavage between north and south Germany. This has been accentuated as Austria's interests became more and more directed towards the east and south-east, and as there arose in the north a powerful state which was predominantly, though by no means entirely, German, since the accession of Frederick the Great had been bidding for the German leadership, and by the territorial changes of 1815 had become the guardian of the western frontier of Germany. The problem now to be solved was as to the extent to which the particularism of the smaller German states could be overcome, and the course which the southern states would take when forced by circumstances to give up their policy of balance and choose between Prussia, to which they were already bound by economic ties, and Austria, whose control would be less irksome; and as to the manner in which the

hostility of France to a closer German union could be made ineffective.

That hostility was readily intelligible. Since the treaty of Verdun had divided the realm of Charles the Great, there existed between what were later to be France and Germany a debatable land (the *Lotharii regnum*, whose name remains that of a more restricted area, Lothringen or Lorraine) which was claimed by both. But whilst France could expand continentally only in that territory, Germany could expand there and also, and to a greater extent, eastward. As she acquired strength from her eastern conquests, Germany would have become so much stronger than her western rival that the latter's aims would have been hopeless, but as the French rulers mastered feudalism it increased in strength in Germany, with a consequent disruption that was hastened by the Reformation. The whole aim of French policy for centuries was to foment disunion in Germany, to prevent the rise of any power strong enough to weld it together. And so in the early seventeenth century France, under Cardinal Richelieu, had sided with the North German protestants against the determined efforts of the Hapsburgs to reassert the old imperial authority in order to use it to crush the Reformation: and throughout the later seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries her support had been given now to Austria and now to Prussia, always with the same object. Bismarck was convinced that German union was impossible unless France should be too crippled to prevent it.

§ 4. *The Polish Insurrection and Franco-Russian Relations*

An essential part of Bismarck's programme was the development of friendly relations with Russia; the opportunity for this, and for the first blow at Napoleon III., was given by a new Polish outbreak. After the Congress of Paris, Alexander II., discontented with Austria and

Prussia and grateful for French support, had inclined to an "entente" with Napoleon, and there was for some time informal co-operation between the two monarchs. This was manifested when the two Powers intervened to stop the war which broke out between Montenegro and Turkey in 1858, after an unsuccessful Turkish invasion of the smaller state had been followed by a rising in Herzegovina, which the Turks cruelly repressed; it appeared again after the Italian War and the French annexation of Savoy, when Russia's attitude put an end to some talk of intervention by Powers jealous of France's gain; and it was finally shown in the discussions which led to the French expedition to Syria in 1860. But the events in Italy alarmed Alexander, and his change of attitude was completed by events in Poland.

After the rising of 1830–1 the Poles had been ruled with an iron hand throughout the reign of Nicholas I. The nationalist movement, driven underground, became more and more revolutionary, whilst the liberals in Russia, who were also the intellectuals, began to sympathise with their class in Poland, since they were suffering under the same tyranny. The accession of Alexander II. inaugurated a new era, which was marked in Russia by a mitigation of the censorship, greater freedom of the subject to travel abroad, administrative reforms, a modification of the customs tariff by what has been called the substitution of high protection for prohibition, the conclusion of a number of commercial treaties with European Powers, including Great Britain, and, above all, the emancipation of the serfs (February, 1861) by measures which were better in intention than in results. The imperial policy towards Poland also became mildly liberal, but the return of political exiles and permission for the formation of an agricultural organisation only gave opportunity for renewal of the nationalist agitation.

There were two parties—the "Whites," consisting of the

nobles and the moderate reformers, willing to remain in union with Russia, but asking for autonomy, and counting on the sympathy of the Russian liberals and diplomatic support from abroad; and the "Reds," the democratic and revolutionary party, seeking to make Poland an independent republic. Events in Italy stimulated the Poles; the Russian government sought to allay the agitation by administrative reforms, but failed before the growing violence of the Reds and the increasing resolution of the Whites. Both parties believed that in a struggle against Russia they could rely on the support of Napoleon III., whose uncle, the first Napoleon, had created the grand-duchy of Warsaw, and whose foreign minister, Count Walewski (1855–1860), was the son of that uncle and a Polish countess. Alexander II., persuaded that concession was useless, sent the White leaders into exile and adopted other repressive measures which led to revolts in Poland and Lithuania in 1863. In the latter province the rebellion was open; in Poland a secret revolutionary committee organised a reign of terror, hoping to maintain disorder and harass the Russian government until foreign intervention took place. But the Reds antagonised Prussia by their claims on Posen and West Prussia, and by recruiting there, and Bismarck forthwith made a convention with the Russian government whereby the two Powers agreed to act together in Polish affairs and allow reciprocally the free movement of their armies across the common frontier. The hostility of Napoleon III. and, to a lesser degree, of England, caused Bismarck to drop the convention, but the Prussian frontier was strongly held and the rebels of Poland deprived of any help from their kinsfolk beyond it. The Poles looked to Napoleon, who invoked the support of Great Britain, where public opinion was strongly sympathetic towards the Poles, and of Austria for a demand on Russia to maintain the General Act of the Congress of Vienna. The three Powers did suggest to the Russian government the

grant of an amnesty, the creation of a national assembly, the revival of local self-government, the use of Polish as an official language, and freedom of worship (since a large proportion of the Poles were Roman Catholics). Russia, supported by Prussia, replied that she was bound by no treaty, and would allow no intervention in her domestic affairs. Great Britain would go no further. Napoleon tried to gain Austria for armed intervention by the offer of territorial rearrangements, involving the surrender of Galicia by Austria and the taking of Posen from Prussia for incorporation with Poland in a new kingdom under an Austrian archduke, Austria being compensated at the expense of Prussia. But the scheme was inacceptable to Austria, and the only help the Poles obtained from Napoleon was a diplomatic protest. He had made his first great failure; Austria had met with a diplomatic defeat; Prussia alone had benefited. The Poles were left unsupported; the revolt was crushed, after a war of terrorism, by April, 1864, and a new and harsher period of repression and russification began. The reaction extended to Russia itself, where Alexander II. turned back to absolutism; the new institutions which he created were retained but strictly controlled; the freedom of the Press became illusory. Liberalism in Russia had failed; when the opposition revived, it was in the form of Nihilism.

§ 5. *The Final Struggle between Prussia and Austria*

Bismarck had scored his first victory over Napoleon, and secured the benevolent neutrality, if not active sympathy, of Russia; he was now ready to deal with Austria, and the opportunity was given by the revival of the Schleswig-Holstein controversy, which was to afford the greatest example of his peculiar genius and methods.

The protocol of the London conference of 1852, which

had been signed by Austria and Prussia, but not by or on behalf of the German Confederation, had declared that the rights of the last-named in Holstein and Lauenburg were to remain unimpaired. The Danes continued their centralising policy, and a new constitution in 1855 subordinated the duchies in regard to certain common affairs to the Parliament, of course predominantly Danish, at Copenhagen. Protests and threats of intervention by the German federal Diet were unavailing. In 1860 further measures of centralisation were taken by the Danes who, when the German Confederation again protested, appealed to Austria and Prussia as signatories to the 1852 protocol. The two governments replied by demanding the restoration of the "indissoluble union" of Schleswig with Holstein. The Danes denied all foreign right of intervention in respect of Schleswig, advantage was taken of the complications arising from the Polish question to ignore the moderating advice of the British government, and in March, 1863, a royal proclamation repudiated the arrangements of 1852, and whilst giving Holstein a separate position rejected in effect the German demands as to Schleswig: and this was followed by a new constitution for the kingdom of Denmark-Schleswig. Shortly afterwards Frederick VII. died and was succeeded by Christian IX., the heir under the London protocol. A violent agitation arose among the Germans in the duchies, and the claims of the prince of Augustenburg were revived. The federal Diet was bound by no commitment, and with general public support was eager to help actively the malcontents; Austria had signed the 1852 agreement, but to stand aloof from the popular movement, still more to resist it, would greatly weaken her influence in Germany; Prussia was also a signatory, but that fact weighed little with Bismarck, who was already contemplating the acquisition of the duchies for his master. But for the time being he encouraged the intervention decreed by the

federal Diet, as an occupation "pending the settlement of the succession." Though Palmerston had publicly declared that Great Britain would resist anything directed against the integrity or rights of Denmark, the British cabinet would not act without French co-operation, and as that was not forthcoming, and the Queen's sympathies were with Germany, Great Britain adopted a policy of non-intervention.

At the end of December Hanoverian and Saxon troops entered Holstein on behalf of the German Confederation, and the Prince of Augustenburg assumed the government. This assertion of a claim by the Confederation and the prince was incompatible with the annexation policy on which Bismarck was now resolved, and would give the other signatories to the London protocol the right to intervene; he consequently induced Austria to join Prussia in asking the Confederation to occupy Schleswig as a pledge for the observance by Denmark of the arrangements of 1852. This was naturally rejected, for the Confederation had never approved of those arrangements; the two Powers thereupon claimed freedom of action, agreed to decide in concert the whole question of the duchies, and jointly invaded Schleswig. The Danes were expelled, and Austria's hesitation having been overcome, the invasion of Denmark itself began. The smaller German states were furiously angry. Great Britain made a last effort to arrange a conference, but failed before the determination of Bismarck, the vacillation of Austria, which was alarmed at Bismarck's obvious pretensions and desired to support the Augustenburg claimant but feared to break with Prussia, and the obstinacy of the Danes. Almost the whole Danish peninsula was overrun; and then by the treaty of October, 1864, Christian IX. renounced all rights over the duchies in favour of the King of Prussia and the Austrian Emperor. Bismarck, bent on making Austria share Prussia's unpopularity in Germany, induced her to join in insisting on the withdrawal of the Confedera-

tion's forces from Holstein, and the two Powers then asserted that they held the duchies by right of conquest, and were, therefore, freed from all previous undertakings. Austria, increasingly alarmed at the idea of Prussian annexation, began to support the Augustenburg claims, as did the smaller German states and the population of Holstein. Bismarck was resolute, but moved cautiously, for German public opinion outside Prussia was bitterly hostile, in Prussia there was strong opposition, shared by the Crown Prince, and William I. himself was wavering. Had the Austrian government taken a firm line Bismarck's plan might yet have been defeated, but they feared that war with Prussia might mean an Italian attack on Venetia, they doubted the loyalty of Hungary, the army was unready, and they offered a compromise. By the Convention of Gastein (August, 1865) Austria abandoned the Prince of Augustenburg. Schleswig was to be administered by Prussia and Holstein by Austria, and Lauenburg was made over to Prussia absolutely in return for a pecuniary payment. It was evident that the arrangement could not last: Bismarck was determined to force an issue with Austria, and only sought to gain time to secure himself against any intervention in the quarrel.

In Italy four ministries had succeeded one another rapidly since Cavour's death, and La Marmora was now in office. Venetia and Rome were the goals of Italian ambition. Hopes had been entertained in the summer of 1862 that the European Powers might agree to the Italian occupation of Rome, but the impatience of the advanced nationalists and a reckless raid by Garibaldi, which ended in his defeat at Aspromonté, wrecked the chance. When the Powers were sounded, Great Britain was favourable, Austria hostile, Russia and Prussia indefinite, and the decision lay with Napoleon III. He was increasingly dependent upon the clericals; his new foreign minister, Drouyn de Lhuys,

rejected the idea, and the informal Franco-Italian alliance came to an end. Two years later Napoleon, after his failure in Poland, sought to revive it, and by an agreement of September, 1864, undertook to withdraw the French forces entirely from Italy, and therefore from Rome, within two years, and Victor Immanuel promised not to attack the Papal States and even to protect them, whilst the Pope was to be allowed to organise a force for the maintenance of order and the defence of his frontiers. A protocol provided that the agreement should become operative so soon as the Italian capital had been removed—which must be within six months—from Turin to some place unspecified. The convention was unpopular in Italy, where it annoyed the Piedmontese, who resented the replacement of Turin by any city except Rome, and the advanced nationalists, as suggesting delay in the acquisition of Rome; it angered the Pope, who was convinced that once the French forces were withdrawn, the Italian government would speedily find excuse for occupying his city; and it roused the French clericals to violent protests. To deflect the Italians from Rome Napoleon pointed to Venetia, and knowing the inclination of La Marmora, intimated that he would not object to a Prusso-Italian alliance. The Italian minister still hoped to obtain Venetia by negotiation, but when that failed he turned to Prussia, and by a treaty of April, 1866, Italy undertook to make war with Prussia against Austria if Prussia commenced hostilities within three months, and to recognise any territorial gains made by her ally, and in return was promised a subsidy and the acquisition of Venetia.

The revival of the republican party in France, the growing unpopularity of his régime and the disastrous failure of his Mexican adventure had gravely shaken Napoleon's position. He was dependent on the clerical party, but profoundly distrusted by them in respect of his Italian policy.

The withdrawal of the French forces from Rome would have meant a complete break with his only support; and that step he dared not take. But to turn the attention of Italy away from Rome, though he well knew that the distraction would not be a lasting one, he encouraged her to assist Prussia against Austria, and thereby aided that ambition of Bismarck which was certain at no distant date to be directed against France. He had met the Prussian minister at Biarritz in October, 1865, and been outmatched. He had acquiesced in the Prusso-Italian alliance already contemplated, which he must have known meant territorial aggrandisement for both Prussia and Italy. He hoped to obtain in return for his friendliness some territory for France—the Rhine provinces or (when he realised the hopelessness of that project) Belgium, or (if Great Britain resisted that) at least Luxemburg. But though encouraged by Bismarck to hope, he obtained no definite promises. His plans were in confusion: it is doubtful if he had any clear project. He was making overtures to Austria, and seems to have believed that if the war were a long one he could intervene as mediator and gain something for France in a general territorial rearrangement, and if it were a short one, whichever side were victorious, he could obtain something as the price of neutrality.

Three months before the Italian treaty was signed Bismarck had commenced the final quarrel with Austria, whom he accused of encouraging the Augustenburg party in Holstein and fomenting popular agitation there by allowing public meetings and undue liberty of the Press. His purpose was so evident that the Austrian government moved troops into Bohemia; Bismarck, who had been preparing war for years, protested against these "provocative" measures. On the 5th April, 1866, he wrote that nothing was further from the king's mind than an offensive attitude towards Austria; three days later the Italian treaty

was signed. A peaceful settlement was clearly impossible except by a complete surrender on the part of Austria, who, however, had the sympathy, and hoped for the effective support, of all the smaller German states except the two Mecklenburgs and Saxe-Weimar. Efforts made at Vienna to detach Italy by the offer of Venetia, if Austria were allowed to recoup herself in Prussian Silesia, failed; negotiations with France obtained nothing beyond a promise of neutrality and of diplomatic pressure on Italy. Austria announced her intention of convening the Holstein Estates, Prussia declared the convention of Gastein at an end, and her troops entered the duchy. On the 10th June Bismarck issued to the German states a circular proposing the reform of the Confederation, from which Austria and Luxemburg were to be excluded, with a parliament based on universal suffrage, a federal government to control foreign affairs and economic policy, and northern and southern armies under the kings of Prussia and Bavaria respectively. The proposals found no acceptance anywhere. The Federal Diet ranged itself with the Austrian government to resist the invasion of Holstein, and the war began.

The widespread expectation of a speedy victory for Austria and her supporters were signally disappointed. Her army was unprepared, there was no national sentiment to animate it, there was doubt about Hungary; the federal troops were ill-equipped, ill-organised, ill-led, and their dispersed efforts were useless; the Bavarian government would not allow its army to join the Austrian forces. The Prussian armies showed the results of the long preparation of Roon and Moltke. Hanover, Electoral Hesse, and Saxony, which had refused to disarm and rejected Bismarck's proposals for a new federal constitution, were speedily overcome, and the other states of the north quickly made terms. Bavaria was invaded and her forces immobilised. The main Prussian armies entered Bohemia, and the Austrian defence

was crushed at Sadowa (3rd July, 1866). It was a decisive battle. The Italians had been far from successful in their campaign, and severely defeated at Custozza, but after Sadowa the Emperor Francis Joseph hastily ceded Venetia to Napoleon III., to be transferred to Italy, and invited his good offices. The French ruler was ill in body, and overwhelmed by the suddenness of the Prussian triumph, but he did not promise to support Austria in her negotiations for peace, and to insist on the territorial integrity of Saxony, which had alone given Austria any real support. An armistice was agreed on, much against the will of King William and the general staff, who were eager to press their advantage to the utmost, and solely owing to the insistence of Bismarck, who still had some anxiety as to French intervention and was convinced of the desirability of such a peace as would mitigate the natural rancour of the vanquished, and afford the possibility of securing Austrian neutrality in the approaching struggle with France. For he did not share Moltke's belief that a French war would be an easy one; in his reading of history (which later events have amply justified) France on the defensive would not be easy to overcome, and might maintain an effective resistance so long as to compel other Powers to intervene. He had a hard struggle with the King and the soldiers, but preliminaries of peace were signed at Nikolsburg on the 26th July. Prussia's gains were far-reaching. Austria abandoned all claim on the two duchies, and recognised all territorial changes made in north Germany by the Prussian government, which proceeded to annex Schleswig, Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Homburg, Nassau, and the free city of Frankfurt, thus increasing the population of Prussia by some four and a half millions. Austria paid an indemnity. Saxony's territorial integrity was maintained. The German Confederation was dissolved; Austria agreed to recognise a north German Confederation to be formed under the

presidency of Prussia, and a south German Confederation constituted of the states south of the Main (Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt), but before the final treaty was signed at Prague four weeks later, Bismarck was negotiating an offensive and defensive alliance between the two Confederations. It was the expulsion of Austria from any participation in the affairs of Germany; her attention was thereafter turned almost wholly to the east. Italy incorporated Venetia.

Then Napoleon tried to obtain his reward for neutrality, and sought for territorial concessions along the Rhine at the expense of Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt. Bismarck answered that his king would not consent to the transfer of any German territory, and persisted in that attitude, though he held out hopes of "compensation" in the form of some non-German lands. Napoleon's request was communicated to Alexander II. of Russia, who disliked Prussia's aggrandisement, but was domestically interested in Hesse-Darmstadt, and to the states of the Southern Confederation, whereby they were promptly brought into the alliance which Bismarck offered.

Disappointed as to the Rhine territories, Napoleon fixed his hopes on Luxemburg, whose grand-duke was also king of Holland, though there was no organic union between the two states. After 1866 the duchy was still in the Zollverein, but not in the North German Confederation, though the capital was garrisoned by Prussian troops as a federal stronghold and Prussia claimed that the right of garrison should continue. Napoleon was anxious to get the Prussian forces withdrawn, and purchase the duchy; the King of Holland was ready to sell his rights. Great Britain was willing to support Napoleon in pressing for the withdrawal, but not in his further schemes; Austria was generally favourable, but would give the Emperor no active help; Russia's sympathies were pro-Prussian. The British government

convened a conference in London in April and May, 1867, and by an agreement then made Prussia undertook to evacuate the fortresses and the Powers guaranteed the integrity and neutrality of the duchy. It was a small defeat for Prussia, and to that extent a diplomatic victory for Napoleon, but his territorial aims were again frustrated, and he had done nothing to rehabilitate his rapidly waning credit in France.

§ 6. *The Founding of the German Empire and the Fall of Napoleon*

The French Emperor's foreign relations became more and more embarrassed, and he renewed his search for alliances. A meeting with the Austrian Emperor resulted in an informal agreement that both should abstain from interference in German affairs, but the Austrian government should endeavour to preserve the sympathies of the South German states by introducing a more liberal system of government throughout its dominions. A Franco-Austrian "entente" was thus created, but it gave Napoleon no assured support. The withdrawal of the French forces from Italy revived the activities of the nationalists against Rome; Garibaldi organised an expedition in the north; arrested by the Italian government, he escaped, gathered his volunteers, and marched on the Papal city. After prolonged and painful hesitation, pressed by the clericals, and, indeed, by French opinion generally, Napoleon sent to Rome in the last days of October, 1867, an army which defeated Garibaldi at Mentana. There was much enthusiasm in France, but the sympathy with Napoleon which still lingered in Italy was finally lost. The French troops remained at Rome, and though Napoleon continued to strive for a formal alliance, and Victor Immanuel himself was well disposed to it, the Italian King realised, and informed Napoleon,

that unless and until the French troops had disappeared from Papal territory no such treaty would be tolerated by Italian opinion.

The final crisis now came rapidly. The position of the Napoleonic dynasty was gravely imperilled. Germany was rapidly marching towards unity. To allow that goal to be reached was contrary to all the traditions of French policy, and success in war against Prussia might save the throne for Napoleon's heir. The French government was ready to find a pretext for quarrel; Bismarck was prepared to manufacture one. But he was resolved so to handle matters as to throw the onus on France, and present the war as one of defence by Germany against an attempt to prevent the realisation of a national ideal. Relying on indefinite hopes of alliances, completely misjudging the probable attitude of the South German Confederation, and trusting to a recent reorganisation, still in fact far from complete, of the army, Napoleon and his ministers snatched at the first cause of dispute which offered.

During the reign of Isabella Spain had experienced constant political disturbance. The reactionary and clerical party had been generally in power, but there was a growing liberal opposition led by Serrano and Prim. Violent measures of repression led to an insurrection in 1868: Isabella fled, a provisional government was set up, and a constituent assembly declared for a limited monarchy. There were various candidates for the vacant throne, including Don Carlos—identified with the extremist reactionary views—and a Saxe-Coburg prince supported by Napoleon; but none was acceptable, and in April, 1869, General Prim proposed Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the elder branch of a family of which the Prussian royal house was the younger line, though the King of Prussia, by virtue of his rank, was regarded as the head of the family. The

proposal, welcomed by the Hohenzollerns (the King gave his approval), was actively encouraged by Bismarck, but in reply to the protest of the French government, who regarded, or professed to regard, the accession of the Prince to the Spanish throne as a stage in a German "encircling" policy, the minister asserted that the matter in no way concerned the Prussian government, but was purely a domestic matter for the Hohenzollerns. The question remained in abeyance for some months, but it was revived in 1870, and the offer, subject to approval by the Spanish parliament, was accepted by Prince Leopold.

In France the liberal imperialist ministry of Ollivier was in power, but the Duc de Gramont was minister of foreign affairs. His appointment had caused some anxiety in Europe generally, as he was believed to owe it to the extreme imperialists and clericals, who were bent on a last desperate effort to recover their authority. At the beginning of July he told the Prussian ambassador that France would not tolerate any Prussian prince on the throne of Spain; in the legislature he declared that respect for the rights of a neighbour state could not be carried to the extent of allowing another Power, by placing one of its princes on the throne of Charles the Fifth, to destroy the whole balance of power, and imperil the interests and honour of France. He counted on help from Austria, in spite of the warnings of Beust. The ex-Saxon minister, who had transferred his services to Austria after 1866, made it clear that Austria would not take up arms, and urged that the French ministry should avoid any attack on the King of Prussia, and treat the whole matter as one for diplomatic discussion with the Spanish government only, and that if it were so treated the Hohenzollern election could be prevented without war. The British ministry of Gladstone thought the same, and was urging the Spanish government to withdraw the candidature and

the Prussian government to discourage it, whilst also doing its best (through Lord Lyons at Paris) to restrain the French ministry.

But Napoleon was broken in mind and body, and his advisers were beyond taking a balanced view of the situation. A demand was made on the Prussian King to order the abandonment of the candidature; he refused, professing to regard it as a purely personal matter for Prince Leopold. But William I. was apparently inclined to favour its withdrawal, under pressure from Great Britain, Austria and Italy, Prim was wavering, and on the 12th July, 1870, Prince Leopold and his father renounced the candidature. But the French government would not give up the cause for quarrel, and Bismarck was more than ready to meet them half-way. The French ambassador at Berlin was instructed to press that King William should not only approve the withdrawal of the candidature but guarantee its non-renewal. To the second demand he would not accede: his refusal was magnified by Bismarck's modification of an official communiqué, and still more by the inspired comments of the German Press, into a personal rebuff to the French representative; it was so regarded in France, and especially in Paris, where there was a blaze of indignation. The imperialist faction round the Emperor seized the opportunity, he and the more moderate ministers were swept along by the current, and in spite of the opposition of a few deputies like Thiers and the new apostle of republicanism, Léon Gambetta, and of the attempts at mediation by the British government, whose ambassador at Paris made every effort to restrain the French ministry, and by Austria and Russia, war on Prussia was declared on the 17th July. That very day the Duc de Gramont learned that the South German Confederation had made common cause with the North, and was mobilising its armies. He quickly knew also that Austria would not even move an "army of observation"

into Bohemia—the court and army were pro-French, but the army was unready for war, Hungary was opposed to it, and Russia threatened to attack if Austria mobilised. The court of St. Petersburg was pro-German but would depart from neutrality only if another Power intervened against Germany. Italian public opinion insisted on neutrality so long as French troops remained at Civita Vecchia to guard Rome, and when they were perforce withdrawn it was too late to affect the Italian attitude (though Garibaldi and some of those to whom his name was still magical fought with the French as volunteers). In Great Britain Napoleon was still distrusted, and opinion generally was pro-German.

So France was left to encounter Germany alone, and the criminal recklessness of her rulers was made apparent. The French armies fought courageously, but they were far below their paper strength, ill-fed, ill-equipped, and led by generals who had no coherent plan of campaign or common direction, and were distracted by conflicting orders dictated not by strategical considerations but by political exigencies. Within a month from the commencement of actual hostilities one great French army under Bazaine, after fierce battles, was shut up in Metz; Strassburg was besieged; and MacMahon's army, after a series of defeats and much marching and counter-marching, had been finally defeated at Sedan (1st September) and forced to surrender. With that army, and taken prisoner with it, was Napoleon himself, who, racked with disease, had yet joined his chief army in the field, leaving the Empress Eugénie as regent to carry on the government at Paris. So he disappeared from the European stage, an adventurer and stoic to the last.

It was the end of the Second Empire. When the news reached Paris there was at once a popular rising, and a new Republic was proclaimed. The Empress fled: the deputies for Paris formed a provisional government, with Jules Ferry as foreign minister and Léon Gambetta as

minister of the interior. The government prepared to defend the capital and carry on the war, and Thiers was sent to the neutral Powers to ask for their mediation. The continuance of the struggle, the long defence of Paris, and the gallant efforts of the new armies which Gambetta's energy and fiery eloquence raised in the provinces rehabilitated the credit of France, but achieved nothing else. The neutral Powers received Thiers sympathetically, but did nothing; Europe had awakened to the military efficiency of Germany, and Bismarck's attitude towards intervention was sufficiently clear. Strassburg surrendered at the end of September; Bazaine yielded Metz and his whole army late in October; three months later Paris fell. A month's armistice was allowed by the victors to enable a national assembly to be elected and meet at Bordeaux; it chose Thiers as "chief of the executive power," and on the 1st March, 1871, proclaimed the Third Republic.

Then followed the negotiations for peace. By the treaty of Frankfurt France was compelled to surrender Alsace, the greater part of Lorraine, and Metz—the reluctance of Bismarck to insist on the cession, which he foresaw would be a lasting cause for trouble, yielded to the insistence of the general staff—and to pay an indemnity of five billion francs; she also had to submit to a provision giving Germany perpetual most-favoured-nation treatment in customs matters. But these were only subsidiary results. The war had achieved the purpose for which Bismarck had designed it. The enthusiasm which the victories of the German armies evoked swept away the resistance of even the most particularist princes; the last steps had been taken, and during the siege of Paris, on the 18th January, 1871, in a gathering of rulers, soldiers, and statesmen at Versailles there was proclaimed the federal German Empire, with the imperial dignity hereditary in the Prussian royal house.

The enforced withdrawal of the French troops from Civita

Vecchia had given the Italian government its opportunity. The removal of the capital from Florence to Rome was proclaimed, the royal troops entered the Papal city without resistance, Rome became at last the capital of a united Italy, and the Papacy, shorn of all its temporal power, and free from the trammels thereof, entered upon a new epoch. And there was one other far-reaching result of the war; Russia took advantage of the distraction of the Powers to denounce the restrictive clauses—what Bismarck called the "most inept provisions"—of the Treaty of Paris, and put an end to the neutrality of the Black Sea. By the Treaty of London (1871) the other Great Powers acquiesced, but by a separate treaty Great Britain, Austria, and France once more bound themselves to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and treat any attack thereon as a *casus belli*.

CHAPTER VII

The Dominance of Bismarck: (I) Internal Conditions of the European States

With a united Germany, a united Italy, an Austrian Empire reorganised, no longer involved in the west and with its attention concentrated on the south-east, and a Russia now freed for action in the south and east, Europe entered on an epoch in which old problems still unsolved, or only partly solved, were to be complicated by economic forces of increasing magnitude. In the first two decades of that epoch, from the commencement of the Franco-German War to March, 1890, Otto von Bismarck, with the unwavering support of the Emperor William I., dominated Germany and the international politics of Europe.

§ 1. *Bismarck's Domestic Policy*

The new Empire was a federation of twenty-five sovereign states, ranging from the kingdom of Prussia with its twenty-five million inhabitants to little principalities whose population numbered less than fifty thousand. The second largest state, Bavaria, had rather less than five million people; Saxony had two and a half million; no other state had more than two million, and thirteen states had less than two hundred thousand each. The territories taken from France, with one and a half million inhabitants, were separately administered by the imperial government. Prussia was preponderant, for she had more than half the total population of the Empire and a corresponding representation in the imperial parliament (*Reichstag*).

The federal government dealt with foreign affairs, the army (with some reservations in the southern kingdoms), commercial policy and treaties, posts and telegraphs (except for Bavaria and Würtemburg), and could assume such additional functions as might result from legislation affecting the whole Empire, but its financial resources were limited to the proceeds of indirect taxation (customs and certain excises) and contributions from the various states on a population basis. The Emperor was the executive head, and the constitution recognised only one responsible minister, the chancellor, who was also (except for one short period) president of the council of ministers for Prussia—a fact which combined with the political prestige and material predominance of that state to bring about the gradual prussianisation of the whole Empire. The Reichstag was elected by universal male suffrage, thus contrasting sharply with the state parliaments, which were generally elected on a franchise so framed as to keep the power in the hands of the propertied classes, with the result that the advanced democratic parties which developed found their political expression almost entirely in the Reichstag. There was no parliamentary government as understood in the United Kingdom, France, or other states of Western Europe; the chancellor was responsible only to the Emperor, the subordinate ministers only to the chancellor, and though the assent of the Reichstag was required for all legislation and taxation, the influence of the crown was for a long period so great that a combination of parties sufficient to carry any government measure could generally be secured by diplomatic arts or, in the last resort, by a dissolution. It must be added that the empire was by no means homogeneous. Apart from social, economic, and confessional differences between the old provinces of the Kingdom of Prussia in the centre and east, and its newer provinces to the west, and between the north and south of the Empire, there were three

subject races—the Danes of Northern Schleswig, the French of Alsace and Lorraine, and the Poles of Posen, Southern Silesia and the province of West Prussia—the great mass of whose kinsfolk were beyond the German border, in two cases in independent national states. The efforts to germanise these people, by persuasion or force, were continuous, but not markedly successful, throughout the period of the Empire.

The first domestic issue of importance was a conflict with the Roman Church. Whilst the last remnants of the temporal power were slipping away the ecclesiastical authority of the Pope had been re-asserted by a series of great assemblies of bishops culminating in the Vatican Council (1869–70) which formulated the principle of papal infallibility and proclaimed the supreme authority of the Papal See over all the bishops of the Catholic Church in every country. A small body among the German Catholics opposed the Vatican decrees; their interests, the Lutheranism of a large part of Germany, and a theory of the state which allowed no authority within its area except that derived from itself, led Bismarck to attempt to counter the reviving Papal influence by the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and a number of legislative enactments which subjected all church appointments in Prussia to state approval, made civil marriage necessary (first in Prussia and later throughout the Empire), took from the Catholic clergy of Prussia the supervision of schools, and imposed state inspection of priestly seminaries. The policy antagonised the Catholics of the Empire, who constituted a third of the population of Prussia, and were predominant in Bavaria, Baden, and some smaller states, and, of course, in Alsace-Lorraine, and led to a violent political conflict and the formation of the so-called "centre" party, which, primarily constituted to defend the Catholic Church, stood also for the maintenance of state rights against encroach-

ments of the imperial authority whose policy, with Prussia predominant, was certain to be greatly influenced by the Lutheranism of that state. As changes in economic conditions caused the break-up of other political parties and the rise of Social Democracy, whilst the centre party continued to grow, the imperial government, in need of parliamentary support in its legislative proposals, modified its attitude; the death of the intransigent Pius IX. and the election of Leo XIII. in 1878 facilitated a *rapprochement*, and by 1880 the greater part of the anti-clerical policy and legislation had been abandoned. It had been an unhappy and unsuccessful experiment.

The second great internal problem was that of economic policy. The Empire had succeeded to the Zollverein, with the differences that the Hanse towns were in the Empire but not in the Customs Union until some eighteen years later, and Luxemburg, though outside the Empire, remained in the union. The policy of the Zollverein had since 1860 been steadily in the direction of the removal or reduction of trade barriers, in accord with the general tendency of Western Europe; the policy was continued after 1870, and by 1877 the Empire had become practically a free-trade state. Then came a sharp reaction. The acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine had largely increased Germany's industrial strength and resources, for the cotton industry was highly developed in Alsace and Lorraine possessed vast iron-ore deposits, not yet exploited. Great trade activity throughout Europe, with very high prices, immediately after the war, was followed by a sudden and deep depression in 1873; over-rapid industrial development aided by the French indemnity, over-capitalisation and over-production in Germany brought a grave commercial crisis; demand fell off and prices dropped heavily, and German manufacturers found themselves faced with acute competition from foreign producers scrambling to unload stocks of goods produced

under the stimulus of the boom, and also, in the case of the cotton trade especially, with increased domestic competition from the new territories. The industrialist demand for protection revived; the landowners of the east, hitherto large exporters of grain, found that the development of the means of transport was exposing them to the competition of Russian and North American grain both abroad and at home, and they also sought protection. France, which had given a lead towards freer trade in 1860, had already turned back. Moreover, imperial expenditure was rapidly increasing; the dependence of the Empire upon contributions from the states was irksome, and as these were raised chiefly by direct taxation, an increase for imperial purposes appeared inexpedient. Bismarck was already inclining towards a protectionist policy, a majority of members of the Reichstag declared in its favour, and the financial difficulties of the Empire were the final incentive. Supported by the iron and textile industries, and by the agricultural interests generally, it was opposed by the merchants, the Hanse towns, and the municipal authorities, who feared an increase in food prices: the working-class organisations, so far as they existed, took no active part. So a tariff based on the principle of moderate protection for industry and agriculture alike was adopted; the agrarians forced the government to give them more protection than was originally intended, and during the next ten years the duties on grain and meat were steadily increased—Bismarck's sympathies were entirely with the landowners. The chancellor did not favour the system of conventional tariffs prevalent since 1860, that is, tariffs in which many of the rates of duty were fixed by commercial treaties, and the numerous agreements made by Germany between 1880 and 1892 were in the main limited to securing to the contracting parties reciprocal "most-favoured-nation treatment."

The rapid industrial development which followed the

foundation of the Empire gave a great stimulus to the Socialist movement. Appearing first in Germany in the troublous years 1848 to 1850, under the inspiration of Karl Marx, it practically disappeared in the ensuing reaction, but manifested itself again after 1861, when Lassalle began the propaganda, cut short by his early death, which created the German labour movement. Meanwhile outside Germany the influence of Marx was increasing in his exile in England, and the International Working Men's Association, founded in London in 1864, became the organ for spreading his doctrine, after it had lost Mazzini and his followers on the one side and an anarchist section, led by the Russian, Bakunin, the creator of Nihilism, on the other. Marxism made great headway in Germany, where Socialism found two able leaders in Karl Liebknecht and August Bebel, and in 1869 the Social Democratic Workmen's Party was founded. The party was able to return six members in the first Reichstag; in 1875 the moderate state-Socialist followers of Lassalle allied themselves with the Marxists, and thereafter progress was rapid. The ruling classes became alarmed; the ordinary police powers were thought insufficient to cope with a movement deemed subversive of social order and dangerous to the security of the state, and popular indignation at two attempts on the life of William I.—quite unconnected with the Socialist campaign—enabled Bismarck to obtain in 1878 drastic legislation directed against all forms of Socialist propaganda. For a time the organisation was broken up. But the chancellor realised that merely repressive action would accomplish little, and that the movement against which it was directed was in part at least the outcome of a legitimate discontent. He sought, therefore, to mitigate some of the causes of that discontent by a policy of social reform, first adumbrated in 1881, which in the next eight years established an imperial system of sickness, accident, infirm-

ity, and old age insurance for the working classes, and inaugurated an area of rapidly-widening state action both in Germany and elsewhere, without checking in the least the advance of social democracy. Though the special repressive law of 1878 was renewed in 1881 and twice later, it became apparent that the Socialists were thriving under persecution; once the first shock of the attack was over, their strength in the Reichstag increased steadily; and the administration of the law gradually became milder. By the end of Bismarck's tenure of office it had fallen almost into desuetude, though the Socialists were still regarded as enemies of the state, and after his departure in 1890 it was not renewed.

§ 2. *The Third French Republic: the Work of Thiers and Gambetta*

The French national assembly, which had met at Bordeaux in Febuary, 1871, had been elected in circumstances which prevented the usual party campaigns, and so represented with some exactitude the real mind of France. The imperialists were discredited, the republicans had no hold on the peasantry, and the energy of Gambetta had in some measure identified them with a policy of continuing the war. Consequently the assembly contained only a handful of imperialists, about one-third of the members were republicans of moderate or radical views, and the remainder were disposed to constitutional monarchy. But the majority leaders did not press for an immediate restoration of the monarchy, lest it should be associated with the inevitable heavy sacrifices with which France must purchase peace, and were content to set up a provisional government, entrusting the executive power to Thiers, whose long experience and European reputation, as statesman and historian, marked him out as the right man for the crisis. Peace was

made—at a heavy price, but then it seemed as if France was doomed to worse disaster, for the movement known as the Commune began in Paris, and was feebly imitated in some other large towns. It was a revolt of one section of Paris, republican and more or less Socialist, against the rest of France; without defined programme, it was inspired partly by antagonism to the majority of the assembly, partly by the fear that Paris would not retain its headship of France—the assembly had established itself at Versailles—and partly by hostility to the highly centralised administrative system and its rigid control of local activities. The Commune was crushed with a ruthlessness largely due to terror, and the anti-republican sentiment prevailing in the assembly was greatly strengthened. Thiers carried on the government in reliance on the moderate royalists and moderate republicans, whose general political ideas, except as to the precise form of the constitution, were closely akin, but it was a task of much difficulty, and despite great ability and parliamentary experience his position was always unstable. He was anxious to leave the question of the final form of the government in abeyance, but he rapidly became convinced that a republic was alone possible. That was not the view of the majority of the assembly, which became more and more resolved on restoring the monarchy. Thiers' retention of power, in spite of growing attacks, was due solely to his remarkable success in the reconstruction of France. The saving of the city of Belfort in the peace negotiations, the suppression of the Commune and restoration of order, the reform of the central administration and extension of local self-government, the reorganisation of the army, the rapid payment of the indemnity and freedom of French territory from German occupation—all this gave him a prestige which kept his parliamentary enemies in check. But his success made him indispensable no longer, and in May, 1873, they forced his resignation and chose in

his stead Marshal MacMahon, whose election was everywhere regarded as the prelude to a royalist restoration.

That it was not so was largely due to Léon Gambetta. That fiery son of a small Italian shopkeeper in a town of southern France, of French descent only on his mother's side, was then thirty-five. Seeking a livelihood by law and journalism in Paris, from the first an ardent republican, a philippic against the imperial régime delivered in a political trial in 1868 had won for him a fame which gave him a seat in the last parliament of the Empire. At the revolution he became minister of the interior in the provisional government; escaping from Paris by balloon early in the siege, he strove with extraordinary energy and courage to rouse France to a great effort to expel the invader. He brought something of order out of chaos, found some competent generals, raised and equipped armies; and though his hasty levies had no chance against Moltke's vast military machine, they did much to restore France's credit. Gambetta disapproved of the armistice, and still more of the peace terms, and resigned in Febuary, 1871. In the national assembly he took little part, but the obvious aims of the majority there brought him again into the political arena. He made a great platform campaign—a phenomenon new in French politics—everywhere denouncing the evils of the imperial régime and proclaiming the power of "the Republic" to work the social and moral regeneration of France, the necessity of universal suffrage and of national education to secure an enlightened electorate, and the danger of clericalism with its claim to direct education and state policy in the interests of the Church of Rome. He denied the right of the assembly to set up a constitution—it had been elected only to decide on peace or war; and, unfortunately, his dislike for the caution and opportunism of Thiers led him into attacks on that statesman which largely contributed to his fall. But the gravity of the position brought an abrupt change. Gam-

betta and Thiers drew together; the campaign to prevent the assembly from setting up a constitution and to force a dissolution was pursued with renewed vigour, whilst the majority of that body, possessed of an administration to its liking, sought to check the opposition by control of the Press and all the influence of a highly centralised bureaucracy. In spite of the efforts of Thiers, Gambetta and their followers, a royalist restoration might have taken place late in 1873—MacMahon would certainly not have resisted it,—but the characteristically Bourbon refusal of the royalist claimant, the Comte de Chambord, to make any recognition of changed conditions, threw his party into confusion. Thiers was forming an alliance of moderate royalists and republicans; to take advantage of the extremer royalists' difficulties Gambetta resolved to join it with his radical followers, and to secure the immediate establishment of the Republic he recognised the right of the assembly to set up a constitution, and accepted one less democratic than he desired. The new combination succeeded, and in January, 1875, the present republican constitution of France was adopted.

But experience had shown that it was one thing to set up a constitution for France and another to secure its continuance, and Gambetta's whole effort was now directed to making the Republic acceptable by a policy of studied moderation. Though the general election of January, 1876, produced a large republican majority, and with Thiers too old for office Gambetta was its natural leader, he was disliked by MacMahon, who entrusted the formation of the first avowedly republican ministry to a less advanced politician. Gambetta, true to his new policy and recognising that the "group" system, already becoming a marked feature of French political life, might disintegrate the republican forces, gave the ministers steady support, but the policy which he urged upon them was not always in the true in-

terests of France—particularly he pressed for the replacement of officials supposed to be out of sympathy with the new régime, and for drastic measures against clericalism, "the enemy" as he called it. MacMahon was essentially conservative and clerically-minded; he was alarmed at the growth of radicalism; and in May, 1877, he suddenly dismissed the ministry, despite its large majority in the chamber of deputies, and formed a new one to resist the radical movement. The issue was clear: was the Republic to be "parliamentary," with the executive responsible to the legislature, and through it to the electorate, or *autoritaire*, as the Second Republic under the presidency of Louis Napoleon? The memory of that experience and its outcome, despite universal suffrage, and the fact that a soldier occupied the presidency, rallied all the republican forces. A fierce election contest followed; the ministry made every effort, legal and illegal, to obtain a majority; against it Thiers gave the support of his great name to the campaign which Gambetta led. An overwhelming opposition majority was returned; the Marshal resisted for a time, but in December, 1878, he was forced to appoint a moderate republican ministry definitely responsible to the chamber of deputies. MacMahon resigned, and the election in January, 1879, of Jules Grévy began a period, lasting to our own time, in which the president took more and more the character of the elected figure-head of the Republic rather than that of chief of the executive.

The development of the "group" system, in which the lines of demarcation between parties is determined as much by personalities as by principles, had already gone far, and the greatest of modern French republicans—the founder, more than any other, of the Third Republic—suffered accordingly. Jealousies kept him out of ministerial office; the moderation of his political utterances made him suspect to his old followers without diminishing the distrust of the less

radical republicans; and when at last, in November, 1881, a distracted president, unable to obtain a stable ministry, did turn to Gambetta, that statesman could get no adequate support. He did take office, but without power, and in the following January was overthrown by an alliance of all the factions, from ultra-republicans to ultra-monarchists. Gambetta withdrew from active political life, and died at the end of the year.

The political confusion continued, but at last Jules Ferry formed a ministry which endured for two years (1883–1885) and achieved marked success both in internal administration (educational and financial reform) and in a policy of colonial expansion in Africa and Indo-China. Its fall, in a momentary panic caused by a small colonial reverse, was followed by a fresh period of party confusion and unstable ministries, and some manifest evils in French parliamentary life and scandals in connection with the bestowal of honours (which compelled the resignation of Grévy at the end of 1887) contributed to a reaction which presently aimed at a dictatorship—the Napoleonic idea of an autocracy based on universal suffrage—as the form of government best suited to France. But General Boulanger proved a very ineffective candidate for the dictatorship; the character of the new president (Carnot) was a valuable asset to the defenders of the Republic; Boulangism found relatively little support outside Paris; and the autumn election of 1889 was a complete victory for the republicans. It meant that provincial France would no longer blindly follow the lead of Paris, and had definitely accepted the Republic, whose existence has never since been seriously challenged.

§ 3. *The Dual Monarchy*

The disaster of 1866, following on that of 1859, caused a fundamental change in the constitutional organisation of

the Austrian Empire. After 1849 Hungary maintained an obstinate resistance to the centralising policy of Vienna, under the leadership of Deák, who had never regarded a complete break with Austria as desirable or practicable and devoted his energy to keeping alive national sentiment by action strictly within the law (as, for instance, the foundation of the academy of Buda-Pest and a national agricultural union) until the demand for the restoration of the Hungarian constitution could be revived with reasonable prospect of success. The party which still looked to the exiled Kossuth as its leader steadily declined.

After the loss of Lombardy, the imperial government made its first efforts at reform. The imperial council was enlarged, so as to represent the "provinces"; but the Magyars refused to take any part, insisting on the restoration of their own Diet. In 1861 a central Diet for the whole Empire was created with considerable powers—there were to be provincial Diets with limited scope; and this again was strenuously opposed by the Magyars under Deák, who would accept nothing short of autonomy on an equality and in union with Austria. Their provincial Diet refused to send representatives to the central Diet, and reiterated their national demands, but they had realised the expediency of doing at least lip-service to the rights of other races, and now declared that "we know that the constantly developing feeling of nationality deserves respect, and must not be weighed by a measure derived from former times or older laws. We shall not forget that the non-Hungarian inhabitants of Hungary are in every respect citizens of the country, and we are prepared sincerely and readily to secure to them by law whatever their own interest or that of the country demands." The government dissolved the Hungarian Diet by force, and suspended the county assemblies; military government was re-established. The Magyars adopted a policy of passive resistance—the German officials were ig-

nored, the taxes were unpaid, the imperial council and central Diet at Vienna were boycotted. After four years the growing external difficulties of his empire impelled Francis Joseph to an attempt at reconciliation; he visited Hungary, the Diet was allowed to reassemble, some Magyar nobles accepted office. The Emperor was still reluctant to yield to the full Magyar demands, but the battle of Sadowa ended his hesitation. Beust, who as a Saxon minister had tried quite unsuccessfully to measure himself against Bismarck, now entered the Austrian service and undertook negotiations with Deák, which ended in the *Ausgleich* or Dualism of 1867. The Austrian realms were divided into the kingdoms of Hungary, including Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia, and the Empire of Austria, comprising all the other Hapsburg possessions. Each part was to have its own parliament and responsible ministers; but for foreign affairs, war, and common finance there were to be special ministries responsible to the delegations, a joint body elected annually by the two parliaments; other matters of common interest which might arise were to be discussed between the two ministries and dealt with by simultaneous legislation, and there was to be a customs union on terms reviewed decennially.

The new arrangement, which lasted as long as the Hapsburgs, realised Deák's ideal of Hungarian autonomy in union and equality with Austria, but it involved in principle, and even more in practice, a denial of the right to autonomy of any nationality under the Hapsburg rule other than the Germans or Magyars. In Hungary after 1867 there was a persistent attempt at the magyarisation of the other races (Rumanians, Serbs, Ruthenes, and Slovaks), first by what may be described as peaceful penetration, but after Deák's death in 1876 by the more drastic measures (electoral law revision and compulsory teaching of the Magyar language) of the fifteen-year ministry of Koloman Tisza. In the Austrian state the constitution of 1867 established a

parliament of two chambers, one hereditary and official, the other elected on a franchise system which assured the preponderance of the German elements of the population. The ministry could legislate by decree in cases of emergency when the parliament was not in session, and as the legislature, which was nominally to meet every year, could be dissolved or adjourned by the Emperor at his pleasure, the government remained in fact largely autocratic. The Austrian Germans, in their efforts to keep their dominance over the Slavs, had the sympathy of their kinsmen in the German Empire and of the Magyars, who though not pro-German, had a similar purpose. The conflict of races continued; the Czech of Bohemia, in particular, claimed as full a measure of independence as the Magyars had received. Some attempts were made to develop a federal system, but they failed to satisfy the Slavs and were resented by the Germans, and the Auersperg ministry (1871–9) fell back on measures tending to strengthen the German predominance. The growing discontent and agitation among the non-Germans led to the appointment in 1879 of the Taafe ministry, which lasted until 1893, relied increasingly on the non-Germans, and accordingly sought to extend the personal power of the Emperor, since the electoral system gave the Germans control of the legislature.

§ 4. *The Russian Empire: the Failure of the "Tsar Liberator"*

In Russia the reforming activities of the earlier part of the reign of Alexander II. were followed by a sharp reaction, the result of the effect on the Emperor's mind of the Polish revolt, the unsatisfactory outcome of the measures taken for the liberation of the serfs, and the small results of administrative changes. The agrarian reforms had not improved the economic condition of the peasantry, whose

payments in respect of the state loans with which they had purchased their holdings from the nobles quickly fell into arrears, and the resultant burdens were the more galling since the peasants had always regarded as their own the lands which they had now been forced to purchase. The nobles, retaining half their estates, found that the labour no longer furnished by serfs had to be paid for, and as they had mostly spent quickly the proceeds of the sales, they fell into difficulties. Many mortgaged their estates and ceased to take any interest in local affairs; for the leadership of the nobles there was substituted the leadership of the village assemblies, composed of ignorant peasants. It was this that deprived the reform of local administration of any chance of success; the subordinate local authorities were without knowledge or experience. The local boards (*Zemstvos*), having no political competence, at least did sound work of a social nature, and formed one of the bright spots in the picture.

The second half of the reign of Alexander II. was—so far as concerns the domestic history of Russia—little more than a struggle between the government and a revolutionary party which, whilst very active and daring, was never more than an insignificant fraction of the population. From the ranks of the students, men and women, who had found their way to the universities of western Europe and been influenced by the various Socialist movements in ferment there, especially in the years immediately preceding 1870, were drawn the enthusiasts who during the next decade carried on propaganda among the peasants. It met with little success, for the intellectual level of the ex-serfs was so low as to make any common touch with the "Intelligentsia" very difficult, and the peasant did not want communism, but private ownership. More progress was made in some industrial centres. The authorities took no serious measures for some time, but finally prosecutions began, and the revolutionaries

passed from peaceful propaganda to terrorism. The years 1878 to 1881 were marked by a long series of political murders or attempts at murder, and increasingly severe methods of repression (martial law). The long continuance of the struggle between the government with its powerful police, widespread espionage, and great army, and a small handful of reckless enthusiasts, was possible only because the revolutionaries had the sympathy of large numbers even of those who condemned their methods. Gradually, after two attempts on the life of the Emperor, the futility of mere coercion was realised, and a project for the creation of a council of high officials and representatives of the Zemstvos was adopted. It was not much, but it might have been a real step in the path of progress, but just as it was taken Alexander II. fell a victim to a revolutionary plot (13th March, 1881).

His successor, Alexander III. (1881–1894) turned back. There was to be no compromise; the autocracy must be untrammelled. The ministers appointed by the new monarch were of higher quality than their predecessors; a state of siege was maintained with such vigour that the terrorism died away; but the Press was thereafter subject to the strictest censorship and the universities were stringently supervised, and even as late as 1890 the functions of the Zemstvos were reduced and the control exercised over them by the central authorities was strengthened. And the policy of russification already adopted in Poland was applied there with increased vigour and extended to the Lithuanian provinces and Little Russia, where the Poles were also predominant or numerous; to Finland, which had its own special constitution, and had hitherto been in little more than personal union with Russia; to the Baltic provinces, which had long enjoyed local privileges and where the upper classes were mainly German; and to the Jews throughout the Empire. The policy of the government was to make the

Russian language compulsory for official and educational purposes, to restrict the practice of all religious creeds other than that of the Orthodox Church, and to limit and wherever possible to abolish all local privileges—that is, to force the whole Empire into a common mould.

§ 5. *United Italy, and Francesco Crispi*

The unity of Italy had been effectively completed by the incorporation of Rome in 1870, though to the north-west and north there still remained territories—Istria, Trieste, and Gorizia, with the surrounding territory, and the Trentino—which Italian nationalists claimed should for both racial and historical reasons form part of the Italian state. Parliamentary government, first established in Piedmont, had been continued as that realm developed into the Italian kingdom, and Victor Immanuel conducted himself strictly as a constitutional monarch, drawing his ministers from the party predominant in the legislature. The two parties (the Right and the Left) which had formed themselves in the decade following 1860 differed as to method rather than purpose. In 1870 the Right was in power, as it had been since 1861, and had to settle the position of the Papacy. The law of guarantees (May, 1871) provided that the person of the Sovereign Pontiff should be inviolate as that of the King, that he should be allowed to maintain an armed guard, and should have full possession of the Vatican, the right to have ambassadors accredited to him from any foreign states, and complete liberty of holding conclaves, control of the Italian clergy and nomination to Italian sees. An annual state grant was also provided for, but Pius IX. rejected this, declared himself a prisoner, asserted his territorial claims, refused to recognise the civil power in the former Papal dominions, and denounced the work of the Italian parliament as impiety and madness.

The Right remained in power until 1876, struggling mainly with financial and economic problems. Italy had been united very rapidly; the heavy military expenditure from 1858 to 1871, and the cost of suppressing brigandage in the south, had resulted in a large debt and heavy taxation; much of the peninsula was in a very backward state, and means of communication were very defective, but little could be done in a financial situation which called for extreme economy. The Left with its more radical programme gained ground, and in 1876 obtained an overwhelming parliamentary majority. Its leaders were largely drawn from the south, the most conspicuous being Francesco Crispi, a Sicilian who had taken a leading part in the revolt of his native island in 1848, and thereafter lived for ten years a life of exile and conspiracy, often in the direst poverty, consorting much with Mazzini, whose nationalist and republican ideals he shared. With Mazzini he had protested against Cavour's alliance with Napoleon III.; after the peace of Villafranca he had gone to Sicily and organised an insurrection for which he sought open aid from the government of Piedmont, and when that was not forthcoming he had turned to Garibaldi, persuaded him to undertake the Sicilian expedition, accompanied it and took an active part in the fighting, followed the great adventurer to the mainland and became his chief political adviser. In that capacity he had done much to counteract the intransigent councils of Mazzini and contributed powerfully to the incorporation of Naples and Sicily in the new kingdom of Victor Immanuel. Nevertheless he was disliked and distrusted by the King and Cavour, and the latter's ministerial successors; he was impatient at the delay in completing Italian unity and resented the influence of Napoleon III. which showed itself in the cessation of the war of 1866 with the nationalist aspirations still unsatisfied, and he continued in active opposition until 1876. His policy, stated in broad lines, was a wide extension of the

franchise, a large development of local self-government, and a reform of taxation by the removal of all indirect taxes except customs duties which, he said in 1869, "from necessity cannot be abolished, since the question of frontier duties is like that of standing armies, which no state can abolish so long as the whole hemisphere does not abolish them." By this date (1876) he had moved from his earlier republicanism to the conviction that the Italian king was "the supreme magistrate of the national unity" and that even in the nineteenth century for Italy republicanism meant disunion. A born leader and demagogue, but violent-tempered, arrogant, and incapable of taking a secondary place, he would not accept office immediately on the triumph of the Left, but he did become minister of the interior in Depretis's cabinet of 1878 and so held that position when in February of that year Pius IX. died, four weeks after Victor Immanuel. Crispi had strongly opposed the law of guarantees, and the majority of the Cardinals at Rome held that the election of the new pontiff must take place out of Italy, since there could be no free election there. Crispi's declaration that if the Sacred College left Rome the Italian government would take possession of the Vatican, but if the election were held there it would be free and guaranteed against disturbance, was decisive; and the result was the accession of Leo XIII. to the pontifical throne. The new Pope began by declaring himself a prisoner in the Vatican and reasserting the right of the Sovereign Pontiff to temporal power; there was a continued refusal to recognise the new Italian kingdom; but during the long pontificate (1878–1904) of Leo XIII., and largely because of his character and statesmanship, the Papacy was to attain to a position of moral authority and influence which it had not enjoyed at least since the Reformation.

The new Italian king, Humbert, followed the constitutional practice of his father, a task of some difficulty since

the personal rivalries of the leaders of the Left, conducted with all the fervour and intrigue characteristic of the south, led to constant ministerial changes. Crispi had been soon driven from office by alleged scandals in his private life, the ministry fell shortly after, and a period of instability set in which lasted until Depretis became chief minister in May, 1881, and remained in power until his death six years later, largely because of a fluidity of principle which enabled him to make such changes in his cabinet from time to time as would enable him to obtain the support of the new political groups which emerged. During this period Crispi was in opposition, and gradually gathered round him such other sections of the old Left as were not so ready to modify their principles. In April, 1887, Depretis turned to them for support. Crispi entered the cabinet, and three months later succeeded to the chief office, which he held until 1891.

The main developments in the domestic history of Italy between 1876 and 1891, apart from the increasing weakness of parliamentary government from the growth, as in France, of the group system, were the extension of the suffrage by the lowering of the age limit and the reduction of the taxation qualification—the electorate was trebled in 1882; the rise of Socialism (the first Italian Socialist Congress was held in 1883); the adoption of an elaborate programme of railway development, the growth of armaments in consequence of changes in Italy's foreign relations and of colonial ambitions, and the rapid increase of debt and taxation.

§ 6. *Some Smaller States of Continental Europe*

The most troubled of the older European states between 1870 and 1890 was Spain. The position of Amadeus, son of Victor Immanuel of Italy, who had been chosen king after the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature, quickly

proved untenable, and his abdication in February, 1873, was followed by the proclamation of a Republic. But its supporters were not unanimous in their aims; some desired a strong centralised government, others a federation of which the provinces, or even smaller areas, would be the constituent states. The northern provinces adhered to the cause of Don Carlos. The federalists obtained a majority in the new legislature, but a number of little republics set themselves up at such places as Cartagena, Cadiz, Seville, and Granada, and a new rising in the north began the second Carlist war, waged against the central government both by armies of considerable strength and by guerilla bands. The federal leader, Serrano, succeeded in crushing the local republics by the beginning of 1874, but the struggle against the Carlists was less successful until General Martinez Campos declared in favour of Alfonso, the youthful son of the ex-Queen Isabella. The army followed him, the new King entered Spain in January, 1875, and was generally accepted. A ministry formed under Canovas del Castillo succeeded in detaching a large part of Don Carlos's following by the offer of an amnesty and safeguards for the special rights of the northern provinces, and after a hard struggle finally overthrew the Carlists in March, 1877.

Spain had at last freedom from civil war, but the exhaustion and demoralisation remained. She had all the forms and machinery of parliamentary government, universal suffrage, legal freedom of the Press, liberty of worship; but venality was rampant in the legislature and public offices, the political parties which alternated in office were distinguished from one another only by personal rivalries, the elections were manipulated in every possible way, successive governments lived in fear of the unduly large army and ambitious generals, no effective action was taken by the state to promote the economic recovery and development of the country, Cuba and the Philippines were in a state of chronic

rebellion, popular education was on a lower level than in any country of western Europe except Portugal, the nation was sunk in lethargy. The death of Alfonso XII., in November, 1885, and the long minority of his later-born son, Alfonso XIII., under the regency of his mother, only facilitated the continuance of the régime thus briefly characterised. In Portugal conditions were equally bad. The constitution, with its two chambers, one nominated and the other elected on a wide suffrage, provided for a parliamentary government, but the political parties were personal factions, the elections were managed as in Spain, all constitutional guarantees could be suspended by decree, the king and his ministers were in effect uncontrolled, the great bulk of the population were illiterate, there was little economic progress except at Lisbon and Oporto, taxation was heavy, and Portugal's oversea possessions remained undeveloped.

The Scandinavian countries, whilst standing apart from the main course of European international politics, yet participated in the general social and economic movement and its consequences. In Sweden the Diet, with its four orders of nobles, clergy, bourgeoisie, and peasants, had been replaced in 1866 by a parliament of two chambers, with a limited suffrage, which caused it to be dominated by the small proprietors. The legislature could check but not control the ministers, who were appointed by and responsible only to the king. The chief domestic issues during the whole period now under consideration were the reform and strengthening of the army and navy (owing to distrust of Russia) and economic policy—the agrarians being protectionist. There was some demand for a wider franchise, and the beginnings of Socialism, but neither movement became active until Sweden entered later into the path of industrialism. In Norway a constitutional struggle between the legislature, of which the form had not changed since 1814, and the king began in 1872 over the position of the ministers; it did not

end until 1884, when the principle of parliamentary responsibility of ministers was in effect established. The main issue, however, was always that of Norway's relations with Sweden; these were constantly strained since the representation of the foreign interests of the two countries was in the hands of a Swedish minister, and the Norwegians had, or thought they had, few interests in common with the Swedes, believed their interests to be neglected, and regarded the position as humiliating. In Denmark the legislature consisted of two chambers, the lower one being elected on a wide suffrage; the ministers were responsible only to the king and were not bound to be members of either of the chambers, though they could speak in both. The position was disliked by the liberals, who obtained a majority in the lower chamber in 1872, and began a struggle for the principle of ministerial responsibility to parliament, which after a conflict which was often acute—the legislature refusing supplies and the executive straining its constitutional powers to the utmost—ended successfully in 1894.

In the Netherlands the parliament consisted of two chambers, the upper elected by the councils of the eleven provinces, the lower directly on a limited franchise; ministers were responsible to the legislature, but the monarch retained considerable personal power, never so exercised, however, as to bring him into conflict with the popular representatives. The liberals, whose strength was in the commercial towns, were in power with one short interval for thirty years; they were partisans of lay education, and such opposition as there was came from the conservative Protestants, supported by the Calvinistic peasantry and claiming for the Calvinist ministers control of the schools, and a small but better-organised body of Roman Catholics, who, at first allied with the liberals to defend liberty of worship, to which the orthodox Calvinists were opposed, had after 1870 turned to co-operation with the conservatives, in view of the Papal atti-

tude towards freedom of thought. Apart from the question of the schools the dominant issues of Dutch politics in the period under review were military service, which the liberals sought to make obligatory on all, certain colonial problems, and the franchise. The electorate was doubled in 1887. Holland's economic development—to which her rich oversea possessions largely contributed—was mainly agricultural and commercial, and she pursued a consistent policy of free trade. Socialism made its appearance before 1870, but in the absence of any considerable industrial population its progress was slow, though the activity of its adherents during the trade crisis of 1886 led to some disturbance and severe repressive enactments, followed, however, in the next year by the beginnings of legislation to improve the conditions of labour.

The political life of Belgium was as orderly and uneventful as that of its northern neighbour. Its constitution, dating from 1831, was a limited monarchy with parliamentary government, substantially on the British model; both houses of the legislature were directly elected, but on a property franchise which kept the electorate very small—even as late as 1893 it numbered only some hundred and fifty thousand. Two parties had made the revolution of 1830—the Catholics, tenacious of the privileges of the Roman Church, and the liberals, who were in part Catholics opposed to the Church's political claims and in part freethinkers (the Belgian Protestants have always been insignificant), and found their support mostly in the Walloon manufacturing towns. A Catholic ministry succeeded a liberal one in 1870, and remained in power for eight years; but the manner in which the Belgian clergy, always ultramontane, used the sanctions of the Church against any forms of liberalism, political or intellectual, led to an alliance of moderate and advanced liberals, which was successful in 1878 and held office for six years. Its education policy—the establishment of state

schools, free and non-sectarian—caused a bitter conflict with the clergy and a rupture with the Papacy; dissension arose within the party on the question of franchise extension; and the increase of taxation made it still more unpopular. In 1884 the Catholics recovered office, which they still held thirty years later. The clergy again secured control of the schools, and thereafter the chief features of the domestic history of Belgium were the rapid growth of industry and foreign trade, combined with a flourishing agriculture; the rise of Socialism, which became active especially after 1885, and was in principles and methods closely modelled on that of Germany; and the agitation for an extension of the franchise, which was not successful until 1894, when the electorate was multiplied tenfold.

Lastly, the history of Switzerland after 1848 was one of quiet progress. The gain in strength and prestige from the new federal constitution was shown in the dispute with Prussia over Neufchâtel in 1856–7, in negotiations with France after the transfer of Savoy from Italy to that country, and in the safeguarding of Switzerland's neutrality in 1866 and 1870–1; and in 1874 the constitution was revised and the powers of the federal government greatly extended. The political problems of the Federation were of little direct interest to, and were little affected by, the rest of Europe, and Switzerland's neutrality combined with her geographical position to make her the appropriate home or starting place of various international organisations to serve common interests,

§ 7. *The United Kingdom*

The statesmen and political parties of the United Kingdom had throughout the whole of the period of the reconstruction of Europe been much more concerned with domestic than with foreign affairs, except the Eastern

question, which had a close bearing on problems of imperial strategy. In spite of the occasional assertiveness of Lord Palmerston, and the pro-Italian manifestations of Lord John Russell and Gladstone, the tradition of Castlereagh and Canning had given way to the tradition of Peel; and this attitude lasted until the middle of the eighth decade of the century. From about that time the changed conditions resulting from the "expansion of Europe" compelled British statesmen to play an increasingly important part in international politics.

During the period from 1850 to 1890 there are three main features of British history. The first is the steady growth of democracy, which found its expression in the extensions of the franchise in 1867 and 1884, the introduction of the secret ballot for parliamentary and other elections, the development of local self-government and the broadening of its basis, particularly in 1889, the extension of state education, the widening of social legislation, and the large increase of trade unionism, facilitated by complete freedom of the Press and of public meeting. The long tradition of British parliamentary life maintained the two-party system, which, whatever its demerits, had at least the advantage, as contrasted with conditions in such countries as France and Italy, of providing relatively stable ministries; it was not until 1892 that organised labour began to manifest itself as a political force quite independent of the old liberal and radical party. The second main interest was the perpetual problem of Ireland, the rise of a nationalist party there, with its demand for a large measure of autonomy—a movement following closely on similar movements on the continent of Europe, with which it had many features in common, and not checked either by agrarian and other legislation intended to remove the chief causes of discontent among the peasantry and Catholic grievances, or by repres-

sive legislation; and the adoption of the cause of "home rule" for Ireland by the leader of one great party in 1886, with disastrous effects upon the fortunes of the party and its exclusion from power (though it was in office for a short period) for two decades. The third phenomenon was the steady expansion of the British overseas possessions—in India, where the political powers of the East India Company were assumed by the crown in 1857 after the great mutiny, and the consolidation of British rule was signalised by the proclamation of the imperial title for the British monarch in 1878; in Canada, where settlement progressed across the continent; in Australasia and, with some set-backs, in South Africa; and in East and West Africa also, particularly in consequence of the activity of explorers of several European nations in the period from 1850 to 1880. To the consequences of this we shall return later; the special point to which attention must here be drawn is the establishment of parliamentary institutions and responsible government in all parts of the Empire where the white population was either overwhelmingly predominant (as in Canada, Newfoundland, the six states of Australia, and New Zealand) or sufficiently numerous and in a position of such economic strength as to undertake the whole burden of government (as in Cape Colony and Natal). To such British possessions the fullest autonomy was given; the crown's veto on legislation became as obsolete as in the United Kingdom; the sole effective legal ties between them and the mother country were allegiance to the common sovereign, the right of appeal from their local tribunals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and their inability to be diplomatically represented in foreign countries or to make treaties, except through the government of the United Kingdom. This system—fully developed during the period from 1837 to 1872—is the second great British con-

tribution—the first being parliamentary government—to the world's political progress. The colonial conference of 1887, a gathering of the prime ministers of all the self-governing parts of the British Empire, inaugurated yet another stage of imperial development and a voluntary co-operation which was to be of the most far-reaching importance.

CHAPTER VIII

The Dominance of Bismarck: (II) International Relations

§ 1. *Bismarck and France*

The Bismarckian policy of aggressive adventure ended with the signature of the treaty of Frankfurt; thereafter the Chancellor's primary object was to safeguard his work. He was convinced that France would seek the earliest opportunity to recover her lost provinces; very soon after Sedan he had intimated to the European governments that German policy must be based on the expectation not of a durable peace, whatever its terms, but of a speedy effort by France, either alone or in alliance with other Powers, to reassert her position in Europe. The efforts of Gambetta, hopeless as they were, and later the successful administration of Thiers, showed that neither the spirit nor the strength of France was broken; he cannot have believed that she alone could wage war against Germany with any prospect of success, but feared she might find allies. The most likely were Austria-Hungary, which had also been humiliated by Bismarck—its Chancellor, Beust, had resisted him in Saxony before 1866, and in 1870 had tried to bring about an intervention of neutral Powers—and Russia. Resolved to keep France isolated, Bismarck turned first to Vienna, and reaped the reward of his moderation after Sadowa; a meeting of the two Emperors was followed by the dismissal of Beust, and his replacement by the Hungarian, Andrassy. Alexander II. of Russia, disturbed

by a rapprochement which threatened to dominate Europe, unable to find any common ground with Great Britain, and distrusting the French government as republican and the product of a revolution, decided to make common cause with his fellow Emperors rather than remain isolated—a course which incidentally might secure their goodwill towards a renewal of Russia's anti-Turkish policy.

So there came into being towards the end of 1872 an informal league of the three Emperors, an understanding directed towards the maintenance of the new territorial arrangements (that is, the German possession of Alsace-Lorraine), joint action in any Eastern question, and resistance to Socialism, with which republicanism was confounded. During the next three years meetings of the three monarchs gave an appearance of solidarity to their alliance, and with the United Kingdom decidedly German in sympathy and Italy more inclined to Berlin than to Paris, the isolation of France seemed complete.

But Bismarck was soon to have a rude shock. The rapid payment by France of the indemnity and the efforts to reorganise the army disturbed the Chancellor, and he apparently believed that with MacMahon in the presidential chair a royalist restoration was possible, and that in any event a conservative and clerical administration was likely, which would seek, perhaps in co-operation with Austria-Hungary, and even Italy, to support the Papacy in the conflict into which Bismarck had plunged it. Whatever his motives, the officially-inspired German Press began a campaign against France, and the enactment of a new army law by the French national assembly in March, 1875, was the occasion of diplomatic representations which could be construed only as a threat of war if the new law were proceeded with. The French government realised the danger, and the foreign minister, the Duc Decazes, invoked the good offices of Great Britain and Russia. Both were desirous of avoid-

ing a fresh European war; neither was disposed to allow the balance of power upon the continent to be still more upset by a further weakening of France. The two governments—in Great Britain there was the ministry of Disraeli, with Lord Derby at the Foreign Office—and the two monarchs, Queen Victoria and Alexander II., made their opinion known with emphasis at Berlin, and Bismarck abruptly changed his attitude. The Press campaign was stopped; the diplomatic representations and threats ceased; the German government declared itself satisfied with the French explanations. At later times the Chancellor held up the danger of a French war as a means of forcing his will on the Reichstag, but the "rattling of the sabre" played thenceforward only a small part in his foreign policy.

The significance of the "incident" was threefold. It showed that the European Powers were no longer hypnotised by the German military successes and Bismarck's diplomatic triumphs between 1860 and 1871; protests and warnings had come from capitals besides London and St. Petersburg; as Decazes said, Bismarck's action had caused "an awakening of Europe." Secondly, it had shaken the league of the Emperors; Bismarck had realised always that it might be impossible to maintain that alliance, and had hesitated as to the choice between Russia and Austria-Hungary, if a choice should become necessary; resentment at the action of Alexander II. and his foreign minister, Gortchakov, determined him to rely on Austria. And thirdly it showed that Europe had realised that a strong France was essential to the maintenance of any balance of power in continental Europe, and, that being so, her isolation would not long continue. And it is of interest, in view of developments a quarter of a century later, that Decazes wrote to the French ambassador in London of the part taken by Great Britain and Russia in the crisis:—"I have never ceased to hope for an understanding between those two Powers which

would enable us to move with them and free us from any need to choose between them, and I think there is a good prospect that my hopes will prove well-founded."

But the realisation of that hope was still far off, and events in south-eastern Europe seemed to make it more remote than ever.

§ 2. *The Eastern Question Once More*

At the time of the Congress of Paris the Sultan of Turkey had issued a firman granting liberty of worship and civil equality to all his subjects—a policy violently resented by the bureaucracy and indeed by all the Moslem Turks as incompatible with the precepts of their creed. It is at best very doubtful if there was any intention on the part of the Sultan and his advisers to carry it into effect; the promise had been made under pressure, but they knew that it came chiefly from Russia, that Great Britain and France were concerned less with reform of the Turkish Empire than with its maintenance as a barrier against a Russian advance to the eastern Mediterranean and in Asia Minor, and were not likely to take any effective action to coerce the Ottoman government. And nothing was done.

Between 1856 and 1876 there were some events of substantial importance in south-eastern Europe. In 1859 the Danubian principalities entered into a personal union under Prince Cuza, in spite of opposition from Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Turkey; seven years later he was overthrown and Prince Charles of Hohenzollern elected in his stead. In 1863 the incompetent and extravagant Otto of Bavaria had been expelled from the throne of Greece, and after some search a new monarch had been found in the person of Prince George of Denmark, whose accession was marked by the cession of the Ionian Islands by Great Britain, which joined with France and Russia in a renewed

guarantee of the Greek territory and constitution. Serbia had obtained in 1867 the final withdrawal of the Turkish garrisons from her fortresses. The use made by Russia of the opportunity afforded by the Franco-German war to secure the abrogation of the Black Sea clauses of the treaty of Paris did much to restore her prestige. And at about the same time came the first overt manifestations of a new national movement in the Sultan's dominions. For centuries the Bulgars had been without an ecclesiastical head of their own, and were subject to the Greek Œcumenical Patriarch at Constantinople. For some half a century they had been claiming an independent headship; they were now supported by Russia, and in 1870 the Sultan, who was having trouble with a Greek revolt in Crete, created a Bulgarian exarchate, much to the annoyance of the Greeks within and without his dominions.

In 1875 there was a rebellion in Herzegovina, which quickly spread to Bosnia; the Serbs of those territories were encouraged by the withdrawal of the Turkish garrisons from independent Serbia, by the revival of the Russian pan-Slav agitation, and by the machinations of unofficial Russian agents, seeming to foreshadow active official support. The rebels declared for union with Serbia. The league of the three Emperors was still in being, but in this matter the interests of two of them were directly at variance. Austria feared that a rebel success might have serious reactions in her own territory, where there were many Serbs; her government was inclined to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as compensation for Italian losses, but there were obvious difficulties—apart from the certain hostility of Russia there was strong opposition from the Magyars, who disliked any increase in the Slav population of the Dual Monarchy and had Turkish sympathies since 1849. On the other hand the Slavs were eager for action in support of the rebels. So the Austrian government

suggested mediation. The ministry of Disraeli pursued the traditional British course of inducing the Sultan to issue an elaborate programme of reforms which would deprive the Powers of any ground for intervention—the likelihood or otherwise of the programme being carried out was a secondary consideration. The other Powers were not satisfied; they asked for security that the reforms would be carried out, by the appointment of a joint commission of Moslems and Christians. The Sultan agreed, and the Powers tried to induce the rebels to disarm—unsuccessfully, for Russia was encouraging them. The insurrection grew, and spread to Bulgaria. The Powers demanded the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and threatened to take joint action to enforce their demand; the British government stood aloof, and thereby encouraged the Turks to resist. Serbia and Montenegro were arming to support the rebels; Turkey demanded explanations from them and was answered by their declaration of war (1st July, 1876). The regular Turkish army being occupied in the north-west, irregulars were sent to Bulgaria to suppress the revolt there—a course which resulted in much savage and unrestrained cruelty, and gave Russia new cause for intervention.

Alexander II. pursued the long-established policy of Russia, to stand forward as the protector of the Christian races of Turkey, to encourage them, secretly or openly as opportunity offered, in attempts to shake off the Turkish rule, if only to the extent of securing autonomy, and so to become the paramount influence in the Balkan peninsula, with the chance of territorial gains there, including even Constantinople itself. The British government was of the same mind as in 1854; it distrusted Russia, it was still bent on maintaining the integrity of the Turkish Empire, though it had been evident for half a century that the policy was hopeless; and it certainly gave the Porte the impression

that vigorous support would be forthcoming. Bismarck would have preferred that neither Russia nor Austria should gain territory or prestige in south-eastern Europe, but he was now embittered against Russia and resolved that if one or other must gain it should be Austria. Against Russia he could rely on the support of Great Britain and probably on that of France, which had always been hostile to any Russian progress in the Levant, and the 1875 crisis being past he was now engaged in smoothing the diplomatic relations between Berlin and Paris.

The Russian Emperor sought to conciliate Great Britain and Austria by proposing a joint demonstration and conference at Constantinople; he asserted that Russia did not wish to separate herself from the European concert, but the situation was so intolerable that if necessary he must act alone. The British government would not co-operate, and Alexander prepared for war. He secured the free passage of his armies through Rumania and the non-interference of the Austrian government, which he agreed should occupy Bosnia and afterwards Herzegovina—to Bismarck's serious annoyance.

The war was going badly against Serbia, and in September, 1876, Russia demanded that Turkey should grant an armistice. Efforts at peace continued, but a conference at Constantinople, at which Lord Salisbury represented Great Britain, failed before the obstinacy of the Sultan. Two palace revolutions within a few months had placed Abdul Hamid on the throne: he would do nothing at the behest or even suggestion of the Powers, but issued in September the "Midhat" constitution for the whole empire, with a representative assembly and the more customary grant of rights and privileges for all his subjects. A conference at London was equally unsuccessful: Turkey had forced Serbia to submit to terms, and flushed with success, and relying on British support, the Sultan refused to make peace with

Montenegro, to disarm, or to appoint a mixed commision to supervise the reforms. On April 24, 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey; four weeks later Rumania did the same and proclaimed her complete independence. Serbia renewed the war; Greece was ready to join in, but was restrained by British influence. Austria occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina. The other Powers declared their neutrality. In the existing position as between Russia and Austria Germany could not do otherwise; France's interests were not very immediately affected; the British government, after all its encouragement of Turkish obstinacy, contented itself with declaring that it would only intervene to protect Constantinople, the Dardanelles, and the Suez Canal, but warned Russia that no peace treaty modifying existing treaties would be recognised unless assented to by all the Powers affected.

The war was not so speedily decided as Russia had expected. Delayed by the strenuous defence of Plevna, it was not until the end of December that her armies crossed the Balkans; but then within a month all the Turkish armies were overthrown and the Russians were nearing Constantinople. The Sultan yielded, and an armistice was followed by the treaty of San Stefano (3rd March, 1878). The full independence of Rumania and Serbia was recognised; reforms were to be made in Epiros, Thessaly and other parts of European Turkey; the districts of Kars, Ardahan, Bayazid, and Batoum, to the east of the Black Sea, were ceded to Russia; the Sultan undertook immediate reforms in the Asiatic provinces inhabited by the Armenians; and a new principality of Bulgaria was to be created, embracing not only Bulgaria proper and Eastern Rumelia, but practically the whole of Macedonia and other lands, including Uskub and Monastir on the east and Koritza and Kavalla on the south, thus giving the new estate an outlet on the Ægean.

The treaty aroused violent opposition in Great Britain where, in spite of Gladstone's vehement denunciations of the "Bulgarian atrocities" and Turkish misrule generally, fear of Russia outweighed dislike of Turkey, and the Disraeli government (in which Lord Salisbury was now at the Foreign Office) was strongly anti-Russian. It was believed that an essential aim of British foreign policy must be the prevention of any Russian advance, direct or indirect, at the expense of Turkey, because the route to India by the Suez Canal would be threatened if Russia established herself on the Dardanelles and thereby on the Mediterranean, and because Great Britain had a large trade in European Turkey which would suffer greatly if Russia were able to apply her restrictive commercial policy to any part of that region. Any new state formed with Russian aid would be under Russian control; political autonomy for the Turkish Christians was only another name for Russian predominance. The races transferred from Turkish to Russian rule would gain nothing, for Russian intolerance of other nationalities beneath the imperial rule had been clearly shown in Poland and elsewhere. Consequently, "whether from a political or philanthropic point of view, the first thing to be considered by England in the present crisis" was "her own interest, and the future destiny of the Turkish Slavs, though not to be excluded from consideration altogether," was a "matter entirely subsidiary to that of putting a stop to Russian encroachment." [1] Austria was alarmed at the prospect of a large new Balkan state, which it was assumed would be under Russian control, and would certainly be an obstacle to the advance already contemplated by the Austrian government through Bosnia and Herzegovina south-eastward to the gulf of Salonica. Serbia and Greece were annoyed at the barrier which the

[1] This argument, and the quotations, are from Baron Henry de Worms, *England's Policy in the East*, (1877), pp. 57–8.

Bulgarian state would present to their own schemes of aggrandisement in Macedonia. Austria mobilised her army; a British fleet went to Constantinople. Then Bismarck intervened, and taking up a suggestion for a conference already made up by the Austrian Chancellor, Andrassy, he offered his services as a disinterested party in a congress to be held at Berlin, hoping thereby to recover the prestige which had been badly shaken three years earlier, and intending to support Austria-Hungary and by checking Russia to avenge the diplomatic defeat of 1875 on those whom he regarded as its principal authors, Alexander II. and Gortchakov. To the Balkan problem in itself he was indifferent: he was concerned with it only so far as it could be utilised for his overruling purpose—a grouping of the Powers which would safeguard the German Empire. Alexander tried to make the acceptance of some of the San Stefano clauses a preliminary condition, but failed, and disappointed of the German sympathy on which he seems to have counted to the last, and unprepared for a new war, he consented to the congress, which met at Berlin in June, 1878.

It was the most imposing European council since the Congress of Vienna. The six Great Powers of Europe, and the Turkish Empire, were represented by their leading ministers: Andrassy, Gortchakov, Disraeli (now Lord Beaconsfield), and Salisbury were amongst the statesmen who met under Bismarck's presidency, but there was in fact little to do beyond registering agreements reached in negotiations which had preceded the opening of the Congress. The British and Russian governments had come to terms; they had agreed upon a reduction of the new Bulgarian principality and some territorial gains to Russia, and the principle of combined European action in respect of Turkey was reaffirmed. But simultaneously the British government had negotiated with the Sultan; it was obvious that the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire could not be maintained,

and the ministry of Lord Beaconsfield resolved to get something for Great Britain. By a treaty of the 4th June it secured the occupation of Cyprus so long as Russia held Kars and Batoum, and on condition of an annual payment, as "a place of arms in the Levant," in return for an undertaking to support and protect the Sultan. Bismarck had made up his mind to support Austria, and, without the knowledge of the Porte, Germany, Great Britain and Austria had determined that the last-named should continue to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina—Russia had long before agreed with Austria as to this.

Under the terms of the final settlement the complete independence of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro was recognised by the Great Powers and Turkey, in the case of Rumania on condition that its government established equality of civil rights for all, without respect to creed. There were some territorial readjustments for these states. Rumania returned to Russia the part of Bessarabia ceded by her to Moldavia in 1856, and received in exchange the whole of the Dobrudja and a strip south of it. Serbia obtained a small accretion of territory: Montenegro was extended, and a little later was given an outlet on the Adriatic at Antivari and Dulcigno. There was one change of greater importance; under the treaty of San Stefano the boundaries of Serbia and Montenegro were close together, but the gap between them was now widened by pushing back the proposed Montenegrin frontier. The enlarged intervening territory was known as the Sanjak of Novibazar, and Austria, authorised to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, was also given the right to maintain garrisons in the Sanjak.

A new principality of Bulgaria, subject to Turkish suzerainty and paying annual tribute, was set up under an hereditary ruler to be elected as soon as an assembly had prepared a consitution. It was to extend only from the Danube to the Balkans: the territory to the south was to

constitute the province of Eastern Rumelia, under the direct authority of the Sultan, but with administrative autonomy and a governor-general approved by the Powers. All the western territories ("Macedonia") were left to the Turks with the usual conditions as to political and administrative reforms, which were never fulfilled. Greece was promised a "rectification of boundaries," which resulted three years later in substantial gains in Thessaly and Epiros. Russia's acquisitions in Asia were confirmed, and the provisions of San Stefano as to the Armenians were repeated.

Such was the settlement reached at Berlin. Three Powers were well content. Germany had appeared as the arbiter of Europe; her chancellor had played a leading part, he had secured the Austrian alliance and had strengthened amicable relations with the British government. Austria had obtained a large accession of territory, for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was obviously equivalent to annexation, and the right of garrison in the Sanjak gave her a base for an advance down the valley of the Vardar towards Salonica. The United Kingdom had also gained—in the opinion of her government and most of her people at the time; Russia had been checked without a war, and a new position secured in the Mediterranean. But everywhere else there was dissatisfaction; the settlement had no element of permanence. The Bulgars were discontented with their truncated principality, and continued to cherish ambitions as to Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia. The Serbs resented the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which transferred their kinsfolk from one alien rule to another, was hated by the transferred population, and appeared to destroy the hope of a Greater Serbia. Russia saw the balance of influence in the Balkans upset to her disadvantage by Austria's gains, was alienated from that country and Germany, and further embittered against Great Britain. Italy viewed with some anxiety the strengthening

of Austria's position on the east of the Adriatic. The Turks saw their empire still further reduced. And the problem of Macedonia was unsolved; empty pledges had been given by the Porte and approved by the Powers, but Macedonia remained a menace to Europe for more than thirty years. For in it there was represented every race of the Balkans: Greeks and Bulgars chiefly, but also Serbs, Rumanians (Vlach), aboriginal Moslems and Turkish settlers, Albanian communities and many Jews. The first three races looked for union with their independent kinsmen; the others were pro-Turk. There was constant unrest and rival nationalist propaganda, which the Turkish government did not attempt to check, but rather fomented.

It will be convenient here to notice briefly the developments in the Balkans between 1878 and 1890. In 1879 Alexander of Battenburg was elected Prince of Bulgaria; continued agitation there and in Eastern Rumelia brought in the latter province in 1885 a peaceful revolution and demand for union. Russia, no longer desirous of a Greater Bulgaria, for Alexander was not amenable to her influence, was hostile; the British government took the opposite course, and an international conference made the Prince governor-general of Eastern Rumelia; it was union in fact. Serbia and Greece were alarmed at the progress of their rival; Serbia declared war and was promptly defeated; Greece was only restrained by an international blockade. But Alexander's success was short-lived: persistent Russian intrigue forced him to abdicate in 1886, but was otherwise ineffective, for in the following year the energy of Stambuloff obtained the selection of Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, and the support of Great Britain, Austria and Italy secured the throne for that prince despite Russian threats. The Princes of Rumania and Serbia assumed the title of King in 1881 and 1882. The former state made steady political and economic progress and in 1883 signed an alliance with

Austria-Hungary to which Germany acceded. As regards the Austro-Hungarian empire the position was difficult, since there were more than two million Rumanians in Hungary, Transylvania, and Bukovina, and their union with the independent state was eagerly desired on both sides of the frontier. Serbia made little progress; its worthless ruler, Milan, was entirely under Austrian influence, especially after the ill-advised adventure against Bulgaria, when complete disaster had been averted only by Austria's intervention, and the little agricultural state was involved in grave economic difficulties by royal extravagance, maladministration, and a lost war. The unpopularity and difficulties of Milan led to his abdication in 1889 in favour of his youthful son.

§ 3. *The Triple Alliance*

By the date of the Congress of Berlin Bismarck had decided that his main reliance must be placed upon a definite and binding agreement with Austria, even if that involved a break with Russia. The understanding between the three Powers upon which he had depended for the safeguarding of his work had been much shaken by the French crisis of 1875 and the Berlin Congress; both of which had shown the latent conflict of Russian and German policies. Bismarck was convinced that nothing more than "correct" diplomatic relations was attainable with France; and whilst the attitude of Great Britain was friendly, her interests were mainly outside Europe, whilst those of Germany were still in Bismarck's view almost wholly continental, and, moreover, the Chancellor disbelieved in the possibility of real continuity of policy under a parliamentary government of the British type. The obvious course seemed to him to be an Austrian alliance and this was obtained by the treaty of October, 1879, which provided that if either contracting state were attacked by Russia the other would

come to its aid: if the attack were by any other Power the contracting party not attacked would maintain a "benevolent" neutrality. This was all Bismarck could obtain at the time, for the Austrian Chancellor, Andrassy, would not undertake to help Germany to maintain her possession of Alsace-Lorraine. But Bismarck was not yet satisfied. He was anxious to avoid a rupture with Russia, and was sedulously promoting better diplomatic relations with that state—a policy facilitated by an improvement in the Balkan situation as between Austria and Russia, the retirement of Gortchakov and his succession by de Giers, and later the death of Alexander II. Immediately after this last event Bismarck obtained (June, 1881) a treaty between Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one side and Russia on the other, whereby each side bound itself to a "benevolent" neutrality in the event of the other side being attacked by a non-contracting state. But even this was not enough. Austria feared that if she were involved in a war the opportunity would be taken by Italy to seek complete unification by the acquisition of the territories with Italian populations still under Austrian rule. The Chancellor sought to bring Italy into an alliance with the Central Powers; as early as the Congress of Berlin he had been preparing the way, foreseeing the use to be made of the question of Tunis.

The possession of Algeria, of which the conquest had begun in 1830, necessarily brought France into close relations with the adjoining province of Tunis, a part of the Turkish Empire which enjoyed practical independence under its Bey. Trade between the two territories was substantial; French subjects enjoyed many concessions in Tunis, and the French government was disturbed by the Sultan's efforts, after losing so much in Europe, to strengthen his hold on Northern Africa. Bismarck was ready to encourage France to turn her thoughts away from Europe and

seek compensation elsewhere for her European losses, and during the Congress of Berlin both he and Lord Salisbury had intimated that their respective governments were willing to give France a free hand in Tunis. There was a school of thought in France which regarded the policy of colonial expansion upon which Jules Ferry was entering with energy and enthusiasm as an abandonment of Alsace-Lorraine, the recovery of which must be the cardinal point of French policy; there was another school which thought of colonial development as the first step towards that recovery, since it would give France new sources of strength. With Ferry in office, the second school had its way; border trouble provided excuse for a French military and naval expedition against Tunis, and the treaty of Bardo (1881) gave France a complete protectorate over that area. Gambetta, regarded throughout France as the apostle of the creed which made the recovery of the lost provinces the first object of policy, wrote to Ferry that by the treaty France had retaken her place as a great Power. The Italian government had for some time been covetous of Tunis, where there were many Italian settlers, and it took alarm at the increased French hold upon the Mediterranean. It was consequently anxious to protect itself against further expansion by France, by securing the support of Germany. In May, 1882, Italy concluded with Germany and Austria-Hungary a defensive alliance. She would have preferred a treaty with Germany alone. But Bismarck insisted on a simultaneous treaty with Austria, and thereby constituted the Triple Alliance.

In that same year the relations between France and Great Britain were strained by the affairs of Egypt. The financial difficulties of the Khedive had led in 1876 to a unification of the Egyptian debt and joint control by the chief creditor countries, and later, as conditions did not improve, to an Anglo-French "condominium" with a new Khedive and European advisers at the side of the Egyptian minis-

ters. The reduction of the army led to a military agitation which soon became a nationalist campaign against all foreigners, Christian and Turkish alike. The British ministry of Gladstone, with Lord Granville at the Foreign Office, announced in November, 1881, their desire that Egypt should retain its administrative independence, and asserted that neither Great Britain nor France had any territorial ambition there—and that the former would only intervene to prevent anarchy. Gambetta, during his short ministry, induced the British government (January, 1882) to co-operate in ruling out the Sultan and informing the Khedive that the two Powers were resolved to repress any action likely to disturb the existing order in Egypt. This alarmed the Khedive, whose authority it seemed to threaten, irritated the Sultan, and angered the nationalists. The British government desired the continuance of French co-operation, but Gambetta fell from power. The military party in Egypt got the upper hand completely, and the French government, after some hesitation and despite Gambetta's protests, declared that in no circumstances would they be a party to armed intervention. They proposed a joint conference of the interested Powers, but before it met there was a massacre of Europeans, mostly British, at Alexandria; when it did meet the British representative proposed a joint military intervention by Great Britain, France, and Turkey. The Sultan temporised; the French ministry hesitated; on the 11th July the British fleet bombarded Alexandria, which the Turks were fortifying. Gladstone declared it to be the duty of Great Britain to convert Egypt from "anarchy and conflict to peace and order," and that if other Powers would not co-operate she would act alone. The French ministry still hesitated, and was overthrown on another issue at the end of July. A few days later a British army landed in Egypt, the nationalist revolt was quickly crushed, the British government announced that it

would occupy Egypt, but only until the administration was reformed and could be safely left entirely in native hands, which it hoped would be soon. The Powers accepted the declaration, largely under the influence of Bismarck, who was cultivating Anglo-German friendliness; France was offered the presidency of the debt commission, and refused it; and the responsibility was left entirely to Great Britain. The resentment of French public opinion at the outcome was not lessened by the fact that it was due to the vacillation of France's own politicians.

So by the end of 1882 the aims of Bismarck's diplomacy seemed to be attained. He had formed the Triple Alliance, he had his re-insurance treaty with Russia, he had strengthened friendly relations with Great Britain; and France appeared to be completely isolated once again.

§ 4. *African Colonisation and the Berlin Conference*

A new set of problems of a kind with which the governments of Europe had never previously been called on to deal collectively now furnished an opportunity for Germany to come forward again, as in 1878, as the leader of Europe. During the greater part of the nineteenth century the expansion of the extra-European possessions of the European Powers had not been such as to menace at all seriously the maintenance of peace; the various movements had been generally too remote from one another, and had been limited mainly to three states—the United Kingdom, whose territories in India, the Malay Peninsula, Australasia, and South and West Africa had been very greatly extended; France, which had acquired Algeria and Tunis, and was establishing herself in West Africa, especially through the energetic work of Faidherbe in Senegambia between 1854 and 1865; and Russia, which had made steady progress in pushing forward her boundaries in Central Asia

and the far east of that continent. But the opening up of Africa by explorers of many nations, the forward colonial policy of France, and the rise of colonial ambitions in other nations, for reasons to be discussed later, had now brought about a new and critical situation.

The work of African exploration, which began with missionary enterprise at the end of the eighteenth century, was most active in the period from 1850 to 1880. Of all the great achievements which then revealed tropical Africa to Europe, Stanley's Congo expedition of 1875–1877 had the most immediate results. The growing interest, commercial, scientific and philanthropic, taken in Africa had caused Leopold II., King of the Belgians, to convene an unofficial conference at Brussels in September, 1876, "to consider the question of the exploration and civilisation of Africa and the means of opening up the interior of the continent to the commerce, industry, and scientific enterprise of the civilised world." The conference decided to establish an International Association for exploratory work, with national committees; but the Association early tended to become entirely Belgian. The return of Stanley at the beginning of 1878 directed attention to the potentialities of the Congo region; the Association formed a committee, on which Belgium, Great Britain, the United States of America, France, and the Netherlands were represented, for the investigation of the Upper Congo, and in 1879 Stanley was sent out to examine its conditions and commercial possibilities. By the time he began his work the Association had become entirely Belgian; it was dominated by the forceful personality of Leopold II., and the idea of a federation of native rulers under that astute and most commercially-minded monarch had taken shape. By the end of 1883 Stanley had made many treaties with local chiefs, established a chain of trading stations into the interior, and set up the machinery of government in the name of the Association. Its territorial

claims were disputed by France, which sought to block its advance into the interior, and by Portugal, which claimed particularly the territory north and south of the Congo mouth, besides much else. Great Britain had hitherto declined to acknowledge any Portuguese rights, but the two governments now came to terms; by an agreement of February, 1884, Portugal's title to the coast was recognised, but her claims to the interior were restricted, and she promised moderate customs tariffs, equality for traders of all countries, and freedom of navigation on the Congo and Zambesi. The Congo Association was shut off from the sea; this in itself was a matter of indifference to the continental Powers, but all objected to the large gains of Portugal, which for centuries had shown singularly little political or administrative ability, and was regarded as entirely under British influence. The treaty was unpopular in the United Kingdom, and was speedily abandoned.

But it had brought matters to a head. All over tropical Africa the struggle for trading concessions and territorial acquisitions had become acute. In West Africa the French, established on the Upper Niger in 1883, were aiming at the linking up of Senegambia and Algeria; German traders were active in the Congo and Niger basins, and in Germany there was a movement in favour of annexation as the best safeguard for German trade; British merchant interests had formed the United African Company, which made with native chiefs treaties, recognised in some instances by the British government in 1884, with the object of securing the Lower Niger as a British "sphere of influence." Further down the West Coast also German traders were pushing forward. The Damaraland and Namaqualand coast had always been regarded as a British sphere, but nothing had been done to secure the position beyond the annexation (March, 1878) of Walfish Bay and a small surrounding territory, and in reply to an inquiry from the German gov-

ernment the British ministry of Gladstone announced that it regarded the Orange River as the north-western boundary of Cape Colony, and would not support efforts to extend its authority northward along the coast. An energetic German trader, Lüderitz, established a trading station on the Damaraland coast, with support from his government, and rapidly acquired rights from native chiefs; there was much indignation in Cape Colony, but the British claims had practically been abandoned by the home government. In spite of its representations a German protectorate over Lüderitz and his possessions was proclaimed in April, 1884, and this was speedily extended to the whole coast from the Orange River to the southern boundary of Portuguese Angola. In three other areas of the western coast of Africa, not claimed by any European Power, German traders had been engaged since about 1880 in establishing vested interests. In the territory between Portuguese Guinea and Sierra Leone they failed before the efforts of the French; to the east of the Gold Coast a German protectorate over the Togoland Coast was declared in July, 1884; and on the Bight of Biafra, where strong pressure by both traders and native chiefs had been put upon the British government, a race between British and German official agents ended in a British protectorate over the whole Niger delta and westward to Lagos, and a German protectorate over the area known as the Cameroons. The same rivalry was developing on the east coast, to which attention had been directed by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. In 1875 a prolonged coastal territory dispute between Great Britain and Portugal had been ended by an award of Marshal MacMahon, which gave Portugal Delagoa Bay, then becoming important owing to the development of the Transvaal. The ill-defined and ill-asserted claims of the Sultans of Zanzibar, who were entirely subject to British influence, to the coast north of Cape Delgado were being challenged

by German traders, who were making with local chieftains treaties which threatened to undermine the Sultan's authority and affect adversely British and Indian trade interests. Beyond the coastal districts the Sultans had never exercised any real authority; there was a "no man's land," in which both British and German traders were endeavouring to stake out claims. Finally in Madagascar, where France had some vague rights dating from the time of Richelieu, and possessed some small islands lying off the coast, a contest for predominance at the court of Tanarivo, waged between British and French since 1862, had been ended by the determination of Jules Ferry to establish a French protectorate, which was secured by a campaign lasting from 1882 to 1885.

In these circumstances it was obvious that serious disputes, menacing the peace of Europe, might arise at any moment. Though German enterprise in Africa was steadily supported by the imperial government, a forward colonial policy met with no real sympathy from Prince Bismarck; he certainly did not think extra-European territories worth a European war, and, as we have seen, he had encouraged the colonial enterprise of France to turn her attention from Europe. But he was not disposed to stand aside and allow the newly-discovered territories to be distributed without Germany's participation; he disliked Portugal's gains and the Anglo-Portuguese treaty; in the interests of German trade he wished to maintain the "open door"; he was genuinely desirous of removing potential causes of European war; and he sought to continue the rôle of arbiter and conciliator of Europe. After sounding France and securing her support, he convened a conference which met at Berlin in November, 1884, to endeavour to establish common principles which should govern the European exploitation of tropical Africa; all the Powers of Europe, except Switzerland and the Balkan States, were represented, as were also

the United States of America. The General Act of Berlin (26th February, 1885) provided for freedom for the commerce of all nations, on terms of perfect equality, in the whole area watered by the Congo and its tributaries, as defined in the Act, and stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean; freedom of navigation on the Niger and Congo and their tributaries, and along the coasts; equal dues on goods, without regard to origin, and their limitation to the amount requisite to cover the cost of public services advantageous to trade; freedom of transit for goods; the prohibition of trading monopolies and privileges; the protection of native races and the encouragement of exploration and missionary and charitable enterprise; and the neutrality in the event of a European war of the territories of the contracting parties covered by the Act. It laid down the general rule that the occupation of territory, to give a valid claim, must be effective and not merely nominal.

The conference of Berlin thus enunciated a series of principles which, if strictly observed, would not have checked the partitioning of Africa—that process had gone too far to be arrested—but would have prevented the exploitation of the native races, whilst allowing the fullest development of the great resources of tropical Africa and a co-operative effort to solve its manifold and varied problems. That these principles were not fully applied was due largely to the intensified rivalry of the European Powers in other fields in the next generation, which reacted upon their relations in tropical Africa; but nevertheless the conference is of great significance as indicating an appreciation, on the part of Europe's most practical statesman and of the European governments generally, of the dangerous position into which commercial and colonial rivalry was bringing the Powers of Europe, and as an attempt to mitigate that rivalry by concerted action.

§ 5. *The Franco-Russian Entente*

The outstanding event in the international politics of Europe between the Conference of Berlin and the departure of Bismarck from office in March, 1890, was the gradual drawing together of France and Russia. The relations between the two Powers had passed through several different phases since the Crimean War. The hostility between them exemplified by that war had been largely mitigated by the policy of Napoleon III. at the Paris Congress, but the amicable feeling developed during the following years received a serious set-back from his action in respect of the Polish rebellion, and thereafter he was altogether distrusted by the Russian ruler and his advisers. The adherence of Alexander II. to the league of the three Emperors was due to long-established personal friendship between the Russian and Prussian royal houses, Russian anxiety to avoid isolation, uncertainty as to the endurance of the new régime in France, and the natural antipathy of an autocrat to a democratic republic, the outcome of revolutionary movement. But, as we have seen, regard for the maintenance of a balance of power had led Alexander to intervene against Bismarck's anti-French policy of 1875; and the consequent strain upon the relations between Russia and the German Empire was increased by the events of 1877–8 and the Congress of Berlin, when Bismarck's action had contributed largely to depriving Russia of the fruits of her military success, and by the German-Austrian alliance. Thereafter, though there was no overt disaccord, and Bismarck obtained his re-insurance treaty, there was on the German side no confidence in the endurance of that treaty, and on the Russian side a growing distrust of Germany. Developments in Bulgaria were displeasing to the Russian government, which, after its failure to control Alexander of Battenburg, disliked the incorporation of Eastern Rume-

lia in his principality, and after bringing about his compulsory abdication found itself powerless to prevent the election of another German prince in his stead, through the diplomacy of the strongly anti-Russian Stambuloff. In its opposition to the incorporation, and to the election of Ferdinand, Russia was supported only by France; against her were ranged the Triple Alliance and Great Britain, which, having opposed the creation of a large Bulgarian state in 1878 when there was a possibility of Russian tutelage, now supported it for the contrary reason.

The clash of interests between Great Britain and Russia had now become marked further east, in consequence of the Russian advance in the Caucasus, which brought it to the confines of Persia, and in Central Asia on the great Turkestan plain, where the boundaries of the Empire had been steadily pushed forward until between 1865 and 1875 the khanates of Bokhara, Khiva, and Khokand had been reduced to vassalage, and the Russian power had drawn close to Afghanistan. The advance was justified by Gortchakov in a dispatch of 1864 on grounds which had been, and were to be, the basis of much British action in India and Africa, and French action in Tunis and Morocco, namely that "a civilised state with marauding tribes on the frontier must choose between 'conquest and anarchy.' The boundary must be pushed forward till it reaches the boundary of another civilised state, or at least of a state whose government can be held responsible for the maintenance of order." But it caused much perturbation in some circles in England and India, which thought that Russian influence might extend over Persia and Afghanistan, always regarded as buffer states for the protection of the British Indian possessions, unless British influence were established first, especially in Afghanistan. It led the government of Disraeli (1874–1880), with Lord Lytton as viceroy of India, into a policy of intervention in Afghanistan, which was violently resented

by the Afghans, caused war in 1878 and the two following years, and was reversed by the Gladstone administration (1880–1885) in 1881, though the Amir of Afghanistan was allowed no foreign relations except with the British government. There was uncertainty as to the boundary at the north-west corner of his state, where territory was claimed by Russia as belonging to Bokhara; whilst negotiations were proceeding for a settlement the Russian and Afghan outposts were drawing close together, and on the 30th April, 1885, a conflict occurred at Penjdeh, in which the Afghans were beaten. The Russians seized the post, and the incident caused much excitement in Great Britain: relations were for the moment seriously strained. Apparently even Gladstone was determined to take military action against Russia, if necessary, and only the pressure brought to bear on the Sultan by the Continental Powers to compel him to maintain the closure of the Straits, even against England, induced the British Government to yield. This crisis may perhaps be regarded as the highwater mark of Anglo-Russian hostility.

Whilst beneath the diplomatically correct relations between Russia on the one hand and the Triple Alliance and Great Britain respectively on the other there was much latent hostility, the relations between the predominant partner in the Triple Alliance and Great Britain were becoming increasingly friendly. The alarm excited by the progress of German colonial policy not only in the African continent but in the Pacific—where it aroused anxiety in Australia—did not appreciably affect the policy of either the liberal ministries of Gladstone or the conservative ministries of Lord Salisbury during the years 1880 to 1892. Before the rivalry of France in Egypt and West Africa, and in the increasing fear of a Russian advance towards India, successive British governments were anxious to avoid friction with the German Empire. The Conference of Berlin had appeared to demonstrate that the two states were at one

as to the policy of the "open door"—and, indeed, so far as concerned customs tariffs German colonial policy remained very much more liberal than that of France, Portugal, or the United States. The absence so far of any really serious German industrial competition, the close connection of the British and German royal families, and the great respect for Teutonic learning entertained by the academic classes in the United Kingdom, contributed to the result that up to 1890 the official relations between the two states increased greatly in cordiality. In that year, despite Bismarck's fall from power and the opposition of the German colonial party, a treaty was signed which settled, largely to the British advantage, conflicting claims in East Africa, secured Great Britain's hold of Zanzibar and Uganda, settled the spheres of the two Powers up to the frontiers of the Congo Free State, defined the limits of German South-West Africa, and ceded to Germany the island of Heligoland—a concession to national sentiment. An optimistic observer might well have believed that so far as concerned Africa all causes of Anglo-German controversy were removed.

In these circumstances it was inevitable that France and Russia should draw together. Each felt isolated; their immediate territorial interests lay far apart and were unlikely to clash; both were antagonistic to Great Britain and distrusted Germany, one of whose Allies resented French expansion in North Africa, whilst the other was in direct and successful rivalry with Russia in the Balkans. The fall of Bismarck, and the decision of the new administration not to renew the "re-insurance" treaty which had been concluded between Germany and Russia without Austria in 1887, roused the anxiety of the Tsar. His uneasiness was enhanced by the ostentatious renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1891 and by the Kaiser's repeated visits to England. The French had been eagerly courting the Russians for some time, and they had already begun to lend money to the Rus-

sian government. When they made it clear that some adequate return must be made, Alexander III. was forced to make a decision. In July, 1891, at the reception of a French squadron at Cronstadt, he spoke of the profound sympathies which united the two countries and in August of the same year gave his consent to a general defensive agreement. It was the beginning of the Dual Alliance.

§ 6. *The Passing of Bismarck*

Sixteen months earlier the great German statesman who had so long avoided a break with Russia had been summarily dismissed by a new monarch. During the lifetime of the Emperor William I. the authority of Prince Bismarck was not seriously shaken either by court intrigues or by the more legitimate opposition of those who were excluded from office by the masterfulness resulting from his prolonged tenure of power—he had been the dictator of the Empire since 1871 and of Prussia since 1862. Conditions in Germany and the dominant factors of world politics were undergoing a transformation, and with the new forces at work the old Chancellor had little real sympathy. The Centre party, largely the outcome of his own ill-advised anti-clerical campaign, was a powerful parliamentary force; Socialism had been checked neither by repressive legislation nor by social reforms; the industrialisation of Germany was proceeding with increasing rapidity, and was not very welcome to one who was at heart an agrarian; and the strivings of the German colonial party were regarded with only lukewarm approval by a statesman whose outlook had so long been limited to the continent of Europe. His immense services and resultant popularity enabled him to keep his opponents in check so long as he had the unwavering support of William I., whose great age combined with the achievements of his reign to intensify the traditional German

loyalty to an almost unreasoning height. But the old Emperor died in March, 1888, and after the tragic three months of Frederick III. the throne was ascended (June, 1888) by William II., who quickly resented that insistence on his own way which the Chancellor's extreme deference to the monarch had never concealed. Between a minister so habituated to power as to have ceased to contemplate the possibility of losing it, and a young monarch who was convinced of his personal responsibility for the government of the state, was encouraged in his convictions by the immense prestige of the monarchy he inherited, and was extraordinarily sensitive to new movements, conflict was certain; and the influence of the crown proved stronger than the popularity of the minister. Bismarck was dismissed in March, 1890—to a retirement which was a prolonged, undignified and ineffective campaign against his successors—and in him there departed from the political stage the last great international statesman of whom it could be said that he had shaped events to his own ends. Thereafter events were to shape the policies of statesmen, despite themselves.

CHAPTER IX

The Growth of International Rivalry:
(*I.*) *Some Causes*

The accession of William II. to the thrones of Prussia and the German Empire, the dismissal of Bismarck, the termination of the re-insurance treaty with Russia and the beginnings of the alliance between that state and France, inaugurated together a new epoch for Europe and the world—an epoch characterised by increasingly violent and widespread international rivalry, the outcome in part of economic changes and in part of a perversion of nationalism. These forces were operative in a number of states but they were most powerful and urgent, and to the rest of the world most disturbing, in Germany.

§ 1. *Economic Changes. Growth of Industrialism and Foreign Trade*

The industrialisation of Germany, which set in after the formation of the Empire, proceeded with great rapidity after 1890. The population rose from 41 millions in 1872 to 65 millions in 1910, and the preponderance passed from the rural to the urban areas with the growth of the industrial demand for labour; in 1890 towns with more than one hundred thousand inhabitants had 11.4 per cent. of the total German population, in 1910 their proportion was 21.3 per cent. A shortage of agricultural labour in the eastern provinces of Prussia became manifest as early as 1896, and

was made good only by seasonal immigration of labourers from over the Russian and Polish borders. The growth of large-scale industry, based on vast coal and iron deposits (the latter largely in the Lorraine territory acquired from France) and guided by remarkable technical and commercial ability, resulted in a very rapid expansion of Germany's export trade. The value of the exports of German produce and manufactures, which averaged 550 million dollars for the period 1872–1874, rose to 2200 million in 1912; the values of the imports for domestic consumption for the same periods were 750 millions and 2600 millions respectively. Germany had become the second nation of the world in 1912 in respect of foreign trade; she had far outdistanced France, was ahead of the United States, and was pressing close upon Great Britain. About one-fifth only, in value, of the imports represented goods wholly or mainly manufactured, whilst these were between two-thirds and three-quarters of the exports. And in the twentieth century German competition in the world's markets was no longer based, as it had been at first, almost solely on cheapness; nowhere had science been applied to industry more widely, more thoroughly, or with more success. The output of crude steel rose from an annual average of 2.8 million tons in 1890–4 to 17.3 million tons in 1912, greatly surpassing that of Great Britain and exceeded only by the United States; and though in the cotton and woollen industries Germany lagged far behind those two countries, in the fine chemical and dyestuffs industries she had practically a world monopoly, in the electrical industry and the manufacture of optical and scientific instruments she held the foremost place, and in the non-ferrous metal trades she was second only to the United States. For the maintenance of her growing industrial population she was becoming increasingly dependent upon foreign countries for foodstuffs; the self-sufficiency sought by Bismarck's tariff legislation

had not been realised, partly because of the rapid growth of population and rising standard of demand, and partly because in the early nineties the protective policy had been mitigated in an attempt to reduce the tariffs imposed by certain predominantly agricultural countries on German manufactures. Of many materials essential to her industries —cotton, wool, jute, rubber, tin, copper, oilseeds and nuts, to mention only the chief—neither Germany nor her colonies could furnish more than insignificant supplies. Finally, at once a consequence and a cause of overseas trade, there was the rise of a mercantile marine, small compared with the British, but larger than that of any other country, and German liner services, in some cases with government subsidies, were rapidly spreading their network over the world.

This development was only the most striking individual instance of a general movement. An increasing number of states were striving to become industrial, influenced partly by the belief that thereby they could attain to a higher level of prosperity and culture than was possible for communities predominantly agricultural, and partly by the desire to rid themselves so far as possible of a dependence upon foreign countries for manufactured goods, which seemed a sign of weakness. This movement manifested itself by efforts to foster industry by both protective tariffs and other methods (largely imitative of Germany) not only in many European states but also in the British overseas Dominions and in Japan. The British self-governing Dominions, like the United States, had the potentiality of a constantly increasing domestic market, and ample home supplies of materials for many industries; their conditions were therefore quite distinct from those of the European countries and Japan, in which the phenomena which had characterised the industrialisation of England and Germany were everywhere repeating themselves. There was the same relatively rapid growth of the urban populations, with incidentally a growing uniformity

through Central and Western Europe of social and administrative problems; there was the same increasing dependence upon foreign, and generally oversea, sources for supplies of raw materials; and there was the same need for increasing markets for manufactured goods. But in the attempt to develop their industries, and the export trade essential thereto, the European Powers encountered four obstacles. There were the protective tariffs of most countries of Europe, designed partly as a means of raising revenue and partly to further the industrialising policy, and of a growing number of extra-European states influenced by the same considerations. Secondly, some of the countries upon which the European manufacturers were dependent for materials were themselves consuming an increasing proportion of their output of those materials, as cotton in the United States and jute in India. Thirdly, to the competition between themselves in markets hitherto preserved for European goods there was added about the end of the nineteenth century the competition, formidable in different ways and for different reasons, of the United States and Japan. And lastly, there was an evident desire on the part of the colonising states to secure in their colonies a preferential position for their own trade. Russia had extended her highly protective tariff wall round all her Asiatic possessions. French products enjoyed complete freedom from customs duties, or a substantial preference, in all French colonial possessions. In 1897 Canada granted preferential treatment to the United Kingdom, and the example was followed later by South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia; and though this action of the Dominions was spontaneous and unconditional, and in the mother-country and the territories whose fiscal régime it also controlled the British government maintained the principle of equality for all, the Chamberlain campaign which began in 1903 in the end committed one great party in the state to the policy of imperial preference. In 1909

the United States established reciprocal free trade with the Philippine Islands.

It was consequently possible that states which were mainly or largely industrial might find themselves in grave embarrassment. Despite the still undeveloped condition and potentialities of great expanses of the old and new worlds, the increase of population and the rising standard of individual needs, it was possible to foresee a time when the capacity of industrial production which so many states were fostering would outstrip both the supply of materials and the world's power of consumption, and to maintain and feed their peoples the industrialised states would have to retrace their steps and seek a new equilibrium of agriculture and industry—a slow and painful task. Under the influence of these fears there arose in Germany at the close of the nineteenth century a strong body of coherent and influential opinion to the effect that the state must pursue two definite lines of policy. One was high protection for agriculture, to maintain the largest possible population without dependence on foreign food supplies: this was a reversion to Bismarck's tariff principles, and the claims of the agrarians, reinforced by the politico-economic argument set out above, were largely met in the tariff law, and commercial treaties based thereon, which became operative in 1906. The other line of policy was the development of such tropical and sub-tropical regions of the world as were naturally capable of producing large supplies of foodstuffs and materials, and so of maintaining big populations, but ill-adapted or quite unsuitable for the carrying-on of industries of a kind or on a scale competitive with those of more temperate lands. The development of such areas might be left to private enterprise without regard to nationality—the policy of the "open door"; or each industrial state might seek to secure territories within which it would have a monopolistic, or at least a preferential, position. The tendencies in this latter

direction, which have been indicated above, led Germany, and not Germany alone, to seek colonial possessions and "spheres of influence"; but her opportunities in this respect, as she came late into the field, were limited, and her desires could be gratified only at the expense of other European nations, or as part of the "liquidation of dying realms," where she found herself in conflict with other states driven by the same economic motives and pursuing the same policy. There was nothing new in the German aims, except that they were more conscious and avowed than those of her predecessors in the path of colonial expansion; there was nothing novel in her methods, except the close co-operation of the government and the trading and financial interests. But her remarkable industrial and commercial development, the manner in which control was obtained over enterprises in foreign countries, the way in which trade was used to stake out political claims, and the open search for colonial territory, combined to create in many of the European states and elsewhere an alarm which was intensified after 1898 by an armaments policy which seemed to mean aggression rather than the defence for which it was professedly designed.

§ 2. *Ultra-Nationalism*

To these economic forces making for European unrest were added more directly political consequences of the nationalist movements of the preceding three-quarters of a century. There were the still unsatisfied ambitions of the Poles subject to the three Eastern Powers; of the Czech, the Croats, the Serbs, and the Rumanians in Austria-Hungary with their demand for autonomy, and in the case of all save Czech the pull of their independent kinsfolk beyond the Hapsburg borders—a force which was operating also upon Austria's Italian subjects in the Trentino, in the district of Gorizia and Trieste; of the French in Alsace and

Lorraine, and the Danes in northern Schleswig, still unreconciled to German rule; of the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgars in Macedonia. Secondly, we have already seen how the colonial policy of Jules Ferry had been adopted as a means of restoring the balance of power, disturbed by the formation of the German Empire and the transfer of Alsace and Lorraine, and of recovering France's prestige. These motives of prestige and the balance of power influenced all the great states; any territorial gains of one must be countered by similar accretions to the others, even though the acquisitions might be an immediate burden and their future value problematical. Thirdly, nationalism was becoming perverted into racialism. The springs of nationalism are elusive, but the one thing clear is that its existence is not dependent upon the common racial origin of those who cherish it in any particular case—that has been proved by Switzerland and Belgium. The nationalism which held sway in Europe until 1870 was as a whole largely international in its sympathies; except in the case of the Magyars there was among the peoples struggling for recognition of their rights as nationalities little grudging of each other's claims. But a marked change came with the formation of the German Empire, which was not a victory of nationalism in the same sense as Serbian and Greek and Belgian independence and the unification of Italy, but was the bringing together in one state of the greater part of a people disunited, as the result of historical causes operative through centuries, but not subject to foreign rule. With the German liberalism of 1848 none of the creators of the German Empire had any sympathy; most of them were concerned chiefly with the territorial and political aggrandisement of Prussia and its royal house, though historical traditions, racial pride, and nationalist aspirations were invoked in aid.

Military triumphs, the diplomatic successes of Bismarck, and the remarkable economic development sketched above,

engendered a belief in the inherent superiority of the Germanic race over all others, which had two consequences. One was the attempt to force into a common mould the non-Teutonic races within the Empire—a policy which, abated at the accession of William II., was later resumed with increased vigour; the German state, with its parliamentary institutions based on the broadest democratic suffrage, thus followed the same course as its autocratic eastern neighbour, which was russianising Poland and Finland. The second was an ambition to bring into a single state all the peoples to whom a common Teutonic racial basis, however remote, could possibly be ascribed. This was Pan-Germanism, which more or less openly aimed at the incorporation in one German realm of all the German-speaking peoples of Austria and Switzerland and even the Dutch of Holland and the Flemings of Belgium, and so struck at the roots of nationalism and menaced the existence of small independent states. Coincident in effect, and more immediately influencing state policy, was a growing fear, the greater because mingled with contempt, of the Slav races —a feeling, as we have seen, shared by the Magyars—and particularly of Russia, whose population increased from 120 millions in 1890 to about 170 millions in 1910, and whose long-continued encouragement of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, efforts to secure hegemony in the Balkans, and ambitions towards Constantinople were regarded in Germany as manifestations of Pan-Slavism, that is, of a racial creed and policy for the Slav peoples of the same nature as Pan-Germanism for those of Teutonic descent. Whatever basis there may have been for the fear of increasing Russian pressure westward, there was no reasonable likelihood of any coalescence of the various peoples of Slav origin—their traditions and characteristics were too diverse, and the efforts at common action which began in 1848 had borne little fruit. But the popular belief in a "Slav peril" was

to be a valuable asset to the German government in the crisis of 1914. Another racial danger conjured up after the successes of Japan in her Chinese War of 1894–5, and again after her victories over Russia, was the "Yellow Peril," against which the German Emperor warned Europe with ineffective fervour.

§ 3. *International Co-operation—and its Limitations*

Whilst international rivalry was thus becoming intensified there was not lacking practical recognition of the increasing economic inter-dependence and social inter-relation of all civilised nations, and with it the development of a sense of common interests and responsibilities; and attempts were made to guard against or mitigate some of the consequences of unrestrained rivalry. Even the most protectionist states appreciated the desirability of facilitating, by joint or uniform action, commercial intercourse, and Europe had become covered by a close network of treaties and agreements relating not only to customs duties but to many other matters of importance to commerce and navigation. There were in addition conventions to which a large number of European and extra-European states were parties, such as the Industrial Property Convention (relating to patents, designs, and trade-marks) and the Copyright Convention. The same humanitarianism which had inspired the action taken at the Congress of Vienna and later in respect of the slave trade, attempted in the twentieth century to deal with some evils of modern industrial and social conditions by agreements for common action in restraint of nightwork for women in industry, the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches, the white-slave traffic, the liquor traffic among the fishing fleets in the North Sea, the trade in opium, and the safety of life at sea. The wars of the fifties had brought about the Geneva Convention of 1864

relative to the treatment of the wounded, and the development of the international Red Cross organisation. The recognition of the importance to Europe of a regular food supply and of accurate data as to the world's crops led to the co-operation of a number of governments in the formation of the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome in 1905; whilst a similar recognition of common interests in one widespread industry was evidenced by the International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' Associations—formed on private initiative in 1904. But neither the increasing complexity of international economic relations, nor the development of international co-operation for many common purposes, nor the persistent growth, taking Europe as a whole, of democracy, nor the spread of popular education, nor the efforts of numerous organisations—labour, commercial, scientific, professional—in various countries to promote mutual goodwill, better understanding and realisation of common interests, had any appreciable effect in mitigating international distrust and rivalry and checking the progress of armaments. The forces of political and economic nationalism were too strong.

The growth of armaments, which had turned most of continental Europe into a cluster of great armed camps, and the increasing financial burdens resulting therefrom, caused in 1899 the meeting at the Hague, on the initiative of the Emperor Nicholas II. of Russia, of an international conference to consider the possibility of a limitation of armaments and of compulsory arbitration in disputes between states. The proposal of the Russian government that there should be no increase in the military forces or budget of any state for five years failed before an opposition led by Germany. The project of compulsory arbitration ended in the establishment of an international tribunal to which disputant states might have recourse should they so desire. A group of conventions codified the laws and customs of war

by land and restricted or prohibited some methods of warfare. Eight years later, when the competition in naval armaments had become acute, particularly between Germany and Great Britain, the British ministry of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman proposed a second Hague conference, but Germany refused to take part in any discussion aiming at their limitation, her government contending that their naval programme was dictated solely by the need of protection for Germany's growing commerce and mercantile marine, and could not be influenced by any consideration other than her own interest. At the conference itself, a proposal supported by Great Britain, the United States, and some smaller Powers that the arbitration treaties already existing between various states (which, as for instance the Anglo-German agreement of 1904, provided for arbitration only in matters not touching the vital interests, independence, or honour of the contracting parties) should be combined in a general agreement the observance of which would be compulsory, also failed before the opposition of Germany. So the second Hague Conference, like the first, had for its practical outcome only a group of conventions codifying the generally accepted rules of warfare, especially at sea. At the end of 1908 a further international conference at London agreed upon a declaration of rules of international law in respect of the treatment of commerce in war-time, but strong opposition in Great Britain to what were regarded as undue restrictions of the right of search, as limiting the effectiveness of naval action, prevented the British government from ratifying the declaration. The sharpness of national rivalries, and growing international tension, had made every great Power, and every smaller state which deemed itself in danger from its stronger neighbours, resolute to keep itself fully armed and free to develop its fighting strength to the utmost. So the competition in armaments went on, led especially by Germany, who was at once steadily

increasing her land forces and carrying out a long programme of naval expansion, but shared in by other states from motives of ambition or fear.

§ 4. *William II. of Germany*

In conditions such as these the burden of responsibility upon these continental rulers who despite the political progress of the century were still largely autocratic was very heavy, and of the three such rulers of great states other than Turkey after 1894 it may be said without injustice that not one was fitted to bear the burden. Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, despite his long experience and the disasters of his reign, had learned little of political wisdom; a picturesque and tragic figure, narrow-minded and obstinate, he had no policy beyond the traditional resistance to all the national and liberal movements within his heterogeneous dominions. The Russian Emperor, Nicholas II., who ascended the throne in 1894, was honest, hard-working, well-intentioned, and essentially commonplace; irresolute and timid, in mind as in physique far inferior to his three immediate predecessors, he was in fact the servant of an intolerant and corrupt bureaucracy, following a long-established policy of centralisation, russification and advance somewhere and somehow towards the open sea, and in two decades his weakness destroyed the almost superstitious reverence of the Russian peoples for the person of their ruler. The policy of both these rulers was largely the policy of their ministers; in the German Empire the policy of the ministers was largely, and for fifteen years out of the twenty-four from the dismissal of Bismarck to 1914 it was entirely, that of the Emperor William II.

Of the Chancellors of the German Empire during that period, Caprivi (1890–1894), Hohenlohe (1894–1900), Bülow (1900–1909), and Bethmann-Hollweg (from 1909 on-

ward) the first and fourth were no more than officials. The high social rank and family connection with the imperial house, the age and experience, of Prince Hohenlohe enabled him to exercise a restraining influence on his royal master from time to time, but he was too old (seventy-five when he took office) and tired to attempt more. Bülow alone had the strength of mind and purpose, and the diplomatic ability, to frame a policy of his own and largely carry it through, but in the end his independence brought his downfall. For William II. was imbued, even more than his grandfather, William I., and his great-uncle, Frederick William IV. of Prussia, with the conviction of divine right, of sole responsibility for the government of his people, and of divine illumination to guide him in his course. From the first he deliberately identified the policies of the Imperial and Prussian governments with his own personal will; the opponents of any ministerial policy were his personal opponents and were consequently the enemies of the state. Beginning his reign with an attempt to check the growth of Socialism by conciliating labour (by factory legislation and social reforms), disappointment at failure and at the increasing strength of the Socialist vote drove him into the fiercest opposition to that movement, and the party which in 1903 returned 82 members and in 1912 110 members to the Imperial parliament was denounced by him in unmeasured terms as the enemy of himself, of the state which he ruled, and of the divine rule which he personified. But despite this deliberate entry into the arena of party politics, his impulsiveness and impatience of unpalatable advice, a facility of unconsidered public speech which often threw fuel upon the flames of domestic controversy, disturbed Germany's foreign relations and gravely embarrassed his ministers, and an arrogance which in some of his utterances amounted to megalomania, the prestige of the imperial office

as inherited by William II. was so great that the authority and popularity which had enabled him to dismiss Bismarck without any public protest had not been appreciably diminished twenty-four years later. And had the great European War not come when and as it did he might have been accorded a high place amongst the great rulers of history. He was passionately eager for the development of Germany's greatness, political and commercial; his keen interest in the army was not diminished by enthusiasm for the navy, which was in a very real sense his own creation; his frequent consorting with bankers, merchants, shipowners and manufacturers, and encouragement of their efforts to increase Germany's industrial power and overseas trade, were accompanied by a solicitude for agriculture, for the King of Prussia was the greatest German landowner; he was an enthusiastic advocate of a forward colonial policy. Nor were his interests confined to these aspects of German progress, they extended to all other activities of his people; and though his patronage of art, science, and letters was that of the dilettante, was founded on very superficial knowledge and prejudice rather than judgment, and was frequently short-lived (only an interest in the application of science to industry was lasting), there can be no question of its stimulative effect in Germany. The fundamental defects of the Emperor William II. were a personal pride which easily took offence and made criticism intolerable to him, a lack of self-restraint and a consequent precipitancy of speech and action which placed him again and again in untenable positions, a super-sensitiveness to every new emotion and an instability of mind, not as to ultimate purposes, but as to methods, which made his course incalculable alike to his own subjects and to foreign governments. It was under such a monarch, determined to direct the policy of his realm, but swayed by every passing mood,

that Germany strove, with a definiteness of national purpose and a conviction of intellectual superiority and administrative ability which were without parallel, to become a world-power.

CHAPTER X

The Growth of International Rivalry: (II.) The Approach to the Climax

When Bismarck left office Germany was firmly allied with the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Italy, was safeguarded by a treaty with Russia from attack on that side and was in friendly relations with Great Britain, which was on good terms with both Germany's allies and had, indeed, in 1887 concluded with them certain informal agreements aiming at the preservation of the status quo in the Mediterranean. Between France and Great Britain political relations were quiet but not cordial; between Great Britain and Russia there was a definite antagonism, as there was between France and Germany. It remains for us now to trace the course of events which, in the conditions described in the preceding chapter, brought about the grouping of the European Great Powers in the Triple Alliance, with one uncertain member, and a Triple Entente, and led to the World War of 1914.

§ 1. *Great Britain and Germany. The Period of Uncertainty*

Bismarck's pro-Russian inclinations were incompatible with support of Austria's ambitions in the Balkans: the Emperor William II. was much more sympathetic to that Power, and the abandonment of the Russian treaty showed that for the maintenance of Germany's continental position reliance was to be placed henceforward chiefly on the Haps-

burg realm. At the same time expediency appeared to coincide with the Emperor's own personal disposition in dictating closer relations with Great Britain; a considerable step forward was taken, as we have seen, by the treaty of July, 1890, and despite the outcry of the German colonial party that important interests had been sacrificed for a "summer resort" (Heligoland), the policy was continued until in 1894 the two powers clashed on the question of a treaty concluded between England and the Congo Free State by which England hoped to prepare the way for a Cape to Cairo Railroad. The two states also pursued divergent policies in the Far Eastern problem in 1895 and in 1897 found themselves in conflict in South Africa. There the influx of non-Dutch, and especially British, immigrants into the Transvaal after the gold discoveries alarmed the Boers, who feared it would be followed by re-imposition of the British rule which they had shaken off in 1881; they turned to Germany, which desired to keep as much of Africa as possible from falling under the control of any European Power other than herself, and were encouraged to hope for German support. When at the end of 1895 the difficulties between the Boer government and the immigrants culminated in an attempted rising on the Rand and "Jameson's Raid," a telegram in the German Emperor's name, and sent with his personal authority to the Transvaal President, which appeared to treat those events as part of a deliberate policy of the British government to end the independence of the Republic, and seemed to promise aid against any such attempt, aroused strong resentment in Great Britain and brought the two nations within measurable distance of war. But Germany was impotent at sea, and could not enlist useful support; Italy had no interest in South Africa, and her Mediterranean ambitions made British goodwill desirable; to France Alsace and Lorraine made co-operation with Germany impossible. So diplomatic

explanations were given by Germany, and accepted, but the incident was of great significance as the first serious manifestation of Anglo-German rivalry; it had a lasting effect on the attitude of the Boers, who still expected German aid in a conflict with Great Britain; and since Germany's diplomatic defeat was due largely to her weakness at sea it stimulated William II. to commence the campaign for the creation of a powerful navy, which resulted in the German naval law of 1898.

Another argument for that same campaign was furnished by events in the Far East, which also for a time brought Germany and Russia together again. The Chino-Japanese War of 1894–5 showed that a new Power was rising in the Pacific; the treaty of Shimonoseki (April, 1895) gave Japan, besides Formosa, the Kwan-tung peninsula and the fortress of Port Arthur, and thereby control of the Gulf of Pechili. Russia, firmly established in the north, saw a new obstacle to her plans for expansion at the cost of China and Corea, and intervened professedly on behalf of China. France's support was assured; Germany joined, in the hope of acquiring a coaling station or a naval base, with the support of Russia; and under pressure from the three Powers, with Great Britain standing apart, Japan gave back Kwantung and Port Arthur to China. Corea, the cause of the war, was left independent, coveted by Russia and Japan. Germany's gain was not immediate, but the murder of two missionaries in 1897 gave the pretext for carrying out the long-premeditated plan; the harbour of Kaio-chau was seized and China was compelled in January, 1898, to "lease" it for ninety-nine years—it was, in fact, a cession. Then considerations of the balance of power and of prestige drove the other great European Powers in the same path. The Chinese government was helpless: Russia obtained a lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan (Dalny) to become the terminus of a branch of the trans-Siberian railway, and so to

bring Corea within her grip; Great Britain occupied Wei-hai-wei, leased to her "to provide a suitable naval harbour in North China and for the better protection of British commerce." France secured a position on the bay of Kwang-chau.

The events of the years 1895 to 1898 had extended the territorial rivalry of the European Powers to the Far East, created in Japan a bitter resentment against Russia who had deprived the victors of their gains to annex them herself, replaced Japan's admiration for Germany, who had been her model and furnished instructors for her army, by a distrust intensified by William II.'s "Yellow Peril" pronouncements, and in China thrown the government into confusion and caused a nationalist agitation against it and the foreigners whom it was powerless to resist. The movement brought the Boxer rising of 1900, with attacks on foreigners and Christian converts, and the siege of the foreign diplomatic missions in Peking. The European Powers took action. Russia occupied Manchuria because of the need to defend the railway to Port Arthur, but then dissociated herself from the other Powers, who sent to Peking a joint expedition directed, as it was explained, not against the Chinese government but against the rebels, who were in fact encouraged by that government, which fled into the interior. The high rank of the commander of the German contingent compelled the Powers to give him the command of the allied force, and so enabled Germany to appear as the leader of Europe. The British and German governments agreed together to maintain the integrity of China and seek no territorial gains at her expense, and the terms imposed on the Chinese government were only the payment of an idemnity; but Russia kept her hold on Manchuria, and the German Chancellor, Bülow, asserted that the Anglo-German agreement related merely to China proper, and afforded no ground for German support of a protest to

Russia. Great Britain and Japan were alike alarmed at Russia's progress and discontented with Germany's attitude.

In October, 1899, the long dispute between Great Britain and the Boer republics in South Africa ended in war. There was much popular enthusiasm in Germany and France on behalf of the Boers, and Russia proposed a joint intervention. But the policy of the German government, and especially of the Emperor, had swung back; despite the encouragement previously given to the Boers, Germany would not move. The proposed combination would be powerless against the British command of the sea, and the German government maintained officially a strict neutrality, covering their refusal of the Russian proposal by insisting as a condition of joint action on a guarantee of the *status quo* as regards Alsace-Lorraine—an impossible condition for France. The Emperor William II. privately showed sympathy with Great Britain, and the Boers were left unaided. The peace of Vereenigung in May, 1902, incorporated the Boer States in the British Empire.

The events in South Africa and China brought about a far-reaching change in British foreign policy, hitherto directed to the avoidance of anything which would limit Great Britain's freedom to act as her interest might dictate in any contingency. But the South African war had shown her military weakness; her naval predominance was threatened by the German programme inaugurated in 1898; her diplomatic isolation could, it seemed, be no longer maintained with safety. The Triple Alliance appeared as strong as ever; the Franco-Russian entente had become an alliance. There were antagonisms between individual members of those groups in various parts of the world, but it was far from certain that they might not make common cause against Great Britain.

Once it was decided to depart from the policy of "splendid

isolation" there were two possible courses—an understanding with Germany (which would bring the other members of the Triple Alliance in train), or an entente with France, which involved a readjustment of Anglo-Russian relations. The way had to some extent been prepared in both directions. Many outstanding territorial and other questions between Great Britain and France had been settled, though not entirely to France's satisfaction, by a series of agreements ending in the treaty of March, 1899, which followed on the encounter of Lord Kitchener and the French explorer, Marchand, at Fashoda, and debarred France from access to the Nile. France had now an African realm which extended unbroken from the Mediterranean to the Congo and from the coast of Senegal to the western confines of the Sudan. On the other hand, an agreement was reached in 1898 between Great Britain and Germany as to the partition of the Portuguese colonies in South Africa should Portugal at any time find them too burdensome and be willing to sell; in 1899 Great Britain ceded to Germany her claims in Samoa; in 1900 there was the agreement as to China, though Bülow's interpretation of its scope proved disappointing. With Germany's allies Great Britain had long been on friendly terms; to France's ally she had for half a century been in sharp antagonism. And her first departure from the path of isolation seemed to emphasise that antagonism; on the 30th January, 1902, an Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance was signed. The two Powers saw their commercial interests in the great Chinese market threatened by the advance of Russia, and in a lesser degree by German aims; Japan desired that Corea should be an outlet for her increasing population; and they agreed to act together to maintain the territorial *status quo* and peace in Asia, and the independence and integrity of China and Corea. Should either contracting party be involved in war on that account with any single Power, the other would

maintain a benevolent neutrality; but it would come to the aid of its ally if attacked by a second Power.

§ 2. *Two Personalities and the Triple Entente*

But then came a change, more abrupt in appearance than in reality. France's colonial ambitions were no longer a serious menace to Great Britain; she had acquired vast territories of which the development would tax her resources to the utmost for many years; her population was almost stationary; the bulk of her overseas trade was not of such a kind as to compete seriously with that of Great Britain; and after a series of domestic political crises the republic seemed to have attained stability. Germany, on the other hand, was showing an increasing determination to secure overseas territory, impelled thereto by her rapidly-growing population, expanding industries in direct conflict with those of Great Britain, and traders who were establishing themselves in markets in which British trade had long enjoyed undisputed sway and where German commercial enterprise was being used to mark out political claims. The area in which Anglo-German commercial and political competition was becoming most open and direct was the Turkish Empire. To that we shall return later; its significance in this place is that it directed British policy finally to an understanding with France.

That understanding was facilitated by two personalities. For seven years (1898–1905), in five successive ministries, M. Théophile Delcassé was French minister for foreign affairs, and could pursue a coherent and continuous policy. His earliest task was to settle the Fashoda dispute—a diplomatic defeat for France; but from the first he aimed at the completest possible agreement with Great Britain—a policy inspired by the belief that it was France's best safeguard against aggression by Germany. In Great

Britain the accession of Edward VII. (January, 1901) brought into the forefront of European politics a monarch who, whilst maintaining a strictly constitutional position, served his ministers as a special ambassador with a success which made him during his short reign the most conspicuous international figure. For in three great European states foreign policy was in the hands of the monarchs themselves, and in the other states, large and small, it was only to a limited extent within the purview of parliaments; and though monarchs and statesmen were being driven by events and no longer shaping them, their personal relations largely affected the ease or difficulty with which agreements deemed desirable could be realised. There is little doubt that whilst the Anglo-French entente was the logical result of circumstances, its formation at this particular moment was greatly facilitated by the appeal which King Edward VII.'s personality made to the French public, and the presence in the foreign office of the two countries of M. Delcassé and Lord Lansdowne, the former with an inbred hostility to the annexer of Alsace-Lorraine and the latter untrammelled by any past co-operation with Germany.

An enchange of visits between the King and the French President Loubet in 1903 was followed by a general arbitration treaty, of the usual limited scope. February of the next year brought war between Russia and Japan in the Far East, where the former's grip on Manchuria and Corea threatened Japanese trade and blocked her aims of conquest and colonisation for her growing population. Japan was protected from outside intervention by the British treaty, and from the first it was apparent that, whatever the outcome of the war, Russia would not for a long time have her hands free for European afairs. France's ally afforded her therefore little security; she turned definitely to Great Britain, and the result was the agreements of April, 1904. These settled various outstanding questions between the

two governments in Newfoundland, West Africa, Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides, but the most important was a declaration relating to Egypt and Morocco. The British government affirmed that it had no intention of changing the political status of Egypt, and France left Great Britain practically a free hand in the administration of that country, subject to the maintenance of existing French rights. A similar declaration as to the political status of Morocco was made by France, but Great Britain recognised that France, whose African possessions encircled Morocco landwards, had a special right to see to the maintenance of order there and to aid its ruler in all necessary reforms, and gave France a free hand so long as existing British rights were respected. Both governments pledged themselves to maintain equality of treatment for the commerce of all nations in Egypt and Morocco respectively; and freedom of navigation through the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal was also guaranteed. There was provision for reciprocal diplomatic support in respect of the provisions of the treaty. Secret clauses envisaged the possibility that force of circumstances might drive the two Powers to change the political régime in Egypt or Morocco, but stipulated that nevertheless the provisions as to freedom of commerce and navigation should remain unimpaired. The claims of Spain to a "sphere of influence" upon the coast were recognised, subject to her acceptance of the principle of trade equality and an undertaking not to transfer to any other Power any territory which might pass under her control, and six months later she adhered to the Anglo-French declaration.

That declaration was a decisive event in European history. Great Britain had definitely ranged herself with France, and undertaken obligations in a matter which was certain to cause friction between that state and Germany. France could regard the maintenance of order and of her

prestige in Morocco as essential in view of its geographical relation to her African possessions. But it was unlikely that Germany, whose trade interests in Morocco, though small, were expanding, would readily acquiesce in a French protectorate there. And as soon as France took steps to strengthen her position, and it was apparent that Russia was fully occupied with her Far-Eastern war, the German government intervened; William II., cruising in the Mediterranean, landed at Tangier (31st March, 1905) and delivered a speech which announced his imperial intention to protect German interests in Morocco, which were defined as those of the "open door," and to that end to co-operate with a Sultan whom Germany regarded as entirely independent. By a circular to the Powers the German government proposed an international conference of the signatories of a treaty signed at Madrid in 1880 which had recognised the independence of the Sultan and regulated the position in Morocco of a number of European Powers and of the United States.

It was a challenge to France, and a deliberate testing of the Anglo-French entente. Delcassé would have resisted the German proposal, even at the cost of war, but France was unprepared; he was overruled, and resigned. His fall was a victory for the German Emperor and Bülow, but their success ended at that point, for at the conference of Algeciras (January–March, 1906)—where, beside the six Great Powers, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United States were represented—Germany, despite the personal appeals of William II. to the Russian Emperor and the American President, found herself unsupported. Great Britain and Russia stood firmly by France—in the former country Sir Edward Grey had assumed in the preceding December a direction of the Foreign Office which was to last for eleven years; Italy was concerned to keep on good terms with the two western Powers because of her

Mediterranean ambitions; Spain had adhered to the Anglo-French declaration; the smaller Powers disliked the German attitude, and were only slightly concerned; the United States government, convinced that France alone could secure order and development in Morocco, supported her; Austria's main anxiety was to avoid a European war. So the general act of Algeciras reasserted the integrity and independence of Morocco, the need for order and prosperity there, and the principal of commercial equality, and provided for a police-force under French and Spanish instructors, control of the traffic in arms, the reorganisation of the finances, a state bank with international capital, and a system of competitive tenders for public works concessions without preferential treatment for the nationals of any country. But despite all this it was evident that Morocco would fall more and more under French economic and political control.

The increasing cordiality of Anglo-French relations brought naturally a change in the British attitude towards Russia, and the movement was hastened by the latter's defeat in the Far East, since the check to her progress there seemed likely to cause a resumption of her advance in Central Asia and so through Persia towards the Persian Gulf, where Great Britain had been predominant, both politically and commercially, for generations. Negotiations to remove possible causes of conflict in Central Asia resulted in the Anglo-Russian convention of the 31st August, 1907, which recognised the independence and integrity of Persia, but assigned to Russia a northern sphere of influence and to Great Britain a southern sphere; excluded Russian influence from Afghanistan, whilst the British government disavowed any intention of changing the political status of that country; and recognised China's suzerainty over Thibet, and bound the two Powers to abstain from any interference in the administration of that country. The

advance of Russia in Central Asia being thus checked, so far as it could be by such agreements, her progress towards the open sea could only be at the expense of Turkey.

At the end of 1907 the Triple Alliance was still formally as strong as ever, though Italy's Mediterranean interests made her an unreliable member. The Anglo-French entente, tested at Algeciras, had developed into a Triple Entente. The Anglo-Japanese alliance had been renewed in 1905 for ten years, and this had been followed in 1907 by treaties between Japan and France and Russia, mutually guaranteeing the existing territorial position in the Far East. As to the other European states it is necessary only to notice that the union of Sweden and Norway had come to an end in 1905, and that whilst Norway was inclined towards Great Britain, fear of Russian aggression made Sweden disposed to look to Germany: Portugal was a traditional ally of Great Britain: Spain was bound to that state and France by agreements as to the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* on the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic coast of Africa: Belgium and the Netherlands (the former country especially) were becoming alarmed at Germany's growing power. And then the Balkans became again the centre of European politics.

§ 3. *The Turkish Revolution and its Consequences*

The Turkish Empire in Europe had never been tranquil since the Congress of Berlin. An insurrection in Crete in 1896, with a demand for union with Greece, had led to a Greco-Turkish war; Greece had been saved from disaster only by the intervention of the Great Powers, who after trying to repress the Cretan movement found themselves driven to induce the Sultan to give the island autonomy, which was obviously only a step towards union with Greece. From that action Germany, already pursuing a philo-

Turkish policy, and Austria-Hungary stood ostentatiously aloof. But the permanent problem was Macedonia, with its fierce racial rivalries; there conditions steadily became worse, and a rising of the Bulgar inhabitants in 1903 was followed by widespread massacres. Greek armed bands crossed the frontier to aid their kinsmen against Turks and Bulgars; the Rumanians were increasingly antagonistic to the Greeks; the Serbs and Greeks, though mutually hostile, were inclined to make common cause against the Bulgars; the Turkish population was dissatisfied at the lack of support from Constantinople; the Sultan's reiterated promises to the Great Powers were not fulfilled, and their efforts to secure order and reform were unavailing. Meanwhile amongst the educated Turks there was growing discontent with the régime of the Sultan Abdul Hamid, whose political astuteness had not prevented the loss (in fact, though not in form) of Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Crete—loss which was not offset by strengthened authority over his Asiatic dominions and the promotion of Pan-Islamism as a means of utilising the Mohammedan subjects of Great Britain, France, and Russia for the defence of the temporal power of the Sultan as head of the Mohammedan faith. There had grown up a party, the "Young Turks," who believed that the Turkish Empire in Europe could only be saved from destruction by vigorous reform, especially now the two Powers, Great Britain and Russia, whose antagonism had long been Turkey's chief safeguard, had come together, and that the first step should be the re-establishment of the Midhat constitution of 1876, with a representative assembly, equality for all the races within the empire, and restrictions on the personal power of the Sultan. A revolution brought about by the Young Turkish party—formed of military officers, the Jewish community centred at Salonica, Albanians, and educated Turks living abroad—forced the Sultan to proclaim

the constitution of 1876, and this action, enthusiastically received in Turkey, was welcomed abroad as the entry of Turkey into the paths of reform and constitutional government.

Germany had long posed as a friend of Turkey and its Sultan, and as eager to promote Turkey's economic development, in the hope of obtaining thereby a special position for her trade—and other possibilities. In the early nineties she had secured a concession for a railway in Asia Minor, from Haider-Pasha to Konia: German officers had trained the Turkish army; the course taken by the German government in respect of Crete has already been indicated. In 1898 William II., during a tour in the Holy Land, had announced that the German Emperor would be at all times the friend of the Turkish Sultan and of the Mohammedans throughout the world who looked to that Sultan as their head; there had been an imperial visit to Constantinople; and later came an agreement whereby a German-controlled company obtained a concession for a railway from Konia to Bagdad and thence to the head of the Persian Gulf, through a region where British and Indian trade had for more than a century been almost unchallenged.

The Austrian administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina had come to be regarded as part of the permanent territorial organisation of Europe, as had the military occupation of the Sanjak of Novibazar; in 1908 the Austrian government was planning a railway through the Sanjak to Salonica, as a means of promoting her economic and subsequent political control of the Balkans, and the definite annexation of the occupied provinces. The claims of the Young Turks that the provinces should be represented in the new national assembly was answered by a proclamation incorporating them in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Turkish national sentiment was offended; independent Serbia saw her hope of incorporating the Serb-populated territories apparently

destroyed; Russia resented the increase of Austrian power in the Balkans, and with Great Britain and France protested against this departure from the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin. Germany had to choose between the pro-Turkish professions of the Emperor, and the desires of her ally; she chose to support Austria, and the declarations of her government, and some rhetorical pronouncements of William II., were decisive. The objections of the Triple Entente were not pressed, and early in 1909 an Austro-Turkish agreement confirmed the sovereignty of Austria in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and returned the Sanjak to Turkey, which received a monetary compensation. One day before the Austrian declaration, Tsar Ferdinand proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria.

German influence in Turkey had been greatly shaken by these events, and by the dethronement of the Sultan Abdul Hamid by the Young Turks early in 1909 for fear of a counter-revolution, but the sympathy between the reformers and Great Britain aroused by the British attitude towards the revolution of 1908 quickly passed away. The Young Turks were a minority, maintaining themselves only by force, and under the influence of Pan-Islamic doctrines and an intolerant nationalism they quickly adopted the policy of compulsory turkisation of the non-Turkish races, arousing thereby the resentment of the independent Balkan states, who saw it ruthlessly applied in Macedonia, and indignation in Great Britain at massacres there and in Asia Minor. The change of feeling in Great Britain, the strengthened British position in Egypt, and the refusal to agree unconditionally to an increase in the Turkish customs duties, led the Young Turks to turn again to Germany, where many of their leaders had been educated and whose government carefully refrained from any criticism of their actions. The results were a rapid revival of German influence in Turkey, great German commercial activity there,

the pushing-on of the Bagdad railway, and from both Germany and Turkey a serious menace to Great Britain's economic and political position in Mesopotamia and along the Persian Gulf.

The diplomatic success of Germany in the annexation crisis of 1908 was regarded there as "the revenge of Algeciras," and inspired her government to attempt to reassert itself in Morocco. In February, 1909, an agreement whereby Germany recognised France's special interest in the maintenance of order there, in return for an undertaking to respect German commercial and industrial rights, seemed to hold out hope of the removal of the Moroccan question from the field of international controversy. But as the French dominance in Morocco increased the German colonial party became increasingly dissatisfied; a failure in domestic policy and strained relations with the Emperor William II. had caused Bülow to be replaced by Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg, who could hold in check neither the monarch nor the trading and colonial interests to whose influence he was so susceptible. A rising of Moroccan tribes which caused a French military expedition to Fez showed that the independence of Morocco was at an end, and the German government professed itself free to take any course it thought appropriate to the new conditions. In July, 1911, a German gunboat appeared at Agadir, in south Morocco, and whilst the avowed object was only to safeguard the lives and property of the German traders, the real object evidently was to force the French into a settlement of the whole problem on the basis of compensation to Germany. The British ministry of Mr. Asquith promptly ranged itself by the side of France, and negotiations began in which Germany had two objects, freedom and security for her trade and industrial enterprise in Morocco and, in return for recognition of a French protectorate, substantial ter-

ritorial compensation in Central Africa, particularly in areas of the French Congo, adjacent to the Cameroons, where the French occupation had never been effective and German traders were pushing forward. But Great Britain as well as France was opposed to any large increase of Germany's possessions in Africa; and the outcome of the negotiations, conducted under the shadow of imminent war, was the practical recognition (November, 1911) of the French protectorate over Morocco, and a transfer to Germany of Congo territory which was regarded in that country as a quite inadequate offset to the loss of Morocco, and in France as a quite unnecessary concession to Germany's colonial ambitions. The tension between the two states was increased rather than diminished, and the fact that Germany's failure was largely due to British action intensified the anti-British sentiment which was prevalent among the ruling classes there.

Italy had long cherished colonial ambition—there was an enormous annual emigration—so far with little success; and most of all she desired territory in Northern Africa. Disappointed in Tunis in 1878–1881 she now saw the whole south coast line of the Mediterranean, except Tripoli and Cyrenaica, held by France and Great Britain, and the often-invoked plea of the security of frontiers might soon lead to the partition of the territory still held by Turkey. The Pan-Islamic policy of the Young Turks there afforded Italy excuse for intervention to protect the interests of Italian traders and settlers: the Turkish refusal to assent was followed by war (October, 1911) which lasted for about a year. By the treaty of Lausanne the Sultan ceded to Italy his provinces in Northern Africa, where resistance still continued in the interior, and Italy kept the islands of the Dodecanese until Tripolitania should be entirely evacuated by the Turks.

§ 4. *The Balkan Wars*

The Balkan states, rivals as they were, were drawn together by hostility to a common foe—the Young Turks with their reactionary and turkising creed. When Turkey became involved in war with Italy they saw their opportunity; Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria entered into treaties of alliance and military co-operation, without, however, laying down any principles to be followed in the distribution of such territory as might be acquired by successful war. On the 13th October, 1912, when the Turkish government was abandoning to Italy its African provinces, the Balkan allies addressed to it an ultimatum demanding administrative autonomy for Turkey's European provinces, with frontiers drawn on ethnographical lines, and with Christian governors from Switzerland or Belgium; elected provincial assemblies; the reform of local administration; freedom of education; and the demobilisation of the Turkish army. The Great Powers warned the allies that "in case of war they would not admit, as its result, any modification of the territorial *status quo* in European Turkey," but as usual they urged the Turkish government to make reforms. It refused all concessions, and war began immediately. From the first it was disastrous for Turkey, despite the fact that the movements of the armies of the allies were dictated less by a combined strategy than by the desire of each government to occupy as speedily as possible the territories it hoped to secure in the division of the spoils. Meanwhile the representatives of the Great Powers were in conference in London, under the presidency of the British Foreign Secretary (Sir Edward Grey) and an armistice arranged in December, 1912, enabled representatives of Turkey and her Balkan foes to meet there also.

The problem was one of great complexity. The success of the allies revived their old discords and territorial rival-

ries. Austria and Italy, supported naturally by Germany, strongly opposed the claim of Serbia to an outlet on the Adriatic, a course which turned the Serbs to the valley of the Vardar, where they came into conflict with the claims of Bulgaria. There was a similar dispute as to the Monastir-Istib region; the Greeks and Bulgars were rivals for Salonica. Russia favoured the Serbs, but a strong Bulgarian state reaching close to Constantinople must be a further obstacle to her own designs on that city. The conference in London, after a renewal of the war still more disastrous to Turkey, prepared a treaty of peace which was signed in May, 1913, whereby the Sultan ceded to the allies all his territories north-west of a line from Enos on the Ægean to Midia on the Black Sea, losing thereby all but a fragment of his European possessions. Albania—a strip of mountainous territory some eleven thousand square miles in area, lying along the Adriatic coast between Montenegro and Greece, was made into an independent state—an ill-starred experiment which satisfied no one, and was the outcome of the determination of Austria and Italy to keep Serbia away from the south-eastern Adriatic coast and inability to reconcile their own ambitions to acquire that coast, Italy because it would give her control of the straits of Otranto and so of the Adriatic, and Austria to defeat the Italian designs.

The dispute between the victors as to the distribution of the ceded territory brought in less than a month the second Balkan war. Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece, but the latter were quickly joined by Montenegro, and also by Rumania, which now intervened with the encouragement of Russia, given for the reasons already indicated. Turkey also took advantage of the falling-out of the victors to renew the war, and re-occupied Adrianople and the surrounding district. Bulgaria was overwhelmed; and the war ended with the treaty of Bucharest in June, 1913. The final

outcome of the two wars was that the Sultan's European territories were reduced by some hundred and forty thousand square miles, of which the greater part passed to Serbia and Greece. The former had been enlarged in area from 48,000 to 87,000 square miles, and in population from two and three-quarters to over four and a half millions. For Greece the territorial increase was even greater, from 64,000 to 120,000 square miles, whilst her population rose from two to four and three-quarter millions. The little state of Montenegro received territory which increased her population to 435,000. Bulgaria's net gain both in territory and population was small, for she was compelled to cede a considerable part of the Dobrudja to Rumania, and Turkey retained the town and district of Adrianople.

§ 5. *The Verge of Catastrophe*

The outbreak of the Balkan War had come as a complete surprise to the two Central European Powers; the results were a serious blow to them. Austria's primary aim had long been to prevent the union of the Serbs and Croats in her south-eastern dominions with their kinsfolk in the Sanjak, Macedonia and Serbia, and to obtain possession, or at least control, of the great trade route to the sea at Salonica, and the economic dominance of the Balkans. Now her government saw that ambition blocked by the formation of two strong states which lay right across the path, and it was certain that the military successes and enhanced dignity of Serbia would give a fresh stimulus to the agitation, both there and in the Austrian dominions, for the creation of a state which should include all the southern Slavs. Moreover, Bulgaria, which might have been useful to Austria as a barrier against Russia, had suffered heavily and was no longer the predominant state south of the Danube. The Austrian government sought for a revision of the

Bucharest treaty in the interest of Bulgaria—which would have reopened the whole settlement. But it found no support. Germany had sympathised strongly, and in 1908, as we have seen, effectively with her Hapsburg ally; she had hoped to secure through the Balkans great trade routes to both Salonica and Constantinople, and by way of the latter city and the Bagdad railway to the Persian Gulf—routes which through her influence at Vienna and Constantinople she would largely control. William II. had widely advertised, German statesmen and traders had largely pursued, a pro-Turkish policy aiming at a development of the Ottoman dominions from which it was hoped to gain much commercially, and perhaps territorially also. Austria might well expect, therefore, that her proposal for a revision of the treaty would be supported from Berlin. That she was disappointed can only be ascribed to a reluctance on the part of the German Emperor and his ministers at the time to commit themselves irrevocably to serving Austrian policy, and to the fact that with two of the Balkan states which had gained by the war, Greece and Rumania (the latter being especially concerned in any revision suggested in the interest of Bulgaria), Germany hoped to develop if not an alliance at least a close understanding—based partly on the relationship of their monarchs to the German imperial house—which would secure to her a position of influence in the Balkans and more than offset the blow to Austria. It was a search for allies, for the loyalty of Italy to the Triple Alliance was obviously weakening, especially now that her new position in the Mediterranean made British and French goodwill still more important to her. So the revision proposal fell through; Bulgaria was left eager to avenge herself on her allies of 1912; Turkey remained resentful, anxious about Constantinople, and waiting only for a favourable opportunity to attempt the recovery of the territory lost in Europe, and was disposed even more

than before to rely on Germany for aid in political revival and the economic development essential thereto.

During the years marked by the Balkan wars efforts were being made to remove some of the more potent causes of Anglo-German friction. One of these was the rivalry in naval armaments; despite the declaration of the Berlin government there was a general conviction in the United Kingdom that the German navy, which was being so sedulously built up, was intended to be used aggressively, and a determination to maintain British preponderance at sea. We have seen that the attempt to deal with the limitation of naval armaments at the second Hague Conference had failed; since then the competition had become more violent. Another cause of friction was the concession for the Bagdad Railway, involving the construction of three thousand miles of line and including mining options and the right to construct harbours; if carried, as was proposed, to the head of the Persian Gulf that railway would create in Mesopotamia large German commercial interests which would prepare the way for attempts at political control. Mesopotamia had long been an important market for British and Indian trade, and there were old-established British concessions for navigation on its rivers; in Southern Persia the special position of Great Britain had been recognised by the Anglo-Russian agreement; and the whole of the Persian Gulf had long been policed and lighted by Great Britain, to whom a number of small local chiefs at the head of the Gulf (Koweit and Mohammerah) and on the Arabian coast (the Trucial chiefs and the Sultan of Muscat) were bound by old treaties. German traders had been active for some years in the Gulf regions, and it was evident that they were being used to prepare the way for political claims. The appearance of a great German-controlled undertaking at the head of the Gulf would strengthen these claims and be a heavy blow to British prestige; whilst Germany and its

allies or associates would command an uninterrupted railway route to within striking distance of India. In 1903, when the railways concession was granted, British participation was possible, but the effort to obtain it was abandoned. Construction began in October, 1904, but was very slow, and it appeared that the expectations in some quarters that financial difficulties would prove insuperable might be well-founded; the Turkish revolution imposed still further delay; but when German influence in Turkey revived the railway company was able to make new financial arrangements with the Young Turk government, and the work was pushed on rapidly in 1910. In the same year the Russian government agreed with Germany "not to oppose the Bagdad Railway," which was to have a branch to the Persian frontier. In these circumstances the British government resolved to take the opportunity of the Turkish request for an increase of the customs duties—which were limited by treaty—to re-open the question of the railway, which involved the Turkish government in heavy financial commitments. The withdrawal of the concession could not be obtained, or even sought—it would do much to develop Mesopotamia, which had great economic possibilities; all that could be attempted was to deprive at least the stretch between Bagdad and the Gulf of its purely German character, and to secure the recognition of Great Britain's special position on the Gulf and the independence from Turkey of the local chiefs who were her protégés.

In February, 1912, negotiations took place in Berlin between the German government and a British cabinet minister (Lord Haldane), at their invitation, on the naval policies of the two countries and a possible treaty of unconditional neutrality in the event of either party being involved in war. On the first question no agreement was reached or was indeed likely, though there does seem to have been some modification of the German shipbuilding programme before

its introduction in the following month. The discussions as to a treaty of neutrality were also abortive; the British government would not bind itself to neutrality in all possible events, though it was ready to declare that it was not, and would not be, party to any treaty or understanding having an attack on Germany as its object. The failure of these general negotiations did not, however, prevent efforts to remove particular causes of stumbling.

There were two problems to which these efforts were directed. One was a settlement between Great Britain, Germany, and Turkey as to the Turkish customs duties, equality of trade conditions throughout the Ottoman dominions, a long-standing Turco-Persian frontier dispute, the general political position in and around the Persian Gulf, the conservancy of the Shatt-el Arab—the waterway formed by the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, British rights of navigation on those rivers, the Bagdad railway concession and British participation therein, and the terminus of the railway, which it was an axiom of British policy must not be on the Gulf itself. On the other hand, it was recognised that German colonial ambitions were not unreasonable, and proposals were discussed which would have given Germany the opportunity of acquiring some parts of the Portuguese possessions in Africa, on compensation terms. The negotiations covering so wide a field were long and complicated, but on the 18th June, 1914, the British foreign minister announced that the negotiations between Great Britain and Germany and Turkey were completed. Ten days later the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian imperial throne, and his wife when on an official visit to Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, gave the signal for the great European War.

That murder was itself only an incident in a Serb national agitation which had at least the sympathy—if it had not the active support—of the Serbian government, and aimed

at bringing the Serb and Croat subjects of Austria into a South Slav state of which Serbia, already greatly enlarged, would be the nucleus. Beset by the perpetual problem of the subject races, obstinate not to make concessions which would only stimulate their separatist ambitions, fearing the reaction upon them of the successes of their independent kinsfolk beyond the Hapsburg borders and a great Slav movement instigated and led by Russia, Austria-Hungary was eager to seize any opportunity of crushing Serbia and checking Russia. In that aim it knew that it could count on the fullest German sympathy and aid; partly because the South Slav movement and the advance of Russia would interpose strong obstacles to the German-Austrian economic control of the Balkans and the great line of communication which Germany was seeking to create to the south-east of Europe and thence through Turkey in Asia, and partly because of the German hostility to Russia, which had two sources. One was a dread, general in Germany, but especially strong in the eastern provinces of Prussia, of Russian aggression, of which the military reorganisation and the construction of strategical railways on the European frontier on which Russia was engaged, were deemed to be an indication; the other was Russia's alliance with France. The antagonism of Austria-Hungary, and therefore of Germany, to Serbia and Russia were shared by Turkey and Bulgaria, for the first had lost heavily and the second had been grievously disappointed as the result of the Balkan wars.

Germany resented the strength of France's colonial dominions, which were believed to be far beyond her capacity to administer and develop: they were the first objects of Germany's ambitions—those of smaller Powers were expected to drop into her hands; and it was believed that they could be obtained as the spoils of a land war. But such a war, to be successful, must come soon, before Russia

was in a position to make full use of her vast resources of man-power. France, on her side, saw with increasing dismay the rapidly growing strength of Germany in wealth and population, which seemed to remove all hopes of the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, and the colonial ambitions which menaced her oversea possessions; and found the rivalry in armaments more and more burdensome. The German legislation of 1913, which provided for a large increase in the standing army, and a great capital levy for military and naval purposes, was answered by legislation in France increasing the period of military service for her smaller population.

There is no doubt as to the genuine desire of the British government, in the negotiations which have been briefly described, to remove so far as lay in its power the occasions of conflict with Germany. But there was in Great Britain a general uneasiness at Germany's economic progress, and at the political ambitions to which it was giving rise; and there were many who believed that she was bent on forcing a conflict with the United Kingdom in her own time, saw in her persistence in a great naval programme ample evidence of aggressive intent, and resented her increasingly open claims to world dominance. There is doubt as to the real attitude towards the negotiations of those in power in Germany, who were not necessarily, and indeed not generally the ministers. The chancellor was sincere, but his influence, never great, was rapidly declining; the German parliament had no control over the executive in respect of foreign affairs. There was a very powerful body of opinion in Germany, of great influence with the Emperor William II., which was eager for continental and overseas expansion, partly for the economic reasons already set out, and partly because of a deep-rooted belief in the innate superiority, in intellect, training, and in ability, of the Germanic race over all others, and its consequent right to world leadership.

That leadership was effectively disputed only by the British—for the United States were still interested only in their own affairs; and the dominant classes in Germany were convinced, as indeed were most Germans, that the industrial and commercial power of Great Britain was in decline, that long prosperity had weakened the mental and physical power of the nation and its ability to hold the British Empire together, and that British policy since the beginning of the century—as exemplified by the Japanese alliance and the Triple Entente—arose from a recognition of inability to face Germany alone. There was thus a fundamental antagonism which could have been removed, if at all, only very gradually; and time was not given.

For a decade the great states, and some of the smaller states, of Europe, driven by forces which were beyond the power of governments to control, had lived in a state of constant anxiety and mutual suspicion; one political crisis after another had brought Europe to the verge of war. In those conditions armaments had been increased until they had become an intolerable burden, and the Great Powers had all become involved in embarrassing reciprocal obligations from which it was impossible to escape without the loss of prestige. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, which followed the Sarajevo murders, set loose all the rivalries and fears and ambitions of Europe, and the great catastrophe followed.

CHAPTER XI

The Immediate Causes of the World War

By Harry Elmer Barnes[1]

I

The Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated at Sarajevo in Bosnia on June 28, 1914, but any attempt to understand even the immediate causes of the World War must go back for at least two years and review the major phases of the diplomatic situation with respect to the Balkans and the growing closeness of diplomatic relations between France and Russia. In this study of the immediate causes of the World War we are uniquely fortunate as to source material. For the first time in the history of mankind the same generation of scholars that witnessed a great European conflict have at their disposal the contents of the archives of the more important governments which participated. The Socialist governments which assumed charge of Germany and Austria following the World War quickly made public the diplomatic negotiations of the earlier régime in the hope that such a procedure would help to discredit the previous capitalistic and monarchical governments. In this way we have adequate information concerning the diplomatic negotiations of the Central Powers. For the same general reasons the Bolshevik government in Russia at once opened

[1] *It is necessary to repeat in this place what is stated in the Preface, that for this chapter Professor Barnes is solely responsible; and that the Author of the work to which this chapter is appended disagrees entirely with certain of the statements made herein (particularly those relating to British policy) and with some of the conclusions reached.* —P. A.

the archives at Petrograd to scholars, though, even earlier, De Siebert, the Secretary of the Russian Embassy at London, had published a large collection of communications which had passed between London and St. Petersburg during the period from 1908 to 1914. Inasmuch as Russia was allied with France and England, the Russian archives revealed much of the pertinent information with respect to the negotiations, relations and co-operation between the Entente Powers in the period preceding the outbreak of the war. Now even England is to allow two reputable scholars, George Peabody Gooch and Harold Temperley, to publish two volumes of communications on English diplomacy in 1914 and the years immediately preceding. Because of these circumstances honest historical scholars are now able to eliminate well nigh entirely the grotesque mythology concerning war origins which was spread by the various Powers during the period of the great conflict, and may handle the subject upon the basis of fact, truth and candour. We shall in these few pages make an effort to summarise briefly and clearly the consensus of historical experts who have thoroughly and carefully analysed the source material mentioned above. Any such collection of competent students of contemporary diplomatic history would certainly include the following names: G. P. Gooch, S. B. Fay, B. Schmitt, V. Valentin, M. Montgelas, P. Renouvin, M. Morhardt, A. Fabre-Luce, G. Frantz, W. L. Langer, John S. Ewart, C. Seymour and Corrado Barbagallo.

The period from 1912 to 1914 is very significant in the diplomatic history of Europe: (1) because of the developments during this time in the way of strengthening the Franco-Russian alliance; and (2) as witnessing a growing and decisive hostility between Serbia and Austria, the latter of which was unquestionably intensified by the Russian encouragement of the Serbian nationalistic aspirations. While there is no doubt that some of the aggressiveness in the

Austria-Serbian situation must be assigned to Austria, it is certainly true that these two major diplomatic developments mentioned above were closely interrelated. The closer collusion between France and Russia promoted the increase of Russian ambitions in regard to Constantinople and the Straits and, consequently, led to a notable increase of Russian activity in Balkan problems and issues. This intensification of Russian concern in regard to the Balkan area took the specific form of encouraging the Serbian nationalists, while it was but natural that the propaganda and activity of these patriots should arouse the suspicion and antipathy of Austria, and increase her already unfriendly and somewhat aggressive attitude towards her troublesome little Balkan neighbour.

The Franco-Russian alliance goes back to about 1892, but during most of the twenty years following that time it had been looked upon by the participating Powers as primarily a defensive alliance against the triple union of Germany, Austria and Italy. About 1908, a transition set in. The century-old Russian desire for Constantinople began to assert itself with a new intensity. The Russian suggestion in 1908 that Austria annex Bosnia and Herzegovina had been based upon the assumption that Russia would receive as compensation the opening of the Straits to Russian war vessels. Having been frustrated in this ambition by the disapproval of England, Russia, after the failure of direct negotiations with Turkey and of the Balkan League, turned her interest to the only other probable means of securing control of the Straits, namely, a European war which would make it possible for the Russians to seize Constantinople and realise the ambition of Russian generals, statesmen and diplomats since the time of Catherine the Great. While many members of the Russian Court and diplomatic circle were extremely favourable to this policy, its leader was unquestionably Izvolski, who became the Russian Foreign Minister and later

Ambassador to Paris. It was quite obvious, however, that no such policy as this would prove successful unless Russia could count upon the support of France and, if possible, that of England as well.

About 1912 the French situation became more favourable to Russian policy than it had been during most of the time in the previous generation. There was arising to power in France a new and more aggressive group of militant Republicans, led by Raymond Poincaré. Poincaré had been born in Lorraine, and since childhood had entertained an all-dominating passion to recover his Fatherland from what he sincerely believed to be the unjustifiable and humiliating seizure by Germany. As there was little probability that Germany would ever voluntarily cede Lorraine to France, because, among other reasons, of the valuable iron-ore deposits in this area, Poincaré well understood that Alsace-Lorraine could presumably be restored to France only as an incident of the favourable outcome of a general European war. Hence, with the rise of the Poincaré party to power in France, Izvolski found in Paris a cordial interest in his proposal that France and Russia should draw more closely together for the furtherance of their mutual ambitions, both of which could be realised jointly and solely through a Franco-Russian victory in a general European conflict.

To bring this about, it would, of course, be necessary to secure the support of the mass of the people in France. Russia being an autocracy, there was likely to be little difficulty in that country, for military and diplomatic affairs were thoroughly controlled by an irresponsible monarch and his court, ministry and general staff. In France the situation was far different, because, theoretically at least, the ultimate control of foreign affairs rested with the Chamber of Deputies. Hence, it was necessary to carry on a long and effective campaign of propaganda in the press which would culminate in the conversion of the mass of the French people from

a pacifically inclined population, to one which believed Germany likely to attack France at any time and was convinced that the Austrian and German policies in the Balkans were diametrically opposed to the peace and safety of France. To bring about this transformation of French opinion, Izvolski obtained from Russia large sums of money which were adroitly distributed by Poincaré, Tardieu and others to the French newspapers of every description and class bias. There was thus executed a generally successful process of bribery of these French newspapers, so that they changed their editorial and news policies markedly in the direction of emphasising the indispensable value to the French of the closer arrangement with Russia, and stressing the dangers which faced France in the alleged aggression of Germany and Austria. Many of Poincaré's associates, such as Tardieu, also contributed extensive articles to these papers, sharply criticising Austro-German policy in the Balkans and warning Frenchmen of the grave menace to their interests and safety alleged to reside therein. The net result was the growing conviction of the French people that Balkan affairs were of vital importance to the country. The Franco-Russian alliance was "Balkanised." When in 1913 Poincaré became a candidate for the French presidency, Russian pecuniary aid also played a part in defraying his campaign expenses.

This intensification of the Franco-Russian alliance produced specific results in the diplomatic negotiations between these states. In 1912 Poincaré, in conference with Izvolski, gave Russia a free hand in the Balkans, promising unconditional French support if she were attacked by Austria or Germany. The one stipulation was that Poincaré or his successors should have a general supervisory control over Russian acts in the Balkans, lest these might on some occasion take a form or course not designed to redound to the specific interest of France or the furtherance of those aims

of the Franco-Russian alliance in which Poincaré was interested. The years 1912–14 augmented the Russian interest and restlessness in regard to the Straits. The Balkan wars appeared to have resulted rather unfavourably to Austro-German ambitions and interests in the Balkan area, particularly in the increased power and prestige of Serbia, and Austria assumed a progressively more menacing attitude towards Serbia. The Russian impatience took on a significant form in February, 1914, when a secret Crown Council was held at St. Petersburg to decide as to whether it would be wisest to strike suddenly and unaided against Turkey and seize Constantinople and the Straits, or to await a probable European war which would give Russia the advantage of the aid of the British and French fleets in holding in check the naval forces of Germany and Austria. It was deemed best to accept the latter alternative. In the meantime, the encouraging Russian attitude towards Serbian nationalism was helping to create a situation which promised to aid notably in producing a crisis that might actually serve to precipitate the desired world war.

It has often been asserted that this aggressive action of France and Russia after 1912 was not the result of deliberate and independent planning on their part, but a program of defence into which they were forced by the increase of German aggression and militarism at this time, in particular the German military bill of 1913. This position has little substantial basis in fact. The combined Franco-Russian military forces in 1910 were far greater than those of Germany and Austria, and after the Grey-Cambon correspondence of 1912 it was practically certain that the support of England could be counted upon. Further, while the German military law of 1913 was passed before that of the French, the French bill was actually laid before the Chamber of Deputies before the German bill was presented to the Reichstag. Neither country forced the

other directly in this regard; the military and naval increases of 1913–14 grew out of the general European alarm over the Balkan situation of 1912–13, which threatened to produce a crisis at almost any time.

II

The nationalistic movement in Serbia had been strong for more than a generation, and had been notably forwarded by what the Serbs regarded as the aggressive and utterly unjustifiable annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1908. Serbian officials did not know that this annexation had actually been suggested by Serbia's supposed protector, Russia. Throughout the period from 1912 to 1914 Austria became more active and aggressive in regard to the Balkans, and during the Balkan crises of 1912–14 assumed a threatening attitude towards Serbia, adding specific causes of irritation in such incidents as the "Pig War." The patriotic and unification movements in the latter state were therefore enormously stimulated from a defensive point of view. In her aggression towards Serbia at this time, Austria had acted without the instigation or encouragement of Germany; in fact, Germany had on two occasions moved to restrain Austria. It should be pointed out, however, that about this time Germany had secured what seemed to be a very thorough-going control over Turkish foreign policy, and was bringing to completion her negotiations and activities in regard to the Bagdad Railroad. Hence Germany was not likely to view with equanimity any increase of Russian activity in the Balkans, to say nothing of the Russian desire to obtain control of Constantinople and the Straits. Likewise, Sazonov was greatly alarmed at the growth of German influence over the Sublime Porte.

The antagonism between Austria and Serbia tended to become acute in the spring of 1914, and in May of that year

a notorious Serbian plotter and assassin, Dragutin Dimitrievitch, who was at this time Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Serbian General Staff, obtained what he believed to be a truthful tip to the effect that Austria planned to attack Serbia during the military manœuvres to be held in Bosnia in the summer of 1914. He believed that this Austrian aggression, which would possibly be fatal to Serbian independence and certainly to Serbian expansion, could be averted only by the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austrian throne. We now know that Austria entertained no such specific intention, but we may assume that Dimitrievitch sincerely believed in the truth of the report he had heard. A number of courageous young Bosnian patriots were enlisted in the plot, trained in pistol marksmanship and the throwing of bombs by Serbian military authorities and then sent, with the connivance of the Serbian authorities, to Sarajevo in Bosnia, where they awaited the impending visit of the Archduke. It is stated that Dimitrievitch lost his nerve as the time for the visit of the Archduke approached, and attempted to call off the plot when it was too late. Whether this is true, we cannot be certain, but there is no doubt about the origin and planning of the plot.

When this information concerning the complicity of Dimitrievitch was first made public by a Serbian historian, Stanojevic, in 1923, it was believed that while the Serbian military authorities may have been cognizant of the plot, the Serbian civil government was innocent of this knowledge. But the exuberance at the tenth anniversary of the outbreak of the World War has proved too much for the discretion of certain Serbian officials, and L. Yovanovitch, a member of the Serbian Cabinet in 1914, has exultantly boasted that the Serbian civil government was likewise in full possession of the facts regarding the plot nearly a month before the assassination. There is some evidence that

the Serbian Minister to Vienna in 1914 passed a hint of the impending assassination to Bilinski, who was at that time Minister of Finance and Administration in Bosnia, but Bilinski, who was out of favour at the Austrian court, never handed on this warning if he actually received it. The Serbian government, hoping that the secret in regard to the collusion of the Serbian military and civil authorities in the plot for the assassination of the Archduke might die with its author, attempted during the war to secure the assassination of Dimitrievitch, and, failing in this, was able in 1917 to execute him on a trumped-up charge of treason. These latter facts have been frankly revealed by another prominent Serbian, N. Nenadovitch. In the light of the fact that we now know that the Serbian premier, Pashitch, was aware of the assassination plot at least three weeks before the murder of June 28th, it is illuminating to remember his ardent and repeated insistence upon his complete ignorance of the plot in July, 1914. Austria entertained at the time of the assassination the strong conviction of the direct participation of the Serbian government in this plot, and acted on this supposition, though as an actual matter of fact the Austrian committee of investigation was unable in July, 1914, to find any convincing evidence supporting this contention, beyond such general and vague considerations as the exuberant attitude of the Serbian press and patriotic societies in regard to the assassination and the assassins.

III

The assassination of the Archduke on June 28, 1914, shocked and startled the various European chancelleries. The tension had been high in the international situation in the spring of 1914, and the murder of the Austrian heir was recognised by most foreign offices as likely to create a serious crisis in diplomatic affairs. In general, there was a fairly

common feeling throughout Europe that the assassination had been an atrocious affair, and that Austria would be justified in taking rather a severe attitude towards Serbia. Poincaré and Izvolski, though they probably did not know of the actual details of the plot to assassinate the Archduke, recognised at once the significance of the episode for the policy which they had been planning during the previous two or three years. Sometime earlier Poincaré had arranged for a visit to Russia in July, 1914, and this trip was executed as planned, though it was to involve a discussion of far more momentous and immediate issues than had earlier been contemplated. Many of the ultra-severe critics of Poincaré have alleged that this trip was planned solely to encourage the aspiring but cowardly and hesitant Russian militarists. It is definitely known, however, that the trip had been fully provided for a considerable time before the assassination. This fact does not, however, in any way affect the thesis that Poincaré exploited the visit primarily for the purpose of stiffening the Russian determination to prevent any strong Austrian action in the Serbian crisis, and hoped to use the Balkan controversy as the basis for precipitating the world war which would lead to the Russian seizure of the Straits and the French recovery of Alsace-Lorraine.

We know upon authentic information that Poincaré was most enthusiastically welcomed at St. Petersburg, that he did everything possible to strengthen practically and symbolically the Franco-Russian alliance, and that he urged the Russians to be firm in their attitude towards the Serbian situation. He also assumed a somewhat menacing attitude towards the Austrian ambassador to St. Petersburg. Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburg took place before either he or the Russians had any complete knowledge of the specific nature of the impending Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Yet the long postponement of a definite statement of the presumably punitive action in regard to Serbia had aroused the

suspicion of both the French and the Russians that something ominous was imminent. But one must not fail to point out that at this early date Poincaré gave Russia a free hand to act in the Serbian crisis, and promised full French aid in any event before either he or Sazonov knew the specific terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. The Kaiser has been frequently, and not unjustly, condemned for giving Austria a blank cheque in regard to Serbia. But it should be indicated in frankness and candour that this was exactly what Poincaré did during his St. Petersburg visit with respect to the Russian attitude and policy in regard to Austria. Largely as a result of Poincaré's visit the Russian militarists thoroughly gained the upper hand over the pacific party at the court. General Russian preparations for the war began immediately, and we may most certainly accept as accurate the conclusion of the scholarly Frenchman, Alfred Fabre-Luce, to the effect that after Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburg there was only a very slight chance that the European war could be averted.

It was generally contended by the Entente propagandists during the World War that 1914 was a particularly fortunate date for such a conflict from the standpoint of the Central Powers, and an especially unfortunate one from the point of view of the Entente. Exactly the opposite was the case. There was no specific reason why Germany and Austria should have considered 1914 advantageous for a European conflict, and only the nebulous general one that the longer the conflict was delayed, the greater would become the disproportionate military strength of Russia and France. But it must be remembered that all of Austria's plans for the Balkans and most of Germany's foreign policies were likely to be wrecked by a European war. On the other hand, 1914 was a crucially important date for a European war from the standpoint of the interests of Russia and France. Without the British navy Russia and France would

have been gravely handicapped in a war against Germany and Austria. In June, 1914, England and Germany had settled in a satisfactory manner their outstanding difficulties in international relations, particularly their disputes over Mesopotamia and the Bagdad Railroad, and were getting on better terms than during any other period in the previous eighteen years. Hence, in another year it would be highly doubtful if Great Britain could be induced to undertake warlike action on behalf of France and Russia. In the same way that this Anglo-German *rapprochement* created a greater necessity for war in 1914 on the part of the Dual Alliance, so it decreased the occasion for any German war against Great Britain at this moment. It also gave the Germans greater assurance of probable British neutrality.

IV

The Austrian court and military circles had for some years before 1914 become alarmed at the Serbian nationalist agitation and its encouragement by the Russians. It seemed to them the most menacing movement then directed against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy. If successful, it would lead to the immediate loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and would constitute an invitation to revolution and secession on the part of the other minority nationalities within the polyglot empire. Up to the time of the assassination of the Archduke, active Austrian intervention in Serbian affairs had been prevented by the opposition of the moderates in the Austria-Hungarian ministry, particularly Count Tisza, the Hungarian premier, and by the adverse attitude of Germany towards any open aggression against Serbia. The assassination of the Archduke brought the matter to a crisis by enormously strengthening the activity and determination of the interventionists, and helping to silence

or weaken the opposition to such a policy. The Vienna authorities, civil and military, quickly came to the decision that the Serbian menace could no longer be ignored, and Count Tisza was soon won over to the policy of forcible intervention.

The attitude of Germany in the crisis had, of course, to be ascertained by the Austrians, and on July 5th a letter from Franz Josef was delivered to the Kaiser, setting forth the Austrian grievances against Serbia and stressing the fact that the Austrian Empire could not be kept intact without immediate and vigorous action against this south Slavic state. The Kaiser, who had earlier been frequently accused by Austria-Hungarian ministers of special partiality and friendliness towards Serbia, was now alarmed about the future of Austria-Hungary, with which the destinies of the German Empire were so closely linked. He was also personally shocked and doubtless somewhat frightened by the assassination of the Archduke, with whom he was personally friendly, and whose dynastic fortunes were so closely related to the House of Hohenzollern. Consequently, after consultation with his Chancellor and the Foreign Office on July 5th, the Kaiser made the following momentous decision: "Austria may judge what is to be done to clear up her relation with Serbia; whatever Austria's decision may turn out to be, Austria can count with certainty upon it that Germany will stand behind her as an ally and a friend." The Kaiser recognised at the time the possibility that this decision might lead to war, but he believed it highly improbable, because he felt that the Tsar, like himself, would be so shocked at the assassination as to eliminate any considerable probability of Russian opposition to the proper punishment of Serbia. And, in any event, he believed Russia insufficiently prepared, and staked too much on the assumption of British neutrality.

During the latter part of the World War there developed

a luxuriant myth concerning an alleged "Potsdam Conference," said to have been held on July 5, 1914, at which the Kaiser was claimed to have met the leading German and Austrian officials, as well as prominent members of the financial and industrial world in the Central Empires, to have revealed to them his determination to precipitate a general European war, and to have warned them that they would have only about three weeks to prepare for its outbreak. We now know that there is not the slightest shred of evidence to support this notorious fabrication, which was published throughout the Allied world by Henry Morgenthau, who was during the war the American Minister at Constantinople. There was no such conference whatever; the Kaiser at that time had only the slightest anticipation that a European war was to come, and was distinctly opposed to any general European war over the Serbian issue. He and his Chancellor can, however, be accused of grave indiscretion in giving Austria this blank cheque. But they repented of this folly later, and would unquestionably have made satisfactory amends for it had not the premature Russian mobilisation frustrated the really earnest German efforts to restrain Austrian aggression when the latter seemed likely to bring on a general European conflict. There is no evidence that Poincaré ever repented of his grant of a free hand to Russia or made any effort to curb Russian aggression.

The Austrians delayed the sending of their ultimatum to Serbia until July 23d. This was once believed to be due to the fact that it had been decided at the "Potsdam Conference" on July 5th that several weeks would be required to put the Central Empires into shape for a Continental war. We now know that the delay was due to the necessity of converting Tisza to the war policy, the desire to delay the ultimatum until Poincaré had left Russia, and the effort to secure proof of official Serbian complicity in the assassi-

nation as result of a study of the facts by an Austrian committee of investigation. This committee was unable to find any evidence of that official governmental responsibility of Serbia which has been subsequently so thoroughly established. But the general attitude of the Serbian government, the conduct of the Serbian press, and other symptoms, only demonstrated still further the already well-known fact that the Serbian state was thoroughly behind the nationalistic and patriotic movements which had produced the assassination. The Austrian government resolved that this time they would thoroughly dispose of the Serbian nuisance, whatever the consequences. The Austrian army was partially mobilised on the Serbian boundary on July 25th, but not until six hours after the Serbian mobilisation order had been issued. In spite of the fact that even the German officials regarded the Serbian reply as quite satisfactory, Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28th. That the Serbians, encouraged by the Russian attitude, were as stubborn and recalcitrant as the Austrians is proved by the fact that the Serbian army was ordered mobilised some three hours before the Serbian reply to the ultimatum had been sent to the Austrian officials. There can be no doubt that the Austrians were determined upon a punitive expedition into Serbia, but Germany was only willing to see this policy carried out on condition that it did not bring with it the strong probability of a general European war. The German civil government distinctly wanted the conflict localised, and limited to a punishment of Serbia. This is in sharp contrast with the policy of Poincaré and the Russians, which was clearly based upon the desire to bring about a general European war, without which the Franco-Russian ambitions could not have been in any way satisfied. This distinction between the type of war contemplated by Austria and that envisaged by France and Russia is of the utmost importance in assessing the relative responsibility of these various powers for the gen-

eral cataclysm that had sprung into full being by the close of the first week in August, 1914.

While every friend of peace might well wish that Austria had accepted the terms of the Serbian reply to her ultimatum, no American can with any propriety criticise her for not doing so. In 1898 Spain made a far more complete surrender to the terms of our ultimatum than did Serbia to the Austrian demands. Yet President McKinley kept the Spanish reply secret and urged war upon Congress. Certainly no one could contend that our interests in Cuba in 1898 were in any way as urgent or direct as those of Austria in the Serbian crisis of 1914. But a better analogy can be found by asking what the United States would have done if, about December, 1904, President Roosevelt and his wife had been assassinated at El Paso, Texas, by Mexicans who were members of a notorious secret society given over to plotting against the United States and whose murder of Mr. Roosevelt had been immediately proclaimed in the Mexican papers as a noble and laudable patriotic act? It is to be hoped that there is no reader naïve enough to suspect that we would even have waited for any diplomatic exchanges whatever before racing our soldiers into Mexico!

V

The action of Russia following the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was prompt and decisive. The Russian militarists, after the impetus and advantage they had gained from Poincaré's visit and encouragement, were in full command of the situation at St. Petersburg, and they had a most enthusiastic and aggressive aide at the French capital in Izvolski, who, in these crucial days, presided over the negotiations between St. Petersburg and Paris. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia seemed likely to present an admirable occasion for the precipitation of that world war which the

Crown Council had foreseen and longed for in the previous February. The Russian military preparations for a European war had been in process of development for more than a year previous. They had been still further increased following February, 1914, and real activity had been initiated as soon as the news of the assassination of the Archduke reached St. Petersburg. When the court and military circles were informed of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum, military preparations on a large scale began in dead earnest. Widespread preparatory military measures were ordered on the 25th of July, the day that Russia learned the nature of the ultimatum. A partial mobilisation was ordered on the 29th, and general mobilisation on the 30th. All of this came before there had been any evidence of German or Austrian military activity anticipating a world war.

As it had been frankly admitted and assumed by French, Russian and English military authorities for a generation that a general Russian mobilisation would inevitably mean a European war, there can be no question that the Russian militarists were as determined to bring about a general European conflict as was Austria to invade Serbia. The Tsar was certainly in favour of peace, and when the Kaiser telegraphed him, protesting against the Russian mobilisation, he ordered it suspended, but the next day the militarists won over the weak-minded and bewildered monarch to the final and fatal decision upon general mobilisation. He was unquestionably a well-intentioned and pacifically inclined ruler, but unintelligent, vacillating and confused before the impending calamity. The Grand Duke Nicholas and the strongest element in the court group were extremely enthusiastic for war, as in general were the military circles, though there seems some probability that the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, lost his nerve in the face of the crisis. It was for a considerable time believed by scholars that the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, was really in favour of

mediation, and was brought around to the war view only by full realisation of the menace of Austrian policy to Russian ambitions in the Near East. More thorough investigation, and particularly the marshalling of the evidence in the recent book by Professor Frantz, has unquestionably established the fact that Sazonov had, by the time of Poincaré's departure from St. Petersburg, become thoroughly converted to the aggressive attitude and throughout the crucial period of the last two weeks in July was aligned with the military party in the Russian capital. It need not be further emphasised at this point that among all the prominent Russians of the time the zeal of Izvolski in Paris for a European war was matched only by that of the Grand Duke Nicholas at home.

VI

Inasmuch as Poincaré had probably been the chief factor and influence in leading the Russians to determine upon an immediate and actively aggressive policy in July, 1914, it was scarcely to be expected that France would vigorously oppose the Russian preparatory and mobilisation measures, even though French authorities knew that once they were started in real earnest, there was absolutely no possibility of preventing a general European war. We now have most of the dispatches exchanged between the French government and the Russian government at St. Petersburg on the subject of the military measures. There is not a single telegram in this collection which reveals any serious French effort to restrain the Russian military activity. In fact, the most important telegram was one sent by Izvolski on July 30th, stating that the French Minister of War had suggested that the Russians might well speed up their military preparations, but should be as secretive about this activity as possible, so that more time might be gained upon Germany

and no open incitement or excuse be given to the Germans for mobilisation on their part. In a number of important telegrams Izvolski described to his home government the high enthusiasm of the French government and military circles with respect to the impending war. About one A. M. the morning of August 1st, Izvolski telegraphed home that the French Ministry had revealed to him their great exuberance and enthusiasm over the final decision for war, and asked him to request the Russian government to direct their military activities against Germany rather than Austria. And at this same time Izvolski was joyously and enthusiastically admitting his part by openly boasting: *"C'est ma guerre."*

During the war the French persistently called attention to a certain phase of their pre-war military activity as a definite proof of their pacific intent. This was the famous French order of July 30th, directing the withdrawal of the frontier troops in certain sections to a line about six miles back of the boundary. As the French patrols were left at the border posts, so that they could detect any aggressive advances on the part of Germany, who in fact had not yet mobilised at all, this movement of troops did not in any way whatever reduce the military efficiency of the French defences against German invasion. The patrols were in a position to report any advance movement of German troops, and the French armies could have been marched over the intervening six miles in an hour. As an actual matter of fact, this withdrawal was a positive aid to French military preparations, as they carried on extensive preparatory activities back of the screen of the six-mile line. In some sectors it was strategically necessary to withdraw the troops in order to get them out of the way of defensive shell-fire. We now know that the whole thing was primarily a picturesque gesture to aid Sir Edward Grey and the "strong" members of the English Cabinet in duping the English Parliament and people by convincing them of the pacific and

defensive attitude of France. The French authorities recognised clearly, as their dispatches of the time indicate, that if the English people had any serious suspicions of aggressive Franco-Russian action, there would be the greatest difficulty in getting the English nation enthusiastically into the war on the side of France and Russia, and it might even be very difficult to get the English Cabinet to decide upon war. It is also necessary to remember that the withdrawal gesture was further designed to produce a favourable opinion of French official action in the minds of the French and Italian people, in order that the French might rally loyally and the Italians refuse to join Austria and Germany. There is, thus, no substantial evidence that the group in charge of French policy in July, 1914, took any significant steps whatever to avert the great catastrophe, and there is an overwhelming body of proof to support the position that they did everything possible to make the war inevitable.

The French authorities would probably have encountered great difficulty in carrying through this policy if they had gone through the usual constitutional process of putting up the matter of the declaration of war to the Chamber of Deputies, but this Poincaré and his associates carefully avoided; the Ministry itself determined independently upon war, and, after its precipitation, endeavoured with success to justify their acts to the Chamber. It needs to be pointed out here that France went beyond the terms of the Franco-Russian military convention. This promised French aid only in the event of a prior Austrian or German general mobilisation against Russia, whereas in 1914 Russia had ordered full mobilisation before either Germany or Austria had ordered mobilisation against Russia. France was not technically obligated to aid Russia under the terms of the military convention; what bound her was Poincaré's blank cheque given during his visit to St. Petersburg. This fact probably made Poincaré all the more loath to put the mat-

ter of the declaration of war before the Chamber of Deputies. The one great Frenchman living at the time who might have exposed Poincaré and his policy and aligned the majority of sane French pacific opinion against such a foolhardy determination for war, was the socialist leader, Jean Jaurès. But he was assassinated by a militant, patriotic and fanatical supporter of the Poincaré policy before he could take any effective steps in this direction.

VII

As soon as Germany discovered that Austria was determined to go ahead with the Serbian campaign regardless of consequences, and discerned that these consequences, due to the Franco-Russian procedure, would be likely to bring on a general European war, the Berlin authorities began a feverish, but unfortunately belated, effort to put pressure upon those at Vienna in order to restrain Austrian activity and secure some settlement of the situation which would prevent involving all the Great Powers in war. There is little reason to feel that the German authorities, while they may have regarded the Austrian ultimatum as too severe, were inclined to be at all worried about the vigorous Austrian policy in Serbia, provided this should not bring on a general conflict. There is, on the other hand, not the slightest particle of evidence that they were willing to have a European war precipitated over the Balkans, if the Austro-Serbian conflict could possibly be localised. The activities of the German government from July 27th to 29th were concentrated upon the effort to delay the Russians in the matter of intervention in the Austro-Serbian affair, and upon discriminating co-operation with Sid Edward Grey with the aim of bringing about discussions and negotiations between Russia and Austria. Both efforts failed. The Russian military group, now in undisputed

control of Russia, refused to be turned aside from their determination upon war. Likewise the Austrian authorities, equally set upon going ahead with the punishment of Serbia, refused to heed the Kaiser's admonitions, and even declined to answer his telegrams containing the suggestion and offer of mediation. By the 30th the Berlin authorities became highly alarmed at the prospect of war, and Bethmann-Hollweg sent a very insistent telegram, warning Austria that unless she delayed or abated her policy in Serbia the responsibility for a European war might be laid upon her shoulders. On the same day the Kaiser exclaimed in exasperation that he and his Chancellor had been asses to put their necks into a noose through the blank cheque given to Austria on the 6th of July. That the German militarists were, however, in sympathy and collusion with the Austrian war party is apparent from a telegram sent by Von Moltke to Hötzendorf at the height of the crisis, urging Conrad to stand firm in his aggressive attitude in spite of the pressure for mediation and peace by the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg.

We now know that the Austrian authorities viewed this German intercession for peace and mediation with great levity, and were thoroughly decided that nothing should turn them aside from the long-awaited opportunity to discipline Serbia and get the Balkan situation under control. What Germany might have done still further in the way of attempting to restrain Austria cannot be said, as by this time the Russian mobilisation had been ordered. As soon as this had been discovered by the Germans the only feasible German strategic policy was to warn Russia that the continuation of Russian mobilisation must be followed by a German declaration of war, a thing which the Russians from the beginning had known would be the case. One of the chief myths embodied in the Entente propaganda during the war was the allegation that at the close of July, 1914,

Austria was showing signs of weakening in her aggressive policy and of willingness to accept the Entente proposals of mediation, when Germany, fearing lest she should lose the opportunity to precipitate a world war, rushed into the breach and brutally and wantonly declared war against Russia. Nothing could be further from the actual facts in the circumstances. Up to July 31st, Austria never was in the slightest diverted from her original aggressive determination, and until Germany was confronted by the Russian mobilisation, she made sincere efforts to avert any general European conflict over the Serbian episode.

When the Kaiser learned of the Russian mobilisation, he telegraphed the Tsar, urging him to suspend the mobilisation, and warning him that if it was not suspended, Germany would be compelled to declare war upon Russia. The Tsar was obviously impressed and issued an order suspending the Russian mobilisation, but, as was pointed out above, the next day the militarists induced him to sanction the mobilisation policy, and from that time the war was actually on. Some have urged that Germany should have contented herself with mere counter-mobilisation against Russia. But every European military expert of any competence whatever has fully recognised that this policy would have been fatal for Germany, surrounded on both sides by powerful foes, and having as her chief security against the greater Russian numbers her superior mobility and power to strike with rapidity. The Franco-Russian authorities had fully reckoned with this fact, as it had been a basic consideration in their strategy to recognise that general Russian mobilisation would inevitably be followed by a speedy German declaration of war. The Kaiser's rapid and definite effort to avert the Russian general mobilisation stands out in sharp contrast to the complete absence of any such attempt on the part of Poincaré. Also the admitted perturbation, if not dismay, of the Kaiser in signing the war orders was something

far different from the exuberance and enthusiasm of Izvolski and of Poincaré and his associates when they recognised that the war was on at last.

VIII

As to England, it seems certain that, along with Germany, she was one of the two Great Powers involved in active conflict in August, 1914, who desired to preserve peace in the crisis. She was unquestionably definitely committed to France and Russia in what was for all practical purposes a defensive alliance, although Asquith and Sir Edward Grey had repeatedly denied this when questioned in the House of Commons. There is, however, nothing to lead us to believe that, if he had not been bound by fatal agreements with France and Russia, Sir Edward Grey himself would have preferred war to peace in July, 1914, though unquestionably Winston Churchill and certain of the naval clique, together with Bonar Law, Maxse and the conservative nationalists were ready for war. It must also be remembered that Grey had been forced into the unpopular agreement with Russia and France chiefly by the sinister influence of Holstein in leading Bülow to reject the British advances towards a better understanding with Germany, and by the foolish and menacing naval policy of Von Tirpitz.

If Germany had not invaded Belgium, but had merely defended herself on the western front against French invasion, it is possible that the English Cabinet would not have been able to enter war on the side of France and Russia; indeed, it is likely that if they had done so, popular opposition would have paralysed their efforts. It is true that Sir Edward Grey offered several suggestions as to mediation, but his policy throughout the crisis was vacillating and weak. Having sown the wind between 1910 and 1914, he found it difficult to avoid reaping the whirlwind in 1914. His chief potential trump card which he might have played at the time

would have been an early warning of Germany that an aggressive campaign on her part in the west, and particularly an invasion of Belgium, would certainly bring about English intervention on the side of the Dual Alliance. If he had issued such a warning to Germany in decisive terms around the 25th or 26th of July, it is probable that Germany would, even earlier than she did, have taken such steps as would have still further restrained Austria and made it more difficult for France and Russia to enlist the aid of England.

But the most damaging indictment against Sir Edward Grey is that he did not put any effective restraint upon Russia or France in their aggressive action following Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburg, and actually seems to have had a strong positive influence upon the final decision of the Russians to go ahead with the fatal general mobilisation. In spite of the fact that Buchanan, the English ambassador at St. Petersburg, was urging caution on the Russians, Grey, as early as July 25th, told Benckendorff, the Russian ambassador at London, that he believed that the nature of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia would make it necessary for Russia to mobilise against Austria. This led Sazonov and the Russians to feel at this early date that they could surely count on English as well as French support in their projected military measures which they knew would inevitably bring on a European war. No fair-minded historian can well doubt that Sir Edward Grey had earnestly worked for some pacific adjustment of European difficulties in the period following 1908, or that he was probably the best-intentioned foreign secretary in any major state in Europe in 1914. At the same time, no one who has consulted the works of Loreburn, Morel, Henderson and Ewart can well maintain that he behaved as a sincere, devoted and astute champion of peace in the crisis of the early summer of 1914. He must now be included as second only to the

French, Russian and Austrian statesmen in degree of actual and immediate responsibility for the world conflict.

It must also, of course, be recognised that Grey was a somewhat weak and vacillating character, rather ignorant of the details of foreign policy and diplomatic problems. Like Berchtold, he was wont to rely for advice upon his under-secretaries. Of these, Sir Arthur Nicolson, former ambassador at St. Petersburg, a favourite of the Tsar, and a traditional diplomat and militarist, was the most important. Grey admitted that he had been made Under-Secretary in 1910 in order to strengthen the ties between England and Russia. There is little doubt that Grey was as much influenced by Nicolson in his decisions of July, 1914, as was Berchtold by Forgách, Hoyos and others. That Grey did, however, take credit personally for bringing England into the war is apparent from the following telegram of Benckendorff to Sazonov (in the Italian archives):

> Let me add for your most personal information that there is a feeling that Grey carries about almost incessantly, and one which is well founded up to a certain point; namely, that at the moment of indecision of the British public and of the whole ministry, Grey it was, more than anyone, who dragged England into the war, and for that reason he always feels a sense of the deepest responsibility, apart from that of the Cabinet. Still I don't see any symptoms that his energy of decision is affected by it.

In his "Memoirs" Grey admits that he would have resigned if he had not been able to swing England for war.

The delicate and embarrassing situation in which the imminence of war placed the British Cabinet, some of the most eminent members of which resigned rather than participate in any declaration of war, was suddenly removed by what was for Asquith and Grey the heaven-sent episode of the German invasion of Belgium. It seems highly probable that the British Cabinet would have tried to force the country into war irrespective of the invasion of Belgium,

but the actual invasion saved them from a crisis by arousing British indignation, and it put the country rather solidly behind the government in support of active intervention in behalf of the Entente. It should be pointed out, however, that there was no particular ground for ultra-sensitiveness in the British conscience with respect to the German invasion of Belgium. On two earlier occasions, namely, in 1870 and 1887, the British government and British opinion had repudiated any idea of the definite obligation of Great Britain to protect the existing neutrality of Belgium. England had also, in the decade before the war, made repeated, if futile, efforts to secure Belgian consent to the landing of British troops on Belgian soil in the event of war between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. It should further be emphasised that the conduct of Great Britain during the World War was scarcely in line with what would naturally have been expected of a country which entered the conflict primarily to sanctify the cause of neutral rights, international law and international obligations. She bulldozed Greece into the war by methods comparable to those used by Germany in Belgium, and her procedure with respect to the international law of blockade, contraband and continuous voyage was such as to constitute most flagrant violations of international law in these fields. The British assaults upon neutral rights during the war are among the darkest of the blots upon the Allied conduct during this period.

IX

Italy, along with Belgium, may be freed of any responsibility whatsoever for the outbreak of the war. Italy, after the war had actually started, quite naturally and properly considered which group of combatants seemed likely to offer the most favourable opportunities and results from aid and intervention, and joined the Entente because she

felt she had the most to gain thereby. Nevertheless, in the crisis of July, 1914, she was distinctly favourable to peace and, as Morhardt has shown, offered the most attractive and feasible plan of mediation and arbitration of the Serbian issue set forth by any great European Power. It has frequently been charged that, whatever the other facts in the circumstances connected with the outbreak of the World War in 1914, certainly Germany and Austria were the most stubborn and determined in rejecting arbitration and mediation. This is no more true than the other phases of the earlier opinion of war responsibility. It is true that Austria rejected all schemes for arbitration which looked to any intervention of other Powers in her treatment of Serbia, but it is equally true that the Russians were as determined and precipitate in regard to their mobilisation in defence of Serbia. Sazonov categorically announced at the outset that Russia would tolerate no restraint in her policy towards Austria and Serbia. And if Germany declined to accept some of Sir Edward Grey's earlier plans for an arbitration of the Serbian controversy which were disapproved by her ally, Austria, an equally damaging and indictment can be made of the Entente for its refusal to consider seriously the very attractive Italian plan for a satisfactory arbitration of the Balkan dispute. And France and Russia refused Grey's proposal to submit the Austro-Russian dispute to mediation.

It has been held to be a difficult thing to state with any mathematical precision the order of responsibility attaching to the various European Powers for the outbreak of the World War, but it would seem that the evidence is so clear and the information so adequate that we can now scarcely err in this respect. It would appear that France and Russia must unquestionably be regarded as tied for first place,

with Austria, Germany and England following in the order named. Of course, if one desired to include the lesser Powers as well, the first place in the immediate responsibility for the war would have to be assigned to Serbia, though her action in producing the assassination of the Archduke would have had little European significance without the aggressive intervention of Russia encouraged by Poincaré.

But fully as important as the individual responsibility of nations was the basic responsibility of the European system of secret alliances, nationalism, militarism and imperialism. Far from being a guarantee of peace, the balance of power in Europe, as represented by the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, was, as Professor Schmitt has so clearly shown, a guarantee of almost inevitable war as soon as a crisis of sufficient proportions should bring these two great coalitions in sharp and active conflict.

Significant as the system of militarism and secret alliances may have been in making possible the World War, we must not, however, accept the fatalistic thesis of the inevitability of the conflict. The same "system" had existed for a generation before 1914, and it had not produced war in any of the earlier crises, however close war may have been at these other times. The system was so manipulated by specific individuals in 1914 as to bring on the great calamity of the four succeeding years, with its disastrous aftermath. It is a recognition of this fact which justifies the above analysis of this manipulation and direction of the European situation in the crisis of 1914. Any hope of permanent peace must involve an elimination both of international systems which invite duplicity, aggression and force, and of leaders so minded as to wish to exploit this favourable opportunity in the direction of the spirit and practices of war and militarism.

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL READING

A History of Modern Europe, 1792–1878. By C. A. Fyffe. New York: Henry Holt, 1896, 1088 pp.

A thorough, scholarly, generally reliable and readable history of modern Europe, with emphasis upon politics and diplomacy.

A History of Modern Europe, 1878–1919. By G. P. Gooch. New York: Henry Holt, 1923, 728 pp.

A supplement to Fyffe, bringing the material through the World War, by one of the fairest and most distinguished of living historians. This book is the best existing history of the diplomatic background of the World War.

The Historical Development of Modern Europe, 1815–1897. By Charles M. Andrews. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1899, 2 Vols., 457, 467 pp.

An admirably written general treatise. It is the best work of the kind in English on the political trends in the Nineteenth Century, particularly the struggle between absolutism and liberalism.

World History, 1815–1920. By Eduard Fueter. Translated by S. B. Fay. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922, 490 pp.

A work by a scholarly and original Swiss historian. The best single-volume history of the last century for one already conversant with the salient facts of the period. A brilliant and thoughtful interpretation of the age since Waterloo.

A Political and Social History of Modern Europe. Vol. II. By Carlton J. H. Hayes. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924, 905 pp.

The most successful attempt to date in the writing of a college text-book which indicates the economic and social basis of European political history. The text is unusually full and fair on international relations and world politics.

An Introduction to World Politics. By Herbert Adams Gibbons. New York: The Century Company, 1922, 595 pp.

An interestingly written and reasonably reliable work on world politics and diplomatic negotiations since about 1878.

Imperialism and World Politics. By Parker T. Moon. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925.

The best general manual in English on the expansion of Europe since 1870.

A History of European Diplomacy, 1815–1914. By R. B. Mowat. London: Edward Arnold and Company, 1922, 308 pp.

A good brief account of diplomatic history. Unreliable on the immediate causes of the World War.

A History of the Balkan Peninsula. By Ferdinand Schevill. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922, 558 pp.

The only adequate work on the subject in English. Reliable, though not always easy reading.

Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway. By Edward Mead Earle. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923, 364 pp.

An excellent and very interesting account of the Near East in contemporary diplomacy.

The Case for the Central Powers. By Count Max Montgelas. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925, 255 pp.

This work, by a distinguished German, is fair and objective, and the best single volume on the immediate causes of the World War as yet (1925) available in English. The German title, *Leading Threads in the Problem of War Guilt,* is more accurately descriptive of the content.

Les Origines Immédiates de la Guerre. By Pierre Renouvin. Paris: Costes, 292 pp.

The most thorough account of the diplomatic crisis of 1914. By a distinguished French authority. It is the French counterpart of Montgelas. An English translation is promised by Knopf.

The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1914–1918. By Sir John S. Ewart. New York: George H. Doran Company, 2 Vols., 1925. 1204 pp.

The most extensive and complete work in English on the immediate causes of the World War. It also deals with most of the remote diplomatic and economic causes in the period since 1870. It is the work of one of the most distinguished of Canadian jurists, and constitutes the most impressive statement yet presented of the Revisionist point of view. It is the first thorough annihilation of the war mythology and propaganda concerning war origins yet published in any language. It is somewhat weak on the Russian and German materials, but the documents he has overlooked actually strengthen his conclusions. It should be supplemented by Professor Fay's articles on Serbia in the New York Times *Current History* for October and November, 1925.

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